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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS ON CEO CHARACTERISTICS AND CORPORATE DECISIONS 
Trung Nguyen 
Old Dominion University, 2019 
Director: Dr. John A. Doukas 
 
 Recent studies have stressed the importance of managerial fixed effects on firm investment 
decisions. Following this stream of research, this dissertation empirically investigates the potential 
effects of two major Chief Executive Officer (CEO) characteristics, i.e. risk preferences and 
potential mobility, on corporate decisions such as merger and acquisition (M&A) and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) investments. 
Essay 1 examines whether the variation of M&A stock returns around the 2008 financial 
crisis is associated with shareholders’ increased loss aversion as a result of undergoing financial 
losses. The results show that acquisitions carried out by CEOs with risk-averse inducing 
compensation (inside debt) before and during the financial crisis creates greater shareholder gains 
than counterpart M&As by CEOs with risk-seeking (convex) compensation. However, this pattern 
is reversed in the post-crisis period, suggesting that equity holders’ risk tolerance is amplified after 
the financial crisis, consistent with the prospect theory predicting that economic agents become 
more risk-seeking subsequent to suffering a financial loss. 
Essay 2 investigates shareholder reactions to CSR investments undertaken by firms under 
the helm of CEOs with risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation contracts. The evidence 
shows that CSR announcements carried out by CEOs with risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing 
compensation generate higher (lower) cumulative abnormal returns and post-CSR long-term 
performance. This pattern holds under a battery of robustness checks. In addition, firms led by 
CEOs with risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation contracts are less (more) likely to 
engage in excessive CSR decisions and associated with greater (lower) CSR information 
disclosure and improved financial performance. 
Essay 3 explores the impact of CEO mobility on M&As. Using ability and willingness to 
switch jobs as a proxy for CEO mobility, the evidence shows that acquiring CEOs’ mobility has a 
positive effect on the propensity to engage in value-increasing M&A deals. In addition, acquiring 
firms led by more (less) mobile CEOs are associated with higher (lower) short-term shareholder 
gains, realize better (worse) post-M&A long-term performance, and tend to use cash (stock) to 
finance M&A transactions. The empirical results are robust to potential omitted variable bias and 
self-selection bias. 
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the finance and business literature by reconciling 
some of the gaps left by prior studies based on unexplored thus far key managerial characteristics 
that truly matter in corporate decision making. Furthermore, this work empirically validates and 
refines recently proposed measures of CEO potential mobility that can potentially be used to 
address additional research issues in the future. 
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ESSAY 1:  SHAREHOLDER REACTIONS TO ACQUISITIONS AROUND THE 
REALM OF HIGH UNCERTAINTY 
INTRODUCTION 
A key focus of research in corporate finance is whether mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
create or destroy value. A considerable body of research concludes that most mergers do not create 
value for anyone, except perhaps the investment bankers that negotiate the deals. This study 
examines whether chief executive officers’ (CEOs) risk preferences can provide new insights into 
the motives and the likelihood of creating value though M&As. This is inspired by the well-
documented fact that CEO heterogeneous traits do matter to firm corporate policies and 
performance (e.g., Williamson 1963; Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Aghion and Tirole 1997; 
Shivdasani and Yermack 1999; Bertrand and Schoar 2003). Among these characteristics, CEO risk 
preferences have drawn extraordinary amounts of research attention in recent years (Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen 2006; Edmans and Liu 2011; Wei and Yermack 2011; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and 
Stuart 2012; Liu, Mauer, and Zhang 2012; Phan 2014; Srivastav, Armitage, and Hagendorff 2014; 
Caliskan and Doukas 2015; Graham, Harvey, and Puri 2015). On average, a manager is believed 
to be risk-averse because his or her portfolio is generally less diversified than that of stockholders. 
From a theoretical standpoint, standard agency theory suggests that CEO risk preferences can be 
affected by the nature of CEO compensation packages (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986; 
Jensen and Murphy 1990). Specifically, a typical CEO will become more risk-averse (risk-
seeking) and be less (more) likely to engage in risky projects in accordance with the CEO’s 
compensation design. From a practical perspective, a recent survey-based research by Graham, 
Harvey, and Puri (2013) finds that CEO risk preferences are indeed tied to the CEO’s own level 
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of compensation. Furthermore, this survey demonstrates that CEO risk preferences are closely 
related to corporate financial policies. 
Consistent with this evidence, Cassell et al. (2012) investigate the effects of CEO risk 
preferences on corporate policies and find that generally CEO inside debt holdings (i.e., risk-averse 
encouraging compensation packages) induce them to pursue less risky investment and financial 
policies. In addition, Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2014) find that inside debt helps resolve agency cost 
of debt but at the detriment of shareholders’ interests by encouraging CEOs to maintain excess 
cash holdings. Major investment decisions made by risk-seeking CEOs are expected to be favored 
by equity holders, but disfavored by bondholders. Wei and Yermack (2011) find evidence 
consistent with this argument, with the bond (equity) market perceiving inside debt disclosure by 
U.S. firms in 2007 positively (negatively). Several other studies also find a negative relation 
between CEO risk aversion (i.e., inside debt) and accounting conservatism, the cost of debt, the 
issuance of convertible bonds, and the usage of restrictive covenants in debt contracts (Chava, 
Kumar, and Warga 2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang 2010; Wang, Xie, and Xin 2010, 2013; Li, Rhee, 
and Shen 2018). Furthermore, firms with higher CEO inside debt holdings are likely to have 
greater firm liquidation value and narrower credit default swap spreads (Chen et al. 2010; Bolton, 
Mehran, and Shapiro 2015). In terms of dividend policies and payouts, Caliskan and Doukas 
(2015) document that dividend payouts are positively associated with higher CEO inside debt 
while convex CEO compensation decreases dividend payouts. In other words, it seems that risk-
averse CEOs are willing to forgo growth (risky) opportunities in favor of more dividend payouts 
as their compensation is loaded with greater inside debt. Srivastav et al. (2014), in the regulated 
banking industry, instead report that CEOs with higher relative leverage (risk aversion) are more 
likely to reduce payouts to shareholders, which supports the view that inside debt aligns CEO 
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interests with the interests of bondholders, since the distribution of dividends to shareholders is 
against creditors’ interests. 
In this study, we add to the current stream of research by examining the impact of CEO 
risk preferences on the nature and outcomes of M&As, the most visible and important investment 
decisions CEOs can make. The Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances has documented 
that over 44,000 transactions have been announced worldwide with a total market value of more 
than 4.5 trillion USD in 2015.1 Highlighting the risks associated with M&A decisions, Furfine and 
Rosen (2011) argue that such investments tend to intensify the acquirer’s default risk, on average. 
Given the vital importance of this form of corporate investment, research scholars have 
investigated its potential antecedents. 
Although a larger number of M&A studies over the last three decades has identified several 
determinants of acquirer performance, the overall variation in acquisition returns remains largely 
unexplained. Specifically, a widely cited study by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) 
examines over 12,000 M&A deals and, despite employing an extensive list of determinants, is able 
to explain just over 5% of the variation in acquirer returns (as judged by the adjusted R2 values of 
their main regression models). Similarly, studies with smaller samples such as those of Masulis, 
Wang, and Xie (2007) and Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2012) report comparably low 
explanatory powers. In contrast to the common belief that mergers fail to deliver value, anecdotal 
evidence indicates persistent acquisition successes. For example, Cisco Systems, Berkshire 
Hathaway, IBM, General Electric, and Diageo are some noteworthy examples of frequent 
acquirers that most observers consider as having been consistently successful in their acquisitions. 
                                                          
1 More information is available at https://imaa-institute.org/statistics-mergers-acquisitions/. 
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Therefore, we examine whether CEO risk preferences, gauged through the manager’s 
unfunded and unsecured inside debt holdings, in addition to the exhaustive list of factors 
mentioned above, can potentially explain the variation of M&A stock returns documented in the 
previous literature. Moreover, while CEO risk preferences could play an important role, changes 
in investors’ risk tolerance in response to a rare event such as the 2008 financial crisis could also 
influence market reactions to M&A announcements. Cognizant of and motivated by recent studies 
(Wei and Yermack 2011; Phan 2014; Campbell, Galpin, and Johnson 2016) documenting that 
shareholders discern and react to disclosure of CEO inside debt compensation, we argue that 
shareholder reactions to M&As consummated by high (vs. low) inside debt CEOs could also 
change after the financial crisis in response to realizing financial losses during the crisis in accord 
with the prediction of prospect theory. The importance of changes in investor risk preferences 
around the crisis (financial loss) is suggested by prospect theory which predicts that economic 
agents when suffering a financial loss, tend to increase their risk tolerance (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Kahneman and Tversky 1984). That is, shareholders are expected to be much more risk-
seeking in the realm of losses where they are much more likely to take risks in order to recoup 
previous losses or to recover from a loss in order to revert to a previous position by favoring M&A 
decisions carried out by CEOs with risk-seeking (convex) compensations. Hence, the 2008 
financial crisis allows us to directly examine whether investor risk tolerance changed by focusing 
on equity market reactions to M&A decisions before, during and after the financial crisis.  
Our study extends the discussion in the literature in two directions. First, recent studies on 
inside debt are subject to the pre-2006 limitation of pension and deferred compensation data.  More 
important, they rely on post-2006 pension and deferred compensation data rather than the 
compensation portion of supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs), a more accurate 
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indicator of the unfunded component of inside debt. Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong (2013) show 
that total inside debt may not be able to serve its intended purpose - the incentive-alignment effect 
- because the three components of inside debt can be starkly different. Specifically, only the 
compensation portion of SERPs is considered unfunded and unsecured, whereas rank-and-file 
plans and other deferred compensation plans are more secure or can be withdrawn at a more 
convenient time. If a significant portion of a manager’s inside debt is based on SERPs, one would 
expect this to be a better measure of risk aversion. Otherwise, a CEO might still exhibit risk-
seeking behavior despite being exposed to a high level of overall inside debt holdings. Consistent 
with this view, Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova (2013) document a negative association between 
defined benefit pensions and bond yield spread. Similarly, Choy, Lin, and Officer (2014) find that 
freezing only defined benefit pension plans is still associated with higher firm equity risk and firm 
credit risk in subsequent periods. In addition, there is theoretical and empirical evidence against 
the effectiveness of deferred compensation in mitigating risk-taking behavior (Wang et al. 2010; 
Lee and Tang 2011; Inderst and Pfeil 2012; Leisen 2015). For instance, with respect to bonus 
compensation, according to the conceptual model of Leisen (2015) a deferral could inherently 
increase risk-taking. 
Second, although a negative relation between CEO risk aversion and shareholder reactions 
to M&A announcements has been reported in previous studies (Liu et al. 2012; Phan 2014), how 
changes in both managers’ and shareholders’ risk preferences due to an extreme exogenous shock 
influence the nature of M&A decisions and shareholder reactions to such corporate events remains 
relatively unexplored and warrants further investigation. In this study we address this issue by 
focusing on the recent financial crisis, undoubtedly a rare and major exogenous financial event 
that forced the global financial market to cave in resulting in huge firm and shareholder financial 
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losses. The intuition behind this examination is that economic agents’ risk preferences, according 
to the prospect theory, are shaped by their past economic gains or losses. Hence, the recent 
financial crisis offers a unique testing ground to examine the validity of this prediction in the 
context of M&A decisions. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to argue that an extremely rare and 
catastrophic economic event such as the 2008 financial crisis can alter CEO attitudes towards risk, 
and subsequently affect their investment and other corporate decisions. Similarly, investors’ risk 
perception and risk tolerance are unlikely to remain unchanged after the financial crisis (Campello, 
Graham, and Harvey 2010; Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy 2010; Campello, Giambona, Graham, and 
Harvey 2011; Bucher-Koenen and Ziegelmeyer 2013; Hoffmann, Post, and Pennings 2013; 
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga 2015). Recent empirical evidence documents that people who 
experienced a major shock in their life tend to become more risk-averse (e.g., Kuhnen and Knutson 
2011; Malmendier and Nagel 2011; Cohn, Fehr, and Maréchal 2012). For instance, according to 
Malmendier and Nagel (2011), individuals who went through periods of low stock market returns 
during their early years are less likely to take financial risks. They are more likely to be pessimistic 
about future stock returns, more reluctant to participate in the stock market, and allocate a smaller 
portion of their liquid assets to stocks (if they decide to participate). Similarly, CEOs that grew up 
during the Great Depression are averse to debt and excessively in favor of internal finance 
(Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2011). Using German Sparen und AltersVersorgE (SAVE) survey 
data, Necker and Ziegelmeyer (2016) find households that experienced financial losses as a result 
of the 2008 financial crisis tend to be less risk tolerant. Hence, while our study relates to the 
previous literature that examines the impact of agents’ negative past experiences on their current 
decisions, we use the recent financial crisis as the focal point of our analysis to investigate whether 
the risk-tolerance of corporate managers and investors changed subsequent to the financial crisis 
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in line with the conjecture of prospect theory. More specifically, we are interested in examining 
the premise of prospect theory which predicts that economic agents who experience major 
financial losses tend to increase their risk tolerance (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman and 
Tversky 1984). 
Jointly, the research question whether CEO and investor risk preferences matter in the 
context of M&As deserves additional empirical investigation conditional on an exogenous event 
such as the 2008 financial crisis. In this paper, to address the two above concerns, we adopt and 
employ two SERP-based measures of CEO risk aversion in conjunction with the traditional ones 
that depend on both SERP and deferred compensation, and jointly examine whether equity 
holders’ reactions to M&A announcements were influenced by their exposure to the 2008 financial 
crisis. Our M&A sample is restricted to 2003–20152, mainly due to the time and cost of manually 
collecting pension data via the companies’ annual proxy statements. Furthermore, the start of the 
sample period is justified by the need to exclude any potential effects caused by the 2001 tech 
bubble. Using a comprehensive sample of 1,929 takeover bid announcements by 417 unique public 
U.S. firms, we find that CEO risk preferences are significantly associated with acquisition 
announcement cumulative abnormal stock returns conditional on the financial crisis. Specifically, 
the results of the univariate analysis, show that M&A carried out by risk-seeking and risk-averse 
CEOs led to short-term shareholder gains before the financial crisis. However, equity investors 
reacted positively (negatively) to M&A announcements associated with risk-averse (risk-seeking) 
CEOs during the wake of the financial crisis. In stark contrast with the widely accepted notion that 
shareholders are less likely to favor risk-reducing CEO compensation packages (i.e., inside debt), 
because they motivate the undertaking of risk averse corporate decisions, our evidence suggests 
                                                          
2 For data merging procedure, the pension data is from 2002 to 2015. 
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that CEO inside-debt compensation acts to the benefit of shareholders in devastating financial 
times, such as the recent global financial crisis. 
After 2009, more importantly, the equity market’s reaction to M&A announcements linked 
with risk-averse (risk-seeking) CEOs is less (more) positive. Collectively, the evidence suggests 
that the post-2009 behavior of both risk-seeking CEOs and equity investors seems to defy the view 
in the literature that individuals who were exposed to exceptionally bad times tend to act cautiously 
(conservatively) subsequently. Rather, their behavior is more likely to be consistent with prospect 
theory (betting behavior). Specifically, equity investors appear willing to place bets on post-2009 
M&A activities pursued by risk-seeking CEOs, since they hope that these investment decisions 
will not only restore but also substantially grow bidders’ future value, resulting in positive 
announcement excess returns considerably greater than those in the pre-2009 period. 
These results also survive a battery of robustness tests such as alternative proxies of M&A 
short-term stock performance, CEO risk aversion, and subsample analyses. Additionally, empirical 
investigation of acquirers’ buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns post-2009 lends further support 
to the betting attitude story, since M&As pursued by risk-seeking CEOs lead to lower long-term 
performance than the ones initiated by risk-averse CEOs. Collectively, our results are consistent 
with prospect theory predicting that economic agents who experience a financial loss tend to 
become more risk tolerant afterwards (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman and Tversky 
1984) by betting on the outcomes of riskier investment decisions. Furthermore, we replicate the 
analysis of Wei and Yermack (2011) for the 2009–2015 period and find that, after the financial 
crisis, equity investors also react negatively to firm annual proxy statement disclosures, indicating 
an increase in CEO relative leverage ratios (i.e., when CEOs become more risk-averse) among 
firms with at least 1 billion USD in market capitalization.  
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In summary, we document that equity market reactions to M&As are not uniform but vary 
with CEO risk preferences and changes in shareholder risk preference around the 2008 financial 
crisis. More importantly, our evidence demonstrates that equity holders who experienced the 
financial calamity of the 2008 financial crisis, exhibited more risk-tolerant (gambling) behavior in 
the post-2008 financial crisis than before with equity investors betting on and overestimating the 
future gains of M&A deals announced by risk-seeking CEOs after the financial crisis. On the other 
hand, unreported results show bondholders consistently placed a premium (discount) on M&A 
announcements made by risk-averse (risk-seeking) CEOs before, during and after the 2008 
financial crisis.3 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the research 
methodology. Section 3 reports the univariate and multivariate results of acquirers’ cumulative 
abnormal stock returns as well as additional robustness tests. Section 4 presents supplemental 
analyses. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
METHODOLOGY 
Data collection 
We utilize different secondary sources to compile the data of our sample. From the 
Thomson One M&A database, we extract M&A deals announced by U.S. public firms with non-
negative common equity between 2003 and 2015. To construct the final sample of successful 
M&A announcements, we impose the following restrictions (Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and 
Teoh 2006; Liu et al. 2012; Phan 2014): First, the emphasis of our empirical analysis is on M&A 
activities conducted by non-financial and non-utility firms in the United States; therefore, we do 
not consider announcements made by acquirers with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 
                                                          
3 These results are available upon request. 
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that range from 4900 to 4999 or from 6000 to 6999. Second, an announcement is included in the 
final sample only if the transaction value is at least 5 million USD and the transaction value scaled 
by acquirers’ total assets is greater than or equal 0.1%. (Cai and Sevilir 2012; Huang and Tung 
2016). This restriction ensures that our M&A sample only comprises successful announcements 
that are likely to have a tangible impact on acquirers and their shareholders. The final M&A sample 
consists of 1,929 successful deal announcements made by 417 unique acquirers (or 586 unique 
CEOs). 
Variable description 
Cumulative abnormal stock returns 
For each M&A deal, we follow the standard event study procedure to estimate acquirer 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement (Eckbo 2009; Wei and Yermack 
2011). The cumulative abnormal stock return is calculated as the sum of several daily abnormal 
returns for a two-day window (i.e., from t = 0 to t = 1) around the announcement date. We estimate 
daily abnormal stock returns using the one-factor model (Sharpe 1964).  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) +  𝑖,𝑡 
The acquirers’ daily stock returns are obtained from the Center for Research in Securities 
Prices (CRSP). We calculate the coefficient estimate (𝛽) of the market risk premium (Rm,t – Rf,t), 
using the estimation period from t = -251 to t = -11 relative to the M&A announcement date for 
each acquirer. The daily abnormal stock return (ARi,t or 𝑖,𝑡) is the difference between the actual 
return and the return predicted by the one-factor model.4 
                                                          
4 The results are similar when we employ the four-factor model and are available upon request. 
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CEO risk preferences 
Since pension and deferred compensation data became publicly available after the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s 2006 disclosure requirement, previous studies (Sundaram 
and Yermack 2007; Edmans and Liu 2011; Wei and Yermack 2011) have recommended the use 
of such information to better estimate the degree of CEO risk preferences. Because of the unfunded 
and unsecured nature of pension and deferred compensation (or so-called inside debt), a CEO 
whose compensation structure tilts toward these two debt-based components is exposed to default 
risk comparable to that faced by bondholders, and the CEO is expected to display a higher level 
of risk aversion. Accordingly, previous studies have used CEO relative leverage and CEO relative 
incentive to identify whether a manager is risk averse or risk seeking. A CEO is expected to be 
more risk-averse if exposed to a higher level of relative leverage or relative incentive (Edmans and 
Liu 2011; Wei and Yermack 2011). Specifically, CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt 
divided by CEO inside equity scaled by firm leverage while CEO relative incentive is the ratio of 
the change in CEO inside debt to the change of CEO inside equity scaled by the change in firm 
leverage. 
However, information about CEO pension and deferred compensation was not made 
available until 2006, which further limits the estimation of CEO risk preferences prior to 2006 
from the Securities and Exchange Commission data source. A possible remedy is the collection of 
this information from the listed companies’ annual proxy statements (i.e., form DEF 14A). In an 
ideal scenario, we should be able to compute both pension and deferred compensation values for 
a CEO, using information from such statements. Because deferred compensation was disclosed 
with extremely limited information prior to 2006, we can only construct CEO risk preferences 
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measures by relying on the estimation of pension values from 2002 to 2005.5 To estimate the CEO 
pension data for 2002–2005, we strictly adopt the methodology proposed by Sundaram and 
Yermack (2007). All the necessary inputs are extracted directly from the company’s annual proxy 
statements. Given this information, we calculate the annual actuarial present value of each CEO’s 
pension for 2002–2005. 
Another problem with these two inside debt measures of CEO risk preferences is that they 
do not address the opposing effects of the components of inside debt, that is, pension versus 
deferred compensation. According to Anantharaman et al. (2013), despite sharing similar 
characteristics, deferred compensations differ from SERPs in terms of withdrawal flexibility and 
payment form. Essentially, deferred compensations are less likely to align CEO interests with those 
of creditors. Following Anantharaman et al. (2013), we use CEO relative leverage (SERP) and 
CEO relative incentive (SERP), as alternative measures, to control for this issue. As the terms 
indicate, these two alternatives are identical to the proxies above, that is, CEO relative leverage 
and CEO relative incentive, except that deferred compensation is excluded from the numerator. 
Throughout our empirical analysis, CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive 
(SERP) serve as our primary proxies of CEO risk preferences.6 
Control variables 
In the multivariate analysis, we include several control variables. Specifically, the Pre-
crisis dummy is set equal to one if the M&A announcement occurred before 12/31/2007, and zero 
otherwise. The During-crisis dummy takes the value of one if a takeover deal is announced 
between 12/31/2007 and 06/30/2009, and zero otherwise. The Post-crisis is a dummy that takes 
                                                          
5 A comprehensive and exhaustive discussion of this issue is provided by Sundaram and Yermack (2007). 
6 Following previous studies, we only consider acquiring CEOs with positive values for these two proxies (Wei and 
Yermack 2011; Cassell et al. 2012; Phan 2014). 
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the value of one if a M&A deal is announced after 06/30/2009, and zero otherwise.7 In terms of 
CEO characteristics, we control for CEO age and CEO compensation after logarithmic 
transformation. Following previous studies (Andre, Kooli, and L'her 2004; Coles et al. 2006; 
Cassell et al. 2012; Phan 2014), for firm characteristics, we incorporate firm size, the firm’s 
market-to-book ratio, and the firm’s financial leverage into the model specifications. The related 
items are extracted directly from the Compustat database. Concerning deal characteristics, in 
addition, we control for the method of payment, that is, stock deal, friendly deal, private target, 
public target, as well as industry and international diversifications. Additionally, we account for 
the effect of the relative deal value, which is defined as the deal transaction in U.S. dollars, scaled 
by the acquirer’s total assets. A detailed description of these variables is provided in Appendix 1.1. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1.1 reports the annual number and percentage of successful M&A announcements 
made by U.S firms in our sample. The number of successful M&A announcements is evenly spread 
across the sample period. However, the total number of M&A announcements in our sample 
slightly declines from 208 deals in 2006 to 124 deals in 2009. If the financial crisis leaves a bad 
impression among managers, we would expect a major decline in the ratio of M&As conducted by 
risk-seeking CEOs to the total after the financial collapse of the markets. However, closer 
examination reveals that the annual number of M&As conducted by risk-seeking CEOs does not 
seem to drop dramatically, even after the financial crisis. Rather, the average percentage of annual 
M&A activities of risk-seeking CEOs are maintained at more or less the same level, that is, around 
76% pre-2007 as opposed to 71% post-2009. 
                                                          
7 12/31/2007 (06/30/2009) indicates the first (last) date of the 2008 financial crisis according to the business cycles of 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The related information can be retrieved from: 
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. 
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[Insert Table 1.1 about here] 
In addition, the table shows the average of several items in terms of the CEO’s 
compensation structure. As in previous studies, the majority of CEO compensation portfolios in 
our sample consist of stock and option holdings. For instance, in 2008, CEO inside debt constituted 
less than approximately 20% of CEO inside equity. Consistent with the number of M&A 
announcements, average CEO stock and option holdings also experienced a significant drop in 
2007 – 2009 period. 
[Insert Table 1.2 about here] 
 Table 1.2 reports the descriptive statistics of all the right-hand side variables used in our 
empirical analysis. Panel A reports acquirer and M&A characteristics while Panel B shows the 
statistics for CEO characteristics. According to Panel A, 35.04% of our M&A sample consists of 
internationally diversified deals, while around 45.20% of the sample represents industrially 
diversified deals. About 39.40% of the deals are made before 12/31/2007 while approximately 
50.60% of the M&A announcements occurred after 06/30/2009. The average transaction value is 
around 10.08% of the acquirer’s total assets. Consistent with previous studies, more than 30% 
(27%) of the announcements involve private (public) targets whereas less than 43% of the sample 
involves other form of targets as specified by Thomson One. Of the final sample, there are only 
4.15% of the takeover deals whose at least 30% of transaction value is finalized with stock. Similar 
to previous studies, the average acquirer in our sample is overvalued and has a market-to-book 
ratio of 1.8155 (Liu et al. 2012; Phan 2014). The average of the logarithm of CEO age is 4.0290, 
that is, slightly higher than its median (4.0254). The means of our two primary measures of CEO 
risk preferences are 0.8152 and 0.6807, respectively. Including CEO deferred compensation into 
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Acquirer CARs and CEO risk preferences: Risk-seeking versus risk-averse CEOs 
 In this section, we first investigate the average reaction of equity holders to M&A 
announcements estimated by the one-factor model for the entire sample period. Column (A1) of 
Table 1.3 reports the means, standard deviations and number of observations for the full sample. 
The acquirers’ CAR[0,+1] is positive and significant at 1% for the entire sample period. In 
particular, acquirers earn 0.63% cumulative abnormal stock returns during the two days around 
the event. Although the figure is generally consistent with recent papers (Liu et al. 2012; Phan 
2014), it differs from previous empirical work (e.g.,Doukas and Travlos 1988; Dong et al. 2006) 
reporting that M&As are, on average, value-destroying events. Therefore, we conduct an 
additional analysis to address this issue and find that the difference is mainly due to the uneven 
distribution of the method of payment in our sample. According to the literature, M&As financed 
with stock tend to have lower or even negative cumulative abnormal stock returns than cash 
acquisitions. As reported in Table 1.2, however, less than 5% of the deals included in our sample 
whose at least 30% of transaction value is paid with stock. Hence, our results and most likely those 
of recent work are probably attributed to the lower use of the stock method of payment (Fuller, 
Netter, and Stegemoller 2002; Masulis et al. 2007; Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki 2011; Duchin 
and Schmidt 2013; John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva 2015; Schmidt 2015).8 To confirm this, we 
                                                          
8 In their comprehensive analysis of U.S. M&As from 1992 to 2009, Netter et al. (2011) intensively discuss how 
sample screenings can affect acquirers’ short-term performance. 
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examine acquirers’ cumulative abnormal stock returns by method of payment (not tabulated here 
for brevity but available upon request) and find the average CAR[0,+1] to be positive for cash 
deals, whereas the corresponding average for stock acquisitions is negative, which is consistent 
with the earlier acquisition literature. For instance, the average CAR for stock acquisitions is -
1.49% (statistically significant at 5%), whereas that of cash deals is 0.72% (statistically significant 
at 1%).  
[Insert Table 1.3 about here] 
Following the previous literature (Liu et al., 2012; Phan 2014), we also examine how the 
equity market reacts to M&A announcements conditional on acquirers’ CEO risk preferences for 
the entire period. Previous studies suggest that pension value or inside debt compensation would 
induce managers to be more risk averse with respect to M&A decisions, since these compensation 
packages will not be distributed until several years later or, even worse, until retirement (Sundaram 
and Yermack 2007; Edmans and Liu 2011; Wei and Yermack 2011; Cassell et al. 2012). Managers 
loaded with inside debt compensation are more likely to engage in risk-reducing M&A activities 
that might not be in the best interests of shareholders. Therefore, our a priori expectation is that 
equity investors will react more positively to M&A announcements made by risk-seeking CEOs 
relative to those pursued by risk-averse CEOs. To test this prediction, we partition the M&A 
sample into two groups based on CEO relative leverage (SERP). A CEO-year observation is 
classified as a risk-seeking (risk-averse) if its CEO relative leverage (SERP) is lower (higher) than 
the sample median. Accordingly, we compute the means and standard deviations of cumulative 
abnormal stock returns as well as the number of observations for the two groups, namely, risk-
seeking CEOs that is, low CEO relative leverage (SERP) and risk-averse CEOs that is, high CEO 
relative leverage (SERP). In addition, we perform the difference-in-means test between these two 
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CEO groups. As shown in columns (A2) to (A4) of Table 1.3, takeover deals initiated by risk-
seeking CEOs earn marginally higher, though insignificantly so, cumulative abnormal stock 
returns than M&A deals associated with risk-averse CEOs. In line with our prediction, M&A deals 
announced by risk-seeking CEOs seem to deliver slightly better equity returns than those pursued 
by risk-averse CEOs for the entire period from 2002 to 2015. This evidence is similar to the 
findings of recent empirical work (Liu et al. 2012; Phan 2014). 
Acquirer CARs around the 2008 financial crisis 
 Given the nature and consequences of the 2007–2009 financial crisis, many common 
beliefs in business and economics have been questioned and challenged. For instance, 
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2015) show that conglomerates, in contrast to the general consensus 
that they are traded at a discount, outperform single-segmented firms by a considerable margin 
during periods of financial distress. In the context of M&As, we also expect that the disastrous 
event of the financial crisis would dramatically change the behavior of managers which, in turn, 
affects corporate decisions and investors, for two particular reasons (Duchin et al. 2010; Hoffmann 
et al. 2013). First, due to limited access to external capital and exogenously driven bottlenecks on 
the demand side, firms are faced with additional constraints in selecting and financing potential 
growth opportunities, which result in underinvestment (Campello et al. 2010; Campello et al. 2011; 
Balakrishnan, Watts, and Zuo 2016; Gunn, Khurana, and Stein 2018). Second, recent behavioral 
studies have shown that extreme events, such as the recent financial crisis, can alter investors’ risk 
perception and tolerance thanks to their salience, in turn dictating investors’ trading and investing 
behavior during and after such events (Malmendier and Nagel 2011; Bucher-Koenen and 
Ziegelmeyer 2013; Hoffmann et al. 2013; Gerrans, Faff, and Hartnett 2015; Necker and 
Ziegelmeyer 2016). For instance, Kuhnen and Knutson (2011) find that emotional states (positive 
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versus negative) can dictate individuals’ subsequent beliefs and behavior. Hence, the 
“characteristics of markets, economic policies, or organization design that have an impact on 
emotional brain circuits may influence decision making under risk by changing both risk 
preferences, and the learning process” (Kuhnen and Knutson 2011, p. 623). Therefore, the 
financial crisis presents itself as an ideal setting to investigate whether investors’ exposure to such 
a catastrophic event altered their risk tolerance, through their reaction to M&A announcements 
conditional on CEO risk preferences (risk averse versus risk seeking). 
Accordingly, we examine shareholders’ reactions to M&A announcements before, during, 
and after the 2007– 2009 financial crisis. Columns (A5) to (A7) of Table 1.3 report the means and 
standard deviations of cumulative abnormal stock returns as well as the number of observations 
for each period. Means difference tests among the three periods are also reported in column (A8) 
to (A10). Shareholder reactions are positive and statistically significant at 1% for the pre-and post- 
crisis, yet negative and insignificant during the crisis. More important, although M&A 
announcements are associated with positive cumulative abnormal stock returns in the pre- and 
post-crisis periods, those occurring after 2009 result in higher short-term economic gains, 
suggesting that investor reactions were highly optimistic about the future performance of these 
deals. For the two-day window, the short-term performance of post-crisis M&As is 0.38% higher 
than that of pre-crisis M&As and statistically significant at 5% as shown in column (A10). This 
implies that the equity market reacted to M&A news more positively after the financial crisis, 
which seems to indicate that investors favored risky investments in the post-crisis period to recover 
financial losses realized during the crisis. An alternative explanation for this result could be that 
acquirers may engaged in more positive NPV acquisitions after the crisis, which triggered the 
positive shareholder reactions. If this is the case, post-crisis targets should have a higher Tobin’s 
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Q value, on average, than pre-crisis targets. Nevertheless, additional inspection of the data show 
that there is no statistical difference in the public targets’ Tobin’s Q before (i.e., 1.8238) and after 
the crisis (i.e., 1.6719). To put it differently, investors’ greater positive reaction to M&A deals 
after the crisis is probably because they endorse risky investments to recover losses realized during 
the crisis, not because acquirers engaged in superior deals after the crisis.9 Therefore, the evidence 
documented so far is more consistent with prospect theory predicting a decrease in equity 
investors’ risk aversion after the crisis as a result of having suffered financial losses due to the 
financial crisis.  
Acquirer CARs and CEO risk preferences around the 2008 financial crisis 
The evidence so far has shown that equity investors do pay attention to CEO risk 
preferences when evaluating M&A announcements and the 2008 financial crisis has affected the 
market reactions to such corporate events. In this section, we directly compare shareholders’ 
reactions around M&A announcements for risk-seeking and risk-averse CEOs before (before 
12/31/2007), during (12/31/2007 – 06/30/2009), and after (after 06/30/2009) the crisis. The 
empirical findings are reported in panel B of Table 1.3. Before 12/31/2007, the M&A 
announcements of firms run by both risk-seeking and risk-averse CEOs elicited positive 
shareholder reactions and there is no statistical difference between the two groups. However, 
during the crisis period (12/31/2007 – 06/30/2009), the average shareholder reaction to M&As 
announced deals by risk-seeking CEOs is -0.98% and statistically significant at 1% while M&As 
pursued by risk-averse CEOs triggered a positive but insignificant short-term shareholder reaction. 
However, the difference between these two groups of CEOs is statistically significant at 5%. Thus, 
                                                          
9 We observe that acquirers in the post-crisis period allocated more capital resources in research and development and 
capital expenditures. For brevity, these results are not tabulated here but are available upon request. 
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this pattern reveals that equity investors seem to endorse the M&A decisions of risk-averse CEOs 
when firms have to operate under tighter financial constraints and higher uncertainty during the 
crisis which tends to amplify firms’ underlying risk (Hoffmann et al. 2013; Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga 2015). Furthermore, in contrast to previous studies arguing that IOU (inside debt) 
compensation helps align managers’ interests with the interests of bondholders at the expense of 
shareholders, the reported evidence suggests that inside debt appears to be beneficial to 
shareholders as well, especially in high uncertainty times. 
In the post-crisis period (after 06/30/2009), equity investors continue to react positively to 
the acquisitions of risk-averse CEOs (i.e., 0.57% and significant at 1%) as in the pre-crisis and 
during the crisis periods. However, shareholder reactions are even more positive to M&As made 
by risk-seeking CEOs and the difference in terms of short-term shareholder gains is 0.65% and 
statistically significant at 1%. In addition, as shown in columns (B2) and (B8), the difference in 
acquirer CAR between the post- and pre-crisis periods for risk-averse CEOs is (i.e., 0.58% as 
opposed to 0.57%) statistically insignificant. However, as shown in columns (B1) and (B7), 
takeover bids pursued by risk-seeking CEOs after 06/30/2009 generated approximately 1.22% - 
0.45% = 0.77% (significant at 1%) higher abnormal returns than the ones conducted before 
12/31/2007. Taken together, although equity investors preferred risk-reducing investments and 
stayed away from investments made by risk-seeking CEOs during the crisis, in the post-crisis 
period, shareholders on average exhibited a strong preference for M&As carried out by risk-
seeking CEOs than the ones pursued by risk-averse CEOs. Overall, the positive reaction of 
shareholders in the post-2009 period suggests that the financial crisis amplified their risk tolerance. 
Jointly, these findings do not appear to be consistent with the literature postulating that past severe 
economic experiences (events) tend to reduce investors’ risk tolerance (i.e., increase risk aversion). 
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A plausible explanation for the patterns reported thus far is that equity investors’ strong post-crisis 
endorsement of risk-seeking CEOs’ heightened merger activity could be driven by shareholders’ 
betting attitude with the aim to recuperate losses realized during the crisis period. This pattern is 
in line with the premise of prospect theory according to which investors’ risk tolerance increases 
when previously they have experienced a financial loss. To ensure that the above reported results 
are not biased by the interval of estimated CARs, we replicated the analysis using CAR[-1,+1] 
window and the CEO relative incentive (SERP) instead of CEO relative leverage (SERP) to 
measure CEO risk preferences and find that the new findings remain consistent with the reported 
ones. These results provide additional support of shareholders’ increased risk tolerance in the post-
2009 period as a result of the financial losses they incurred during the crisis period.10 
Multivariate analyses 
CEO risk preferences and shareholder reactions to acquisition announcements 
 Next, we examine the equity market’s reactions to acquisition announcements carried out 
by CEOs with different levels of risk preferences controlling for other effects. We employ ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regressions with robust standard errors to test the effect of CEO risk 
preferences on acquirers’ CARs around the announcement dates. The main dependent variable is 
the acquirers’ cumulative abnormal stock returns for the two-day event window.11 As mentioned 
in Section 2, our research design controls for firm and deal characteristics such as the logarithm of 
the CEO’ age, the firm’s financial leverage, the firm’s market-to-book ratio, firm size, methods of 
payments, diversification indicators, target status, and relative deal value. In addition, we employ 
both CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive (SERP) based on pension value, 
                                                          
10 These additional findings are available upon request. 
11 We arrive at the same conclusion regardless of the event windows and factor models used to estimate the cumulative 
abnormal stock returns. 
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as alternative measures, to capture the effect of CEO risk preferences on acquirer CARs. The 
baseline regression model of our study is as follows.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅 𝑖 = 𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝑋𝑖 +  𝛽2(𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠)𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠)𝑖 + 𝛽4[𝑋𝑖 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠)𝑖] +
 𝛽5[𝑋𝑖 ∗ (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠)𝑖] + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑍𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑖
𝑘
𝑗=1
          (1) 
According to equation (1), the emphasis in this study is to examine the effect of CEO risk 
preferences Xi (i.e., β1) on acquirer CARs as well as the moderating effects of the 2008 financial 
crisis on this relationship (i.e., β4 and especially β5).
12 Specifically, if neither CEO risk preferences 
nor the financial crisis matters to investors, we expect these coefficients to be statistically 
insignificant. Alternatively, if equity holders place a premium on M&A decisions made by risk-
averse CEOs relative to those made by risk-seeking CEOs during the crisis, as found in the 
univariate results, β1 is expected to be significantly greater than zero. More importantly, if 
shareholders’ risk tolerance increases subsequent to the financial crisis, due to losses realized as a 
result of the financial crisis, the interaction coefficient β5 is expected to be statistically less than 
zero in accordance with the prediction of prospect theory. That is, a negative value implies that 
shareholders, after experiencing severe losses due to such a catastrophic event, become more risk 
seeking after the crisis, as they gamble on the success of M&As initiated by risk-seeking CEOs  
than risk-averse CEOs (Hoffmann et al. 2013). The empirical findings are presented in Table 1.4. 
Regressions (1) and (3) show that the coefficients of CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO 
relative incentive (SERP, for the entire sample period from 2003 to 2015, are 0.0006 and 0.0008 
respectively. However, they are not statistically significant at conventional levels. This result 
indicates that M&A decisions made by risk-averse and risk-seeking CEOs triggered roughly the 
                                                          
12 The base category is the during-crisis period. 
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same market reaction, suggesting that in the eyes of equity investors, these decisions appeared to 
be fairly similar. 
[Insert Table 1.4 about here] 
However, accounting for the 2008 financial crisis, we find empirical evidence consistent 
with the reported pattern in Table 1.3.  First, as inferred from regression (2), the marginal effect of 
CEO relative leverage (SERP) on acquirer CARs before 12/31/2007 is 0.0057 – 0.0029 = 0.0028 
and it is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that shareholders are indifferent between 
M&A decisions made by risk-averse CEOs and those consummated by risk-seeking CEOs prior 
to the financial crisis. Second, during the 2008 crisis, equity investors responded positively, instead 
of negatively as documented in previous studies, to M&A announcements pursued by risk-averse 
CEOs. Specifically, the coefficient of CEO relative leverage (SERP) is 0.0057 and statistically 
significant at 5% level, as reported in regression (2). Inconsistent with previous studies arguing 
that inside debt motivates managers to be risk-averse that creates agency costs for shareholders, 
our evidence points out that shareholders during financial distressed periods prefer M&As made 
by risk-averse CEOs as they tend to be more prudent and behave conservatively. 
Third, as shown in column (2), the coefficient estimate of the interaction term (CEO 
relative leverage (SERP) * Post-crisis) is -0.0080 (statistically significant at 1%), and the net effect 
of CEO relative leverage (SERP) after the 2008 financial crisis becomes negative and equals -
0.0080 + 0.0057 = -0.0023 (statistically significant at 5%), suggesting that M&As announced by 
risk-averse CEOs are no longer favored by equity investors after the crisis. That is, while equity 
investors favored risk-averse CEOs’ merger decisions during to the crisis (β1 = 0.0057), in the 
post-crisis period, they endorsed the M&A decisions carried out by risk-seeking CEOs (β5 = -
0.0080). To put it differently, shareholders’ post-crisis behavior seems to be consistent with 
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gambling behavior, as they bet on the success of M&As initiated by risk-seeking CEOs. This 
evidence is in line with the prediction of prospect theory that investors who experienced major 
financial losses tend to exhibit more risk-seeking behavior, i.e., favoring risky investments to 
outweigh losses realized during the crisis period. We find consistent results, as shown in column 
(4), when we use CEO relative incentive (SERP) as an alternative measure of CEO risk-aversion.  
 With respect to the effects of other control variables, our multivariate regressions yield 
consistent coefficient estimates with those documented in previous studies (Travlos 1987; Doukas 
and Travlos 1988; Phan 2014; Cai, Kim, Park, and White 2016). Specifically, we find that 
undervalued firms with smaller size are associated with higher short-term stock performance. In 
addition, takeover bids announced before and after the crisis earns significantly higher returns than 
those made public during the crisis. Regarding other deal characteristics, stock deals incur 
additional loss to acquirers’ shareholders. In terms of diversification effects, we document that 
both industrial and international diversifications are value-destroying activities and their 
coefficient estimates are statistically significant at least at 5% across different specifications.  
Alternative measures of acquirer cumulative abnormal stock returns 
 In this section, we continue to check if our multivariate results are robust to different 
measures of acquirer short-term market performance. First, there is a possibility that a portion of 
equity investors may know about the announcement before it is made public. To control for this 
issue, we recapture shareholder reactions to M&A announcements using CAR[-1,+1] estimated 
from the one-factor model and use it in place of the two-day CAR in the regressions. Columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 1.5 provide consistent findings with what have been documented in the previous 
sections. For brevity, the coefficient estimates of other controls are suppressed. 
[Insert Table 1.5 about here] 
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 Second, a potential concern with the acquirer CARs based on the one-factor model used 
thus far is that the CARs estimated for a number of M&A events after 06/30/2009 may be subject 
to an upward bias because the chosen estimation period (i.e., from t = -251 to t = -11) can overlap 
with the crisis period during which acquirer daily stock returns were abnormally low. 
Consequently, we may draw inappropriate inferences from regression results based on these one-
factor model CARs. To overcome this methodological problem, instead of using the one-factor 
model, we simply compute abnormal returns for acquirer i on date t as follows. 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 
The acquirer CARs estimated from this method are unlikely to suffer from the upward bias 
in the post-crisis period. We repeat the multivariate analysis using this simple market-adjusted 
CAR[0,+1] and report the findings in column (3) and (4) of Table 1.5. These results are consistent 
with the reported evidence in Table 1.4 suggesting that our prior inferences remain robust to the 
above concern.  
Alternative measures of CEO risk preferences and crisis period classifications 
 In addition to CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive (SERP) estimated 
using only pension data, we also examine if our previous reported results hold with the two 
commonly used debt-based measures of CEO risk preferences. Therefore, we repeat our empirical 
analysis by employing CEO relative leverage and CEO relative incentive measures, which are 
computed using both pension and deferred compensation. Since deferred compensation data were 
not available until 2006, we restrict our sample to the post-2006 period in this section. Table 1.6 
reports the multivariate results of regressing shareholders’ short-term reactions on these alternative 
measures of CEO risk preferences. Overall, we consistently find that M&As conducted by risk-
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seeking CEOs earn higher short-term gains than M&As made by risk-averse CEOs in the post-
crisis period, confirming the gambling behavior of equity investors. 
[Insert Table 1.6 about here] 
Beside NBER’s crisis classification, we also follow Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2015) 
and divide the sample into four sub-periods: pre-crisis (2002Q1–2007Q2), early-crisis (2007Q3–
2008Q3), late-crisis (2008Q4–2009Q1), and post-crisis (2009Q2–2015Q4), where the pre-crisis 
period serves as the baseline period in our regression models. In line with the previous analyses, 
we are interested in the interaction terms between CEO risk preferences and these crisis periods, 
or whether the effect of CEO risk preferences on equity market’s reaction to M&A announcements 
differs across the above four sub-periods around the crisis. 
[Insert Table 1.7 about here] 
Specifically, in regression (1) of Table 1.7 for instance, the net effect of CEO relative 
leverage (SERP) during the late-crisis period is 0.0031 + 0.0133 = 0.0164 and statistically 
significant at 5% while such an effect in the post-crisis period is 0.0031 – 0.0052 = -0.0021 and 
statistically significant at 10%. Overall, the regression results based on Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga’s (2015) crisis classification, shown in Table 1.7, continue to lend empirical support to 
our arguments that CEO debt-based compensation appears to be beneficial to shareholders during 
tough times, but they seem to become more risk tolerant after the crisis by engaging in gambling 
as exhibited through their robust preference of riskier M&As undertaken by risk-seeking CEOs 
with the expectation of recovering financial losses realized during the catastrophic event of the 
global financial crisis. 
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Effects of better corporate governance after the 2008 financial crisis 
One may argue that the different equity reactions to M&A announcements made by risk-
seeking CEOs vs. risk-averse CEOs after the crisis may simply be due to better exerted corporate 
governance in firms with lower inside debt. To address this concern, we repeat our multivariate 
analysis with the inclusion of corporate governance measures as well as their interaction with the 
post-crisis dummy. Specifically, corporate governance characteristics are captured using the % of 
female directors on board and % of independent directors on board that are both retrieved from 
the Bloomberg database. These results, as shown in Table 1.8, indicate that our main results do 
not change after controlling for corporate governance. In addition, the effects of corporate 
governance measures and their interaction terms are not statistically significant. Collectively, these 
findings rule out the view that the different equity reactions to M&A announcements made by risk-
seeking CEOs vs. risk-averse CEOs after the crisis could be attributed to better corporate 
governance after the crisis. This evidence lends additional support that investor risk preferences 
changed as a result of the shock of the crisis. 
[Insert Table 1.8 about here] 
Subsample analyses using retained CEO sample and U.S. targets only sample 
 Although we provide sufficient theoretical as well as empirical evidence in support of the 
argument that the exogenous shock of the financial crisis led to the shift in investors’ risk tolerance, 
this does not completely rule out the possibility that the financial crisis endogenously affected the 
risk preferences of corporate managers (e.g., via CEO turnover or lower compensation) and the 
market’s reaction to M&A announcements. To address this concern, we focus only on a subsample 
of takeover deals made by the same acquiring firms led by the same CEOs who appeared in at least 
two crisis periods. If the empirical evidence remains robust for this subsample, we can safely 
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conclude that the different shareholder reaction to merger announcements around the crisis is 
attributed to a shift in shareholders’ risk tolerance as a result of this exogenous shock. These 
findings are reported in Table 1.9. According to columns (1) and (2), the multivariate results for 
the same CEO sample before and after the crisis remain consistent with our previously reported 
findings in support of investors’ increased risk tolerance after the financial crisis. 
Similarly, there is also a chance that the more positive reactions to M&As made by risk-
seeking CEOs (relative to risk-averse CEOs) post-2009 may be simply because this sample period 
contains more new CEOs with lower inside debt compensation. Therefore, in an unreported 
analysis, we exclude M&A deals during 2010-2012 made by CEOs who first appeared in our 
original sample only after 2009 and replicate our analysis.13 The findings are still consistent with 
our original evidence implying that there was a systematic increase, instead of a decrease, in equity 
investors’ risk tolerance after the financial crisis. 
[Insert Table 1.9 about here] 
Furthermore, we check the sensitivity of our results by excluding foreign targets (35% of 
the original sample). Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.9 show the OLS regression results for the 
sample of U.S. targets. These findings point out that our original results are not affected by the 
M&A sample of international targets. 
In summary, in contrast to previous studies suggesting that IOU compensation only help 
align managers’ interest with that of bondholders at the expense of shareholders, the reported 
evidence implies that inside debt can be beneficial to shareholders as well during the financial 
crisis. More importantly, the post-crisis evidence is also in line with the prediction of prospect 
                                                          
13 For brevity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request. 
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theory that investors who experienced major financial losses tend to exhibit more risk-seeking 
behavior, i.e., favoring risky investments to outweigh losses realized during the crisis period. 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
CEO risk preferences and post-acquisition returns 
 While the univariate result has shown that equity investors’ reactions to acquisitions carried 
out by risk-averse CEOs around the crisis were essentially uniform, the post-2009 overreactions 
of equity investors to acquisitions performed by risk-seeking CEOs relative to their acquisitions 
undertaken during-crisis suggest increased investor risk tolerance in favor of risky investments. 
To examine whether the more positive and significant reactions of equity investors to the 
acquisition announcements of risk-seeking CEOs post-2009 reflect investors’ speculative 
overestimation of the future outcomes of these acquisitions, we focus on the post-acquisition 
performance of such deals. According to the increased risk tolerance (gambling) hypothesis, we 
expect the post-2009 acquisitions consummated by risk-seeking CEOs to be associated with a 
negative and significantly lower performance than those by risk-averse CEOs. To address this, we 
estimate the acquirers’ buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅[+1, +𝑇]𝑖 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1




where BHAR[+1, +T]i is the buy-and-hold abnormal stock return of acquirer i over the next T 
trading days after the announcement date. We examine acquirers’ long-term performance either 
18 months (T = 375 trading days) or 24 months (T = 500 trading days) after the announcements. 
Furthermore, Ri,t is the actual daily stock return of firm i and Rbenchmark,t is the daily benchmark 
return predicted by the one-factor model. Table 1.10 documents the multivariate results for 
acquirers’ BHARs. 
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[Insert Table 1.10 about here] 
Consistent with the gambling story, more risk-seeking behavior is consistently associated 
with acquirers’ long-term value losses across most of the model specifications. According to model 
(1) and (2), for instance, the coefficient of CEO relative leverage (SERP) (CEO relative incentive 
(SERP)) is 0.0341 (0.0395) and statistically significant at 10%. In brief, these results are consistent 
with the conjecture that shareholders generally exhibit gambling attitudes in the post-crisis period 
and bet on risky M&A investments that eventually result in long-term value loss. 
Shareholder reactions to annual changes in CEO risk preferences 
 The empirical evidence documented so far has confirmed that CEO risk preferences matter 
in the context of M&As. More importantly, we have shown that acquisitions carried out by CEOs 
with risk-averse inducing compensation during the financial crisis created greater shareholder 
gains, compared with the ones performed by CEOs with risk-seeking (convex) compensation. 
However, this pattern is reversed in the post-crisis period despite the severe impact of such a risky 
event. If this is the case, we should also observe a similar result in the context of shareholder 
reactions to a significant increase (decrease) in CEO risk aversion on an annual basis, before, 
during and after the crisis. To test our conjecture, we replicate the results of Wei and Yermack 
(2011) for all ExecuComp companies (excluding financial and utility firms) during 2007–2015. In 
addition, we focus only on observations with a market capitalization of at least 1 billion USD since 
these are more visible to general equity investors. Specifically, we investigate investors’ short-
term reactions to a shift in CEO risk preferences around the official filing dates of a company’ 
proxy statements (i.e., DEF 14A forms). The CEO–year sample comprises 4,684 observations and 
is partitioned into two groups, risk-seeking vs. risk-averse CEOs. A CEO-year observation is 
classified as a risk-seeking (risk-averse) if its change in CEO relative leverage greater than or equal 
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to (less than) zero.14 During 2007–2009, despite being consistent with our expectation, the 
difference is not statistically different from zero (not tabulated for brevity). However, for 2010–
2015, the findings reported in Table 1.11 provide evidence consistent with our main prediction 
and that of Wei and Yermack (2011), that equity investors experience increased risk tolerance (or, 
rather, gambling attitudes) in the post-crisis period and therefore dislike (prefer) firms run by risk-
averse (risk-seeking) CEOs. 
[Insert Table 1.11 about here] 
  Specifically, equity investors generally react more negatively (positively) to an increase 
(decrease) in CEO risk aversion after the crisis. On one hand, for the risk-seeking CEO group, the 
average of cumulative abnormal stock returns is consistently positive and statistically significant 
at 5% across different event windows. For the risk-averse CEO groups, on the other hand, the 
market reactions are consistently negative across all measures of cumulative abnormal stock 
returns, and it is statistically significant at 10% in the case CAR[-1,+1]. For instance, a proxy 
statement disclosure indicating a risk-averse CEO is associated with 0.15% deductions in short-
term performance. More importantly, the reported difference-in-means tests show that the average 
of cumulative abnormal stock returns for the risk-seeking CEO group is statistically higher than 
that of the risk-averse CEO group. 
CONCLUSION 
This study examines and sheds light on the variation of M&A announcement stock returns 
conditional on CEO risk preferences and investors’ risk tolerance changes around the 2008 
financial crisis. Previous studies have shown that CEO risk preferences gauged by compensation 
                                                          
14 Using changes in CEO relative incentive, or changes in inside debt in place of changes in CEO relative leverage 
does not materialistically alter our empirical findings. In addition, substituting CEO inside debt with only CEO pension 
value in the computation of CEO relative leverage and CEO relative incentive does not affect our results either. 
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packages play an important role in corporate investment decisions. Motivated by this strand of 
research, we examine whether risk aversion-inducing CEO compensation, in addition to an 
exhaustive list of factors documented in the literature, can explain M&A outcomes.  In addition to 
the commonly used measures of CEO risk preferences based on both pension and deferred 
compensation values to capture the level of CEO risk aversion, in this study, we use only the 
unsecured and unfunded supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) to estimate more 
accurate measures of CEO risk aversion. We also investigate whether the variation of M&A 
announcement stock returns observed before, during and after the exogenous 2008 financial crisis 
is linked to changes in shareholders’ risk preferences, and more importantly, whether such a 
relation is in line with prospect theory postulating that investors make decisions based on potential 
values of losses and gains rather than expected outcomes, and that their asymmetric (i.e., steeper 
for losses than for gains) value functions imply loss aversion. 
The empirical findings show that takeover bids announced by firms under the helm of risk-
averse (risk-seeking) CEOs are associated with higher (lower) cumulative abnormal stock returns 
before, and especially during the financial crisis. These results suggest that CEO inside-debt 
compensation appears to be favored by shareholders in states of high economic uncertainty. 
Regarding the post-crisis period, however, equity investors switch their preferences to M&A deals 
pursued by risk-taking CEOs, indicating increased risk tolerance among equity investors after the 
catastrophe. Consistent with the prediction of prospect theory, the observed pattern suggests that 
equity investors bet on risky investments to outweigh losses realized during the crisis period. These 
results are robust to different model specifications, alternative measures of CEO risk preferences 
and M&A performance, as well as subsample tests. 
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Additional analyses of acquirer long-term performance, and shareholder reactions to 
changes in CEO inside debt in the post-crisis period provide supportive evidence to the 
aforementioned conclusion. Specifically, despite being preferred by the equity market in the short-
run, the acquirers led by risk-seeking CEOs consistently underperform their counterparts in the 
long run. Furthermore, shareholders also reacted negatively to proxy statement disclosures 
associated with an increase in CEO risk aversion as they did to M&A announcements made by 
risk-averse CEOs after 2009. Taken together, these results imply that equity investors endorse 
increased managerial risk-taking M&A decisions in the post-crisis period. In other words, the 
documented empirical evidence supports prospect theory positing that economic agents when 
suffering significant financial losses, tend to increase their risk tolerance, and that their decisions 
are based on the potential value of losses and gains. 
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Table 1.1 M&A announcement distribution by year from 2003 to 2015 
This table reports successful M&A announcements made by U.S. firms annually during the 2003–2015 period. The means of CEO Option Holdings, CEO Stock 
Holdings, CEO Inside Equity, CEO Inside Debt, CEO Pension, and CEO Deferred Compensation are shown in columns 2 to 7. More specifically, CEO Inside 
Equity is equal to CEO Stock and Option Holdings while CEO Inside Debt equals CEO Pension and Deferred Compensation (reported in thousands). For the post-
2006 period, CEO Pension and CEO Deferred Compensation are extracted directly from ExecuComp. For the pre-2006 period, CEO Pension is estimated using 
Sunderam & Yermack’s (2007) approximation method. The necessary inputs are manually collected from the companies’ DEF 14A proxy statements. The next 
two columns show the number of M&As announced by risk-seeking and risk-averse CEOs, respectively. A CEO-year observation is classified as a risk-seeking 





























2003 25,585.83 68,983.38 94,569.21 . 4,811.41 . 5 14 19 0.98% 
2004 25,795.62 35,843.09 61,483.32 . 7,498.74 . 47 119 166 8.61% 
2005 32,768.49 36,911.30 69,508.23 . 7,886.75 . 42 149 191 9.90% 
2006 36,821.72 74,652.50 110,589.08 . 7,576.29 . 37 171 208 10.78% 
2007 31,482.94 47,050.53 77,639.06 21,813.41 8,117.49 13,292.85 40 136 176 9.12% 
2008 25,185.07 51,624.31 75,922.58 14,834.71 8,912.14 5,922.57 52 90 142 7.36% 
2009 43,209.40 41,377.05 83,192.59 15,739.08 7,934.59 7,804.49 25 99 124 6.43% 
2010 13,807.75 84,788.72 97,897.34 14,378.75 9,677.08 4,701.67 46 112 158 8.19% 
2011 16,348.38 44,005.47 59,826.48 15,595.48 9,470.86 6,124.62 60 126 186 9.64% 
2012 18,331.01 40,411.34 58,305.90 14,053.36 9,793.39 4,259.97 55 113 168 8.71% 
2013 15,369.41 31,262.87 45,222.25 18,161.17 12,096.20 6,064.97 33 76 109 5.65% 
2014 20,351.81 66,440.33 84,470.12 15,645.90 11,339.21 4,306.69 40 109 149 7.72% 
2015 40,683.05 128,548.39 163,419.57 19,900.97 11,863.91 8,037.06 34 99 133 6.89% 





Table 1.2 Descriptive statistics of firm, M&A and CEO characteristics 
This table shows the total number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, and the 25th and the 75th percentile values of all independent variables for the 
final M&A’s sample from 2003 to 2015. Panel A reports the statistics for M&A and firm characteristics while Panel B shows the statistics for CEO variables. For 
the post-2006 period, the items used to estimate CEO variables are extracted and estimated directly from ExecuComp. For the pre-2006 period, in addition to other 
items available in ExecuComp, CEO Pension is computed using Sunderam & Yermack’s (2007) approximation method. The necessary inputs are manually 
collected from the companies’ DEF 14A proxy statements. Appendix 1.1 provides the variable descriptions. 
 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
25% 50% 75% 
Panel A: M&A & Firm Characteristics 
International Diversification 1,929 0.3504 0.4772 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Industrial Diversification 1,929 0.4520 0.4978 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Relative Deal Value 1,929 0.1008 0.2245 0.0086 0.0287 0.0945 
Stock Deal 1,929 0.0415 0.1994 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pre-crisis 1,929 0.3940 0.4888 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
During-crisis 1,929 0.1001 0.3001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Post-crisis 1,929 0.5060 0.5001 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Private Target 1,929 0.3090 0.4622 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Public Target 1,929 0.2794 0.4488 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Friendly Deal 1,929 0.9025 0.2967 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Firm Size 1,929 8.8187 1.6589 7.5947 8.601 10.0086 
Firm Financial Leverage 1,929 0.9395 4.1531 0.316 0.5113 0.812 
Firm Market-To-Book Ratio 1,929 1.8155 0.8172 1.2826 1.5864 2.0838 
Panel B: CEO Characteristics 
CEO Pension (in $ thousands) 1,929 9,133.39 12,823.01 1,498.42 4,549.71 11,509.83 
CEO Deferred Compensation (in $ thousands) 1,182 5,880.71 13,438.91 95.57 1,263.41 4,772.76 
CEO Inside Debt (in $ thousands) 1,182 15,933 22,714.30 2,903.57 8,119.13 18,647.74 
CEO Age 1,879 4.0290 0.1102 3.9512 4.0254 4.0943 
CEO Compensation 1,929 8.7541 0.9309 8.2212 8.7956 9.3863 
CEO Relative Leverage 1,182 1.1014 1.0791 0.4352 0.8312 1.4480 
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP) 1,929 0.8152 0.9509 0.2187 0.5622 1.0427 
CEO Relative Incentive 1,182 0.9243 1.0074 0.3214 0.6478 1.1870 





Table 1.3 Acquirer abnormal stock returns: risk-seeking vs. risk-averse CEOs and pre- vs. during- vs. post-crisis periods 
This table reports the univariate tests for acquirer CARs for different M&A subsamples over the 2003-2015 period. CARs are estimated using the one-factor model. In panel A, 
column (A1) reports the results for the full sample. Column (A2), (A3) and (A4) show the statistics for different groups of CEOs (risk-seeking vs. risk-averse) as well as their 
difference-in-means test. A CEO-year observation is classified as a risk-seeking (risk-averse) if its CEO relative leverage (SERP) is lower (higher) than the sample median. CEO 
relative leverage (SERP) equals CEO pension divided by CEO inside equity scaled by the firm leverage. Column (A5) – (A10) report similar statistics for the pre-, during-, and post-
crisis subsamples as well as their difference-in-means test. The pre-crisis subsample comprises M&A announcements made prior to 12/30/2007.  The during-crisis subsample 
comprises M&A announcements made between 12/31/2007 and 06/30/2009 while the post-crisis subsample includes deals announced after 06/30/2009. Panel B provide the statistics 



















  Pre - During Post - During Post - Pre 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4)  (A5) (A6) (A7)  (A8) (A9) (A10) 
Mean 0.0063*** 0.0070*** 0.0055*** 0.0015 
 
0.0052*** -0.0030 0.0090*** 
 
0.0082*** 0.0120*** 0.0038** 
Standard Deviation 0.0345 0.0375 0.0312 0.0345 
 
0.0323 0.0399 0.0347 
 
0.0339 0.0356 0.0336 
Observations 1,929 964 965 
  
760 193 976 
    
Panel B 
    Pre-Crisis (Before 12/31/2007)   During-Crisis (12/31/2007 – 06/30/2009)   Post-Crisis (After 06/30/2009) 




















RS - RA 
  (B1) (B2) (B3)  (B4) (B5) (B6)  (B7) (B8) (B9) 
Mean 
 
0.0045*** 0.0058*** -0.0012 
 
-0.0098** 0.0037 -0.0136** 
 
0.0122*** 0.0057*** 0.0065*** 
Standard Deviation 
 
0.0342 0.0303 0.0323 
 
0.0440 0.0342 0.0394 
 
0.0375 0.0313 0.0345 














Table 1.4 CEO risk preferences and shareholder reactions to acquisition announcements 
This table reports the results of regressing acquirer CAR[0,+1] on CEO risk preferences, CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative 
incentive (SERP). CAR[0,+1] is estimated from the one-factor model. The two key independent variables are CEO relative leverage 
(SERP) and CEO relative incentive (SERP). CEO relative leverage (SERP) equals CEO pension divided by CEO inside equity scaled 
by the firm leverage while CEO relative incentive (SERP) is the ratio of the change in CEO pension to the change of CEO inside equity 
scaled by the change in the firm leverage. The pre-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made before 12/31/ 2007, 
and zero otherwise. The post-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made after 06/30/2009, and zero otherwise. Other 
independent variables are defined in Appendix 1.1. Models (2) and (4) include the crisis dummies and their interaction terms with CEO 
risk preferences. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP) 0.0006 0.0057**     
(0.6001) (2.2207) 
  
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Pre-crisis   -0.0029      
(-0.9401) 
  
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Post-crisis   -0.0080***      
(-2.8379) 
  
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)     0.0008 0.0061**   
(0.6782) (2.1904) 
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Pre-crisis       -0.0030    
(-0.8660) 
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Post-crisis       -0.0084***    
(-2.7363) 








CEO Age -0.0033 -0.0058 -0.0035 -0.0061 
(-0.4398) (-0.7669) (-0.4601) (-0.8012) 
CEO Compensation 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0003 
(0.1325) (-0.2224) (0.1462) (-0.2215) 
Firm Size -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0022*** -0.0023*** 
(-3.8819) (-4.0284) (-3.8613) (-4.0362) 
Firm Financial Leverage 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.9369) (0.7268) (0.9399) (0.7210) 
Firm Market to Book Ratio -0.0021** -0.0015 -0.0021** -0.0015* 
(-2.2916) (-1.6321) (-2.3100) (-1.6882) 
Stock Deal -0.0245*** -0.0239*** -0.0245*** -0.0239*** 
(-3.6357) (-3.5925) (-3.6341) (-3.5932) 
Industrial Diversification -0.0035** -0.0030** -0.0035** -0.0030** 
(-2.2420) (-1.9885) (-2.2446) (-2.0005) 
International Diversification -0.0036** -0.0032** -0.0036** -0.0032** 
(-2.4209) (-2.1666) (-2.4266) (-2.1832) 
Private Target -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0010 
(-0.2837) (-0.5505) (-0.2903) (-0.5544) 
Public Target 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0003 
(0.0994) (-0.1462) (0.0952) (-0.1270) 
Friendly Deal -0.0045 -0.0055* -0.0045 -0.0054* 
(-1.4584) (-1.7649) (-1.4487) (-1.7507) 
Relative Deal Value 0.0050 0.0041 0.0050 0.0040 
(0.5606) (0.4594) (0.5605) (0.4533) 
Intercept 0.0488 0.0485 0.0491 0.0501 
(1.5387) (1.4993) (1.5504) (1.5513) 
R2 (%) 4.09% 5.99% 4.10% 5.98% 
Observations 1,879 1,879 1,879 1,879 
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Table 1.5 CEO risk preferences and shareholder reactions to M&A announcements with different CAR measures 
This table reports the results of regressing acquirer CARs on CEO risk preferences, CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO 
relative incentive (SERP). The dependent variables are CAR[-1,+1] estimated from the one-factor model and CAR[0,+1] 
estimated from the market model. The two key independent variables are CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative 
incentive (SERP). CEO relative leverage (SERP) equals CEO pension divided by CEO inside equity scaled by the firm leverage 
while CEO relative incentive (SERP) is the ratio of the change in CEO pension to the change of CEO inside equity scaled by 
the change in the firm leverage. In addition, the pre-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made before 
12/31/ 2007, and zero otherwise. The post-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made after 06/30/2009, and 
zero otherwise. Other independent variables are defined in Appendix 1.1. The standard errors are adjusted for 




One-factor CAR[-1,+1]  Market-adjusted CAR[0,+1] 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP) 





CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Pre-crisis 





CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Post-crisis 





CEO Relative Incentive (SERP) 




CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Pre-crisis 




CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Post-crisis 





0.0130*** 0.0126***  0.0117** 0.0115** 
(2.9915) (3.0142)  (2.3325) (2.4167) 
Post-crisis 
0.0217*** 0.0208***  0.0205*** 0.0198*** 
(5.0644) (5.1112)  (4.0955) (4.2029) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 6.67% 6.69%  5.56% 5.55% 
Observations 1,879 1,879  1,879 1,879 
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Table 1.6 Alternative measures of CEO risk preferences and shareholder reactions to acquisition 
announcements 
This table reports the multivariate results for different model specifications. In all specifications, the main dependent 
variable is acquirer CAR[0,+1] estimated from the one-factor model. The two key independent variables are (1) CEO 
relative leverage, and (2) CEO relative incentive for the post-2006 period. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside 
debt divided by CEO inside equity scaled by the firm leverage while CEO relative incentive is the ratio of the change 
in CEO inside debt to the change of CEO inside equity scaled by the change in the firm leverage. In addition, the pre-
crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made before 12/31/ 2007, and zero otherwise. The post-crisis 
dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made after 06/30/2009, and zero otherwise. Other independent 
variables are defined in Appendix 1.1. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variable (1) (2) 
CEO Relative Leverage 0.0062**   
(2.4102) 
 
CEO Relative Leverage*Pre-crisis -0.0064**   
(-2.0699) 
 
CEO Relative Leverage*Post-crisis -0.0083***   
(-3.0436) 
 
CEO Relative Incentive   0.0066**  
(2.3694) 
CEO Relative Incentive*Pre-crisis   -0.0068**  
(-2.0448) 
CEO Relative Incentive*Post-crisis   -0.0088***  
(-2.9458) 
Pre-crisis 0.0123 0.0113 
(1.4819) (1.3781) 
Post-crisis 0.0217*** 0.0206*** 
(4.5632) (4.5409) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 8.13% 8.07% 




Table 1.7 CEO risk preferences and shareholder reactions to acquisition announcements with alternative 
crisis periods 
This table reports the multivariate results for different model specifications. In all specifications, the main dependent 
variable is acquirer CAR[0,+1] estimated from the one-factor model. The two key independent variables are CEO 
relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive (SERP). CEO relative leverage (SERP) equals CEO pension 
divided by CEO inside equity scaled by the firm leverage while CEO relative incentive (SERP) is the ratio of the 
change in CEO pension to the change of CEO inside equity scaled by the change in the firm leverage. The early-crisis 
dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made during 06/30/2007 and 09/30/2008, and zero otherwise. The 
late-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made during 09/30/2008 and 03/31/2009, and zero 
otherwise. The post-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made after 03/31/2009. Other independent 
variables are defined in Appendix 1.1. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variable (1) (2) 
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP) 0.0031   
(1.4332) 
 
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Early-crisis -0.0013   
(-0.5116) 
 
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Late-crisis 0.0133*   
(1.7088) 
 
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Post-crisis -0.0052**   
(-2.1273) 
 
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)   0.0036  
(1.4502) 
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Early-crisis   -0.0015  
(-0.5174) 
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Late-crisis   0.0138  
(1.5321) 
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Post-crisis   -0.0056**  
(-2.0471) 
Early-crisis -0.0032 -0.0032 
(-0.8370) (-0.8868) 
Late-crisis -0.0233** -0.0211** 
(-2.4607) (-2.3122) 
Post-crisis 0.0085*** 0.0081*** 
(3.4118) (3.3981) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 6.08% 6.02% 





Table 1.8 CEO risk preferences and shareholder reactions to acquisition announcements with corporate 
governance 
This table reports the results of regressing acquirer CAR[0,+1] on CEO risk preferences, CEO relative leverage (SERP) 
and CEO relative incentive (SERP). CAR[0,+1]  is estimated from the one-factor model. The two key independent 
variables are CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive (SERP). CEO relative leverage (SERP) equals 
CEO pension divided by CEO inside equity scaled by the firm leverage while CEO relative incentive (SERP) is the 
ratio of the change in CEO pension to the change of CEO inside equity scaled by the change in the firm leverage. The 
pre-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made before 12/31/ 2007, and zero otherwise. The post-
crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made after 06/30/2009, and zero otherwise. In addition, % of 
independent directors on board and % of female directors are used to capture acquirer’s corporate governance. Other 
independent variables are defined in Appendix 1.1. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 



























% of Independent Directors 0.0005 0.0005     
(0.9033) (0.9121) 
  
% of Independent Directors*Post-Crisis -0.0005 -0.0005     
(-0.9060) (-0.9287) 
  
% of Female Directors     -0.0001 0.0000   
(-0.3058) (-0.0190) 
% of Female Directors*Post-Crisis     0.0001 0.0000   
(0.2981) (0.0223) 
Pre-crisis 0.0256*** 0.0246*** 0.0240*** 0.0230*** 
(3.8067) (3.8210) (3.9301) (3.9307) 
Post-crisis 0.0641 0.0636 0.0215*** 0.0214*** 
(1.3856) (1.3820) (2.7939) (2.7945) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 9.72% 9.71% 9.77% 9.74% 







Table 1.9 CEO risk preferences and shareholder reactions to acquisition announcements using the retained CEO sample and the U.S. targets sample 
This table reports the results of regressing acquirer CAR[0,+1] on CEO risk preferences, CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive (SERP) only 
for the sample of M&A deals made by CEOs who retained in the position for at least two crisis periods, and the U.S. M&As sample. CAR[0,+1]  is estimated from 
the one-factor model. The two key independent variables are CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive (SERP). CEO relative leverage (SERP) 
equals CEO pension divided by CEO inside equity scaled by the firm leverage while CEO relative incentive (SERP) is the ratio of the change in CEO pension to 
the change of CEO inside equity scaled by the change in the firm leverage. The pre-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made before 12/31/ 
2007, and zero otherwise. The post-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made after 06/30/2009, and zero otherwise. Other independent variables 
are defined in Appendix 1.1. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant 
levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variable 
Retained CEO Sample  U.S. M&As Sample 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP) 0.0069**    0.0042   
(2.2881) 
 
 (1.3348)  
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Pre-crisis -0.0062*    -0.0013   
(-1.9207) 
 
 (-0.3364)  
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Post-crisis -0.0085**    -0.0079**   
(-2.5315) 
 
 (-2.2167)  
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)   0.0073**    0.0048  
(2.1843)   (1.3827) 
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Pre-crisis   -0.0066*    -0.0015  
(-1.8347)   (-0.3472) 
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Post-crisis   -0.0090**    -0.0084**  
(-2.4070)   (-2.1834) 
Pre-crisis 0.0133*** 0.0126***  0.0078 0.0076 
(2.9027) (2.8720)  (1.2756) (1.2928) 
Post-crisis 0.0174*** 0.0164***  0.0180*** 0.0172*** 
(3.7348) (3.7241)  (2.9620) (2.9692) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 7.63% 7.59%  6.42% 6.41% 




Table 1.10 CEO risk preferences and acquirer post-merger performance after the 2008 financial crisis 
This table reports the multivariate results for acquirers’ buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns after the financial crisis. 
Acquirers’ BHAR[+1, +375] and BHAR[+1, +500] are estimated from the one-factor model. Consecutive M&A 
announcements within 30 days by the same firm are excluded to mitigate the impacts of firms with multiple 
acquisitions. The two main independent variables are CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive 
(SERP). CEO relative leverage (SERP) equals CEO pension divided by CEO inside equity scaled by the firm leverage 
while CEO relative incentive (SERP) is the ratio of the change in CEO pension to the change of CEO inside equity 
scaled by the change in the firm leverage. Other independent variables are defined in Appendix 1.1.  The standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant 
levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variable 
BHAR[+1,+375]  BHAR[+1,+500] 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP) 0.0341*   
 





CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)   0.0395* 
 


















































































R2 (%) 5.36% 5.41%  5.56% 5.58% 






Table 1.11 Shareholder reactions to changes in CEO risk preferences reported in DEF 14A filings 
This table shows the univariate tests for the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) two days, and three days around the 
DEF 14A’s annual filing dates across different groups of CEOs for the 2010–2015 fiscal period. The sample includes 
only non-financial and non-utility firms whose market capitalization are at least one billion dollars. The final sample 
comprises of 3,078 CEO-year observations. A CEO-year observation is classified as a risk-averse (risk-seeking) if its 
change in CEO relative leverage greater than or equal to (less than) zero. The change in CEO relative leverage equals 
the current period’s value minus the previous period’s. The cumulative abnormal returns are estimated using the one-
factor model. The number of observations, mean and standard deviation are reported for each group of CEOs. In 
addition, the table also reports the statistical significance for the difference-in-means test. ***, **, and * are used to 
indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: CAR[0,+1] 





RS – RA 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) 
Mean 0.0005 0.0012** -0.0006 0.0017** 
Standard Deviation 0.0226 0.0222 0.0231 0.0226 
Observations 3,078 1,859 1,219 N/A 
Panel B: CAR[-1,+1] 





RS – RA 
 (B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) 
Mean 0.0001 0.0012** -0.0015* 0.0028** 
Standard Deviation 0.0301 0.0299 0.0303 0.0301 





ESSAY 2:  WHEN DOES CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PAY OFF? 
INTRODUCTION  
Investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) have become more prevalent in recent 
years. According to the U.S. Social Investment Forum Foundation’s 2018 report, around $12 
trillion were invested in sustainable, responsible, and impact investing (SRI) funds, an 
approximately 38% increase from $8.7 trillion in 2016. In addition, a recent 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) global CEO survey indicated that more than 60% of chief 
executive officers (CEOs) consider CSR a core business, rather than just stand-alone activity 
(Horoszowski 2016). The recent surge in CSR investments is due to the common belief shared 
among giant corporations (e.g., Google, Walt Disney, Lego) that views CSR as a means to help 
create a competitive advantage over their competitors (Kramer and Porter 2011; Flammer 2015). 
Given its growing importance to businesses in practice, CSR has become a major topic of interest 
in academic research.15 For example, prior studies (e.g., Jiao 2010; Deng, Kang, and Low 2013; 
Becchetti, Ciciretti, and Hasan 2015; Flammer 2015; Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog 2016) have 
investigated whether CSR truly enhances firm value by examining the underlying drivers at the 
firm and industry levels. Nevertheless, empirical evidence on the effect of CSR on firm financial 
performance is still equivocal at best (Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang 2008). 
Some studies argue that CSR investments boost firm financial performance (Jiao 2010; 
Edmans 2011; Deng et al. 2013; Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2014; Flammer 2015; Ferrell et al. 
2016) whereas others find CSR investments have the opposite effect on firm value (Mahoney and 
Thorne 2005; Frye, Nelling, and Webb 2006; Fabrizi, Mallin, and Michelon 2014; Becchetti et al. 
                                                          





2015). On one hand, proponents of CSR contend that moderate levels of CSR investment should 
enhance corporate financial performance and/or shareholder value through improved relationships 
with other key stakeholders or by CSR’s underlying hedging feature in the form of goodwill 
(Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria 2004; Heal 2005; Goss and Roberts 2011; Humphrey, Lee, and Shen 
2012). However, if excessive amounts of scarce resources are allocated to CSR activities, they 
could produce the opposite effect due to potential agency problems between managers and other 
parties whose interests are aligned with the company’s long-term performance. Specifically, CEOs 
could have an incentive to overinvest in irrelevant CSR activities for their own private benefits 
(e.g., raise their reputation as global citizens) or personal agenda (Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, 
Svaleryd, and Vlachos 2009; Borghesi, Houston, and Naranjo 2014; Kang and Han Kim 2017; 
Liu, McConnell, and Xu 2017). Consequently, CSR activities can potentially harm shareholder 
value in the long run. For example, Cronqvist et al. (2009) find that entrenched CEOs pay higher 
wages to workers than what would be optimal instead of distributing residual corporate cash flows 
back to shareholders. Therefore, whether CSR investments pay off remains a largely unresolved 
question that warrants investigation.  
Motivated by the studies of Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
that stress the importance of managerial fixed effects regarding firm investment decisions, a recent 
stream of research has emerged proposing that the success of CSR and its effects on corporate 
financial performance chiefly depend on CEO traits and behaviors. Employing the fixed effects 
model of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), Davidson, Dey, and Smith (2018) show that 
CEO fixed effects can explain approximately 63% of the variation in CSR performance, whereas 
firm and other unobserved fixed effects only account for less than 30%. In particular, this branch 




viewpoint, and managerial ability, on CSR (e.g., Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014; Tang, Qian, 
Chen, and Shen 2015; Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, and Hill 2016; Yuan, Tian, Lu, and Yu 2017). For 
instance, McCarthy, Oliver, and Song (2017) show that CEO overconfidence is negatively 
associated with the degree of CSR investment as measured by the ratings of Kinder, Lydenberg 
and Domini (KLD) because overconfident managers tend to underestimate firm risks and are less 
likely to use CSR as a goodwill hedging strategy. Nevertheless, the impact of CEO risk 
preferences, induced by the structure of compensation packages, on the nature of CSR decisions 
and the valuation effects of CSR remain largely unexplored, although recent empirical studies 
emphasize the importance of different CEO compensation packages on several corporate decisions 
(e.g., Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart 2012; Phan 2014; Caliskan and Doukas 2015). In this 
study, we therefore empirically investigate the valuation effects of CSR decisions by focusing on 
CEOs’ compensation contracts designed to influence their risk preferences. The balance of our 
study focuses on understanding whether the nature and valuation effects of CSR investment 
decisions are related to CEO risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation. 
Consistent with the previous literature arguing that risk-averse inducing compensation (i.e., 
high inside debt) motivates the undertaking of risk-averse decisions that increase the firm long-
term performance, we also expect CEOs with higher inside debt holdings to engage in socially 
responsible management practices that will ultimately add value to the firm. Because of the 
unfunded and unsecured nature of pensions and deferred compensation, a CEO whose 
compensation structure tilts toward such instruments is exposed to default risk akin to that faced 
by creditors. Therefore, a CEO with debt-like compensation is expected to display a higher level 
of risk aversion and pursue corporate decisions that enhance the long-term performance of the 




investing in research and development (R&D) and leveraging firm capital structure while 
motivating them to focus on operational hedging. Following this logic, we argue that CEOs with 
risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation—that is, CEOs with high (low) inside debt—are 
more (less) likely to be prudent in CSR spending. Specifically, CEOs with risk-averse (risk-
seeking) inducing compensation are more (less) likely to allocate funds to CSR investments that 
are beneficial to firm long-term performance in accord with shareholder expectations. Therefore, 
we predict that CSR investments decisions made by CEOs with risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing 
compensation are expected to be more (less) beneficial to firm value. 
We examine the valuation effect of CSR investments conditional on CEO risk-averse (risk-
seeking) inducing compensation on a sample of 843 CSR events announced by 155 U.S. listed 
companies (and/or 188 unique CEOs) from 2007 to 2015. Following previous studies, we gauge 
CEO risk aversion using the variables CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO 
relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. The results show that 
cumulative abnormal stock returns around CSR announcement dates are positively associated with 
the degree of CEO risk aversion inferred from CEO compensation contracts.16 Moreover, firms 
led by CEOs with risk-averse inducing compensation generate higher buy-and-hold abnormal 
stock returns after CSR announcements than their counterparts with risk-inducing compensation 
contracts. Consistent with the view that risk-averse (risk-seeking) CEOs are more cautious with 
CSR spending, we find that CEOs with risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation are less 
(more) likely to engage in CSR activities. In the additional analyses, using Bloomberg’s 
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure score, which measures a firm’s CSR 
                                                          
16 In a separate untabulated analysis, we also find similar results with respect to bondholder reactions. Specifically, 
CSR investments announced by CEOs with risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation yield higher (lower) 




disclosure quality, we find that CEOs with high (low) inside debt holdings are also more (less) 
transparent in terms of non-financial information disclosure.17 Furthermore, we document a 
positive relation between financial performance and ESG scores only for firms led by CEOs with 
risk-averse inducing compensation. Finally, our main results hold for a battery of robustness tests, 
such as omitted variable bias (i.e., CEO power and CSR categories), self-selection bias, and 
endogeneity concerns.  
Overall, our evidence demonstrates that CEO risk preferences, gauged through risk-averse 
(risk-seeking) inducing compensation, influence the nature of CSR activities and the impact CSR 
exerts on firm outcomes as documented through shareholder reactions to CSR announcements and 
firm long-term performance.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
presents the main hypothesis. Section 3 describes the research methodology. Sections 4 and 5 
report the main findings, additional tests, and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND MAIN HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
CSR and corporate financial performance 
Over the past 50 years, CSR has become widely accepted as “a multidimensional construct 
that encompasses the economic, legal, ethical and discretionary expectations that society has of 
organizations at a given point in time” (Carroll 1979, p. 500). It covers activities such as corporate 
philanthropy, cause-related marketing, minority support programs, and socially responsible 
employment, to name a few (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). Given its growing importance in 
practice to businesses, CSR has become an increasingly important research topic among 
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academics. Specifically, prior studies have investigated whether CSR truly enhances firm value by 
examining the underlying drivers at the firm and industry levels. 
According to stakeholder theory, a firm’s financial performance depends on not only 
explicit contracts, such those involving shareholder dividends or bondholder payments, but also 
implicit contracts, such as those concerning product quality and protection of the environment 
(Cornell and Shapiro 1987; Freeman 2010). When firms breach implicit contracts, stakeholders 
will convert those contracts into explicit claims (e.g., stricter regulations from government 
agencies). These explicit claims are generally costlier for firms to satisfy than their implicit 
counterparts. Since CSR activities are designed to fulfill implicit contracts, such as improving the 
community or society, firms with a stronger CSR reputation are believed to incur lower costs in 
conducting their operations and, accordingly, are expected to enjoy better financial performance 
(Cornell and Shapiro 1987). Consistent with this viewpoint, prior research has shown that CSR 
investments result in positive stock returns through enhanced productivity and analyst 
recommendations (Antunovich, Laster, and Mitnick 2000; Filbeck and Preece 2003). Using the 
KLD database, Jiao (2010) finds that stakeholders’ welfare score is positively associated with 
firms' Tobin’s Q. Other studies also show that firms engaging in CSR have easy access to external 
capital markets and face lower costs of equity, as well as lower costs of debt (El Ghoul, Guedhami, 
Kwok, and Mishra 2011; Goss and Roberts 2011). According to Edmans (2011), a value-weighted 
portfolio comprising firms with high employee satisfaction outperforms industry benchmarks by 
approximately 3.5% based on the annual four-factor alpha. In the context of mergers and 
acquisitions, Deng et al. (2013) document that high CSR acquirers, relative to low CSR acquirers, 
earn higher merger and acquisition announcement returns as well as positive long-term stock 




equity performance and in support of stakeholder theory. Thanks to increased transparency and 
enhanced stakeholder engagement, Cheng et al. (2014) also show that socially responsible firms 
face fewer capital constraints. Employing a regression discontinuity approach, Flammer (2015) 
reports a positive association between the adoption of "close call" CSR proposals and their 
announcement returns as well as firms' subsequent accounting performance (e.g., return on assets). 
A recent study by Ferrell et al. (2016) suggests a similar pattern at an international scale. 
Meanwhile, opponents of stakeholder theory believe that CSR investments are a source of 
expenses instead of value creation. Thus, investing in CSR is believed to divert a firm’s ability 
from conducting its core business activities that yield much better earnings for shareholders 
(Friedman 1970; Jensen and Meckling 1976; McWilliams and Siegel 2001). In line with this view, 
previous studies (Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin 2006; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014; Becchetti 
et al. 2015 among others) find that CSR investments are not associated with positive abnormal 
stock returns, implying that they fail to elicit positive market reactions. In particular, a meta-
analysis of 167 studies during the 1972–2007 period conducted by Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 
(2009) concludes that, although CSR is positively correlated with firm financial performance, the 
effect is rather small in terms of economic significance. Consistently, earlier work by Alexander 
and Buchholz (1978) finds that firms with higher CSR rankings as perceived by the respondents 
in their surveys did not outperform other firms in terms of stock returns. Even worse, Brammer et 
al. (2006) show that CSR investments, especially those related to employment, were negatively 
correlated with abnormal stock returns. Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) report similar effects of 
CSR on future stock performance and return on assets. According to Becchetti et al. (2015), the 
underpricing anomaly of high idiosyncratic volatility portfolios can also be explained by CSR. 




CSR scores, which is consistent with their argument that CSR reduces firm flexibility in addressing 
the negative productivity shocks associated with a decrease in stakeholder well-being. 
Collectively, the effect of CSR on firm financial performance documented in the literature 
is still considered ambiguous at best (Renneboog et al. 2008). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
that the effect of CSR on corporate financial performance might be non-monotonic and that not all 
CSR activities are detrimental to firm value (Barnea and Rubin 2010). On one hand, when the 
investment is at a moderate level, CSR should enhance corporate financial performance and/or 
shareholder value through improved relationships with other key stakeholders or through its 
hedging feature in the form of goodwill (Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria 2004; Heal 2005; Lee and 
Faff 2009; Humphrey et al. 2012). Consistent with this view, Smith and Stulz (1985) and Smith 
(2003) suggest that risk-hedging activities should benefit shareholders through violations of 
perfect market assumptions. If investors are generally unable to diversify the underlying risks 
associated with socially irresponsible firms, CSR investments should be beneficial to shareholders. 
On the other hand, if excessive amounts of scarce resources are allocated to CSR activities, they 
can produce the opposite valuation effect due to potential agency problems between managers' and 
shareholders’ interests. In particular, CEOs can have an incentive to overinvest in irrelevant CSR 
activities for their own private benefits (e.g., raising their reputation as global citizens) or personal 
agenda (Cronqvist et al. 2009; Borghesi et al. 2014; Kang and Han Kim 2017; Liu et al. 2017) at 
the expense of shareholder interests. Consequently, these activities can harm a firm’s social as well 
as financial performance in the long run. Hence, shareholder reactions to such CSR announcements 
are expected to elicit negative shareholder reaction. Despite the insights of the previous literature, 




deduced through risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation contracts remains largely 
unresolved and warrants investigation. 
CSR and managerial fixed effects 
Since Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003) stress the importance 
of managerial fixed effects regarding firm investment decisions, a recent stream of research has 
emerged proposing that the success of CSR and its effect on corporate financial performance 
chiefly depend on CEO traits and behaviors. Employing the fixed effect model of Abowd et al. 
(1999), Davidson et al. (2018) show that CEO fixed effects can explain approximately 63% of the 
variation in CSR performance, whereas firm and other unobserved fixed effects only account for 
less than 30% of such variation. In addition, their study shows that CEO materialism (significant 
ownership of luxury goods) is negatively associated with firm social performance in terms of KLD 
scores. More importantly, empirical findings of their research show that higher KLD scores are 
significantly associated with higher accounting profits only in firms run by frugal CEOs, whereas 
such an effect is nonsignificant in firms run by materialistic CEOs. 
This branch of literature has also examined the potential influences of other CEO 
characteristics on CSR. For instance, CEOs with a rich career experience or a bachelor’s degree in 
the humanities and female CEOs tend to improve firm social performance (Manner 2010). 
Furthermore, Tang et al. (2015) argue that hubristic CEOs are likely to overestimate their problem-
solving skills while underestimating the essential role of stakeholders in providing resources and 
support to the firm’s operation. Consequently, these managers are less likely to engage in socially 
responsible activities and more likely to engage in socially irresponsible ones. These authors find 
empirical support for their theoretical predictions in a longitudinal dataset of Standard & Poor’s 




measure of CEO narcissism, Petrenko et al. (2016) document that firms run by narcissistic CEOs 
tend to have higher profiles in corporate philanthropy, a major form of CSR, than their 
counterparts. In addition, the positive relation between CSR and firm performance is negatively 
moderated by CEO narcissism. Using a newly proposed measure of managerial ability estimated 
by data envelopment analysis (Demerjian, Lev, and McVay 2012), Yuan et al. (2017) demonstrate 
that firms with more capable CEOs are likely to engage in socially responsible activities that 
ultimately enhance firm social performance. 
CSR and CEO risk preferences 
Nevertheless, the impact on CSR of CEO risk aversion resulting from risk-averse inducing 
compensation contracts remains largely unexplored, although recent empirical studies emphasize 
the importance of CEO inside debt compensation in other corporate decisions (Cassell et al. 2012; 
Phan 2014; Caliskan and Doukas 2015). Previous literature suggests that inside debt holdings 
(compensation) motivate CEOs to be risk averse and to hold a long-term view of the firm’s 
financial performance (Sundaram and Yermack 2007; Edmans and Liu 2011; Wei and Yermack 
2011). Accordingly, risk-averse inducing compensation contracts are expected to motivate CEOs 
to engage in more socially responsible management practices to increase firm social performance 
and ultimately add value to the firm than compensation contracts designed to motivate the 
undertaking of riskier decisions. Specifically, because of the unfunded and unsecured nature of 
pension and deferred compensation, CEOs with high inside debt compensation contracts are 
exposed to default risk analogous to that faced by creditors. Hence, a CEO with high inside debt 
compensation is expected to display a higher level of risk aversion and to be motivated to focus 
on upholding the company’s long-term performance. Supporting this view, White (2012, p.2) 




the firm and their future pension benefits.” In addition, according to Cassell et al. (2012), debt-like 
compensation discourages CEOs from investing in R&D and leveraging firm capital structure 
while motivating  them to focus on operational hedging. 
Following this logic, we argue that managers with risk-averse inducing compensation are 
expected to be more selective in their CSR investments. They are particularly less likely to engage 
in CSR activities for their own personal agenda that could hurt the firm’s social performance and 
eventually dampen its future value. Rather, risk-averse CEOs are expected to invest in CSR 
initiatives that act as goodwill hedging instruments to enhance both the social and financial 
performance of the firms they manage. Thus, CEOs with high inside debt compensation are more 
likely to be perceived as hybrid stakeholders who strive for a compromise/balance in terms of CSR 
investments that benefit both equity investors and other stakeholder groups (Caliskan and Doukas 
2015). Therefore, we conjecture that shareholders react more positively to CSR investments 
initiated by high inside debt CEOs than to those initiated by low inside debt CEOs. In short, 
investors will consider inside debt holdings to distinguish between a CSR initiative that is 
trustworthy and beneficial to the firm’s long-term performance and its counterpart that does not. 
In short, the foregoing discussion leads to our main prediction that shareholders are expected to 




We utilize different secondary sources to derive the data for our sample. We collect CSR 
announcements from news releases from CSRwire (CSRwire.com), a leader in publishing CSR 




disclosures for a wide range of industries since 1999. In particular, its syndicated distribution has 
more than 87 million monthly views and reaches more than 200 countries and territories. 
Furthermore, we rely on CSRwire announcements instead of KLD ratings because the markets 
immediately utilize new information and, thus, investor reactions to CSR investment disclosures 
through CSRwire are more relevant than overall year-based KLD ratings. In addition, as mentioned 
by Krüger (2015), KLD newsletters can suffer from selective reporting bias, since KLD could 
intentionally focus on certain news that draws the public’s attention. 
When screening news releases, unlike previous research, we include only news related to 
firm CSR initiatives, that is, commitments to expend a certain amount of money or effort on CSR. 
Potential increases in money outflows or decreases in profitability caused by such CSR 
investments are expected to induce investors to re-evaluate firm prospects and thus elicit market 
reactions. For example, in 2013, 1,200 employees of Newell Rubbermaid Inc. spent hours building 
homes for low-income families. Even though their effort was not explicitly monetized, these 
employees could have increased production and thus profits for Newell Rubbermaid Inc. had these 
hours been used for production rather than CSR activities. Therefore, such news is included in our 
sample. On the other hand, we exclude from our analysis news about such events as awards and 
certifications that involve a firm’s achievements and not its future money outflows or expenses on 
CSR activities. To emphasize the magnitude of the dollar amount, we also include in our analysis 
a dummy variable for CSR financial commitment that takes the value of one if the disclosed value 
is greater than or equal to $200,000. Different thresholds, such as $500,000 and $1,000,000, still 
provide consistent results (not tabulated).  
 Further, we classify CSR initiatives into three categories, as mentioned in the previous 




(CSRwire 2016). Environmental concerns refer to activities that aim to protect an organism or an 
ecological community. This category also includes activities that help to satisfy a firm’s current 
needs without compromising resources for its future needs. An example of this is Walmart’s 
announced investments in renewable wind power in 2008. Corporate philanthropy activities refer 
to donations to charities, communities, and nonprofit organizations, such as Holland American 
Line’s donation of $25,000 to Seattle Children’s Hospital in 2015. Socially responsible investing 
initiatives are those that integrate personal values and societal concerns with investment decisions. 
For example, in 2011, Entergy Corporation committed $1 million to help the elderly and disabled 
cope with high utility bills. 
It should be noted that there are some other CSR categories identified in KLD ratings that 
have been used in prior research. Examples are corporate governance, diversity, and human rights 
(Krüger 2015). However, these relate to policy adjustments and generally do not involve efforts or 
monetary investments that could incur additional expenses to the firm. Hence, we do not consider 
such initiatives in our empirical analysis. Our CSR taxonomy is in line with the main categories 
identified as CSR drivers of market returns in the literature. Each of these three types is distinctly 
different from the other and they have therefore been investigated independently in prior research. 
Griffin and Sun (2013) focus exclusively on green investments when investigating stockholder 
reactions to CSR news. Similarly, Godfrey (2005) examines the relation between corporate 
philanthropy and shareholder wealth. To capture the potential effects of CSR characteristics, we 





Cumulative abnormal returns 
We use the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the five days around the 
announcement date (CAR[-2,+2]) to capture shareholder reactions to CSR investment 
announcements. We estimate the daily abnormal stock return using the three-factor model (Fama 
and French 1996).18 The corresponding inputs are the market risk premium, SMB, and HML, 
respectively: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) +  𝛾(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡) + 𝛿(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) + 𝑖,𝑡 
Daily stock prices are extracted directly from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database. We calculate the coefficient estimates of each factor, using the estimation period 
from t = -315 to t = -15 relative to the CSR announcement date of each firm in the sample. 
Changing the estimation period (e.g., t = -220 to t = -20) does not affect the overall results of our 
study. The daily abnormal return is simply the difference between the actual return and the return 
predicted by the three-factor model. 
CEO risk preferences and other control variables 
Regarding CEO risk preferences, we use several proxies that have been used in previous 
studies. A manager is identified as more risk averse if he or she experiences a higher level of 
relative leverage or relative incentive (Edmans and Liu 2011; Wei and Yermack 2011). 
Specifically, CEO relative leverage equals the natural logarithm of CEO inside debt divided by 
CEO inside equity scaled by firm leverage, while CEO relative incentive is the natural logarithm 
of the ratio of the change in CEO inside debt to the change of CEO inside equity scaled by the 
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change in firm leverage. In addition, we include the two dummies CEO relative leverage ≥ 1 and 
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, respectively. Alternatively, the literature also suggests the use of 
managers’ stock and option portfolios to infer their risk aversion (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
2006). Therefore, we use the natural log of CEO vega-to-delta ratio multiplied by CEO inside debt 
to inside equity in the multivariate analysis as another proxy for CEO risk preferences (Cassell et 
al. 2012). A higher (lower) value for CEO vega-to-delta ratio indicates a CEO is more (less) risk 
seeking. 
We also account for CEO, firm, and CSR characteristics in the multivariate analyses. CEO 
characteristics include the logarithmic transformations of the variables CEO age, CEO tenure, and 
CEO cash compensation. In one of our robustness tests, we investigate if our results are affected 
by CEO power or not. To examine the effect of CEO power, we use the following four proxies of 
CEO power used in the literature: CEO pay slice, CEO relative ownership, CEO relative tenure, 
and CEO duality (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 2011; Han, Nanda, and Silveri 2016). Regarding 
firm characteristics, we include the variables firm size, firm sales growth, firm market-to-book 
ratio, firm financial leverage, firm R&D expenses, and firm free cash flows in our regression 
specifications. To control for the potential effect of a firm making more than one announcement 
per year, we also use the dummy multiple announcements. In the robustness section, we also add 
the following binary variables for CSR characteristics: CSR financial commitment, CSR 
environmental concern, CSR corporate philanthropy, and CSR socially responsible investment. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to control for potential outliers 
(Cassell et al. 2012). All required items to compute these variables are drawn from the 






Because data on executive pensions and deferred compensations have been explicitly 
available since 2006, we first start with an initial sample of CSR events collected from CSRwire 
for the period June 30, 2007, to December 31, 2015. We retrieve 1,841 CSR news releases that 
match our definition of CSR initiatives. Of these events, 1,456 CSR investments were announced 
by U.S.-based companies with an available GVKEY identifier. We then merge this sample with 
the other data sources to extract firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and security price 
information. Companies with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes in the ranges 6000–
6999 and 4900–4999 are excluded due to their unique capital structure and different regulatory 
standards. Our final sample comprises 843 CSR events announced by 155 unique U.S. companies 
(or 188 unique CEOs) from 2007 to 2015. Table 2.1 reports the distribution of our CSR sample by 
year and by the 10 Fama–French industries 
 [Insert Table 2.1 about here] 
 According to Panel A of Table 2.1, most CSR events occurred between 2009 and 2013. 
Specifically, more than 23% and 18% of CSR announcements were made in 2010 and 2011, 
respectively. Regarding firm financial commitments, only 291 CSR events disclosed a monetary 
amount greater than $200,000. In addition, a significant number of CSR observations (568 CSR 
events) are corporate philanthropy related, whereas only 84 announcements are identified as firm 
socially responsible investments. The rest are investments related to environmental concerns. As 
reported in Panel B, the distribution of CSR initiatives illustrates that CSR is mostly related to the 
manufacturing, shops, and other Fama–French industries. For instance, almost 30% of the 
announcements are from the shops industry, with only 0.36% from the energy industry. 




Descriptive statistics are reported in Panel A of Table 2.2. The mean and standard deviation 
of CEO relative leverage are 0.7903 and 0.7159, respectively, while the mean and standard 
deviation of CEO relative incentive are 0.7448 and 0.6781, respectively. Furthermore, more than 
45% of the CSR-CEO sample is identified as risk averse based on the dummies CEO relative 
leverage ≥ 1 and CEO relative incentive ≥ 1. The average of CEO age and CEO tenure (in 
logarithmic form) are approximately 4.0245 and 1.5842, respectively. In addition, the average 
value of CEO cash compensation (i.e., salary plus bonus) after logarithmic transformation is 
around 7.1972. With respect to firm characteristics, the average value of firm size, that is, the 
natural logarithm of firm market capitalization, is 10.2562. Similar to Krüger’s (2015), our sample 
is skewed toward large firms. In addition, the mean of firm market-to-book ratio is 1.8357, 
indicating that the average firm in the sample is overvalued by the market. On average, the ratio 
of R&D spending to firm total assets after logarithmic transformation is 0.2956. The table also 
shows that average firm sales grow by more than 6% per year. The average firm in our sample can 
convert around 5.77% of its total assets into free cash flows. 
Although our sample size is smaller than that of Krüger (2015) due to the elimination of 
missing CEO compensation data, the two samples share comparable statistics for various firm 
variables. Around 77% of the events belong to firms making more than one announcement per 
year. In terms of CSR initiative events, the mean of financial commitment is 0.3452, which shows 
that almost 65.48% of the news releases do not publicize investment amounts greater than or equal 
to $200,000. Among the three CSR categories, CSR corporate philanthropy is more popular than 
the other two (i.e., CSR environmental concerns and CSR socially responsible investment) as 





CSR announcement cumulative abnormal returns and CEO risk preferences 
Univariate results of the cumulative abnormal stock returns of CSR investments for the 
five-day period around the announcement day (CAR[-2,+2]) are reported in Panel B of Table 2.2. 
The second column of Panel B shows the mean and standard deviation of CAR[-2,+2] for the full 
sample. The next four columns report the means and standard deviations of CAR[-2,+2] for the 
CEO relative leverage quartiles.19 For ease of interpretation, we define the first quartile (Q1) as 
the risk-seeking CEO group and the fourth quartile (Q4) as the risk-averse CEO group. The last 
column shows the results of the difference-in-means tests of CAR[-2,+2] between risk-averse 
CEOs (Q4) and risk-seeking CEOs (Q1). For the full sample, according to Panel B, short-term 
equity market reactions to CSR announcements are not statistically different from zero, which 
seems to indicate that CSR investment announcements do not generally have a significant effect 
on firm value. 
However, we find that CSR announcements associated with firms run by CEOs 
compensated with less inside debt (i.e., risk-seeking CEOs, in the bottom quartile) elicit negative 
stock market reactions (CAR[-2,+2] < 0). On the other hand, equity market reactions to the CSR 
announcements of firms managed by CEOs with high inside debt compensation (i.e., risk-averse 
CEOs, in the top quartile) are positive and statistically significant at 5%. Specifically, CSR 
investments for firms run by high inside debt CEOs are associated with a 0.35% shareholder gain, 
suggesting that CSR announcements by more risk-averse CEOs are viewed favorably by equity 
investors. In addition, the far-right column in Panel B of Table 2.2 shows that the cumulative 
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to classify risk-averse versus risk-seeking CEOs does not qualitatively change our overall findings. The results are 




abnormal stock returns of the top quartile (i.e., risk-averse CEOs) are significantly larger than 
those of the bottom quartile (i.e., risk-seeking CEOs) at the 5% level. Thus, the difference-in-
means tests show that equity market reactions support our hypothesis that posits that CSR activities 
carried out by CEOs compensated with inside debt are viewed by investors as more appropriate 
and more favorable in terms of improving the firm’s long-term prospects than the CSR investments 
of these CEOs’ risk-seeking counterparts (i.e., CEOs with low inside debt compensation). 
We continue to examine the impact of CEO risk preferences on market reactions to CSR 
announcements through multivariate regression analysis by controlling for other variables. The 
following table presents the results of empirical tests of the effect of CEO risk preferences on CSR 
cumulative abnormal returns using the following five proxies of CEO risk preferences: CEO 
relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, 
and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. Specifically, we employ the following cross-sectional ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression model with clustered standard errors at the firm level: 




The dependent variable is the short-term cumulative abnormal return (CAR[-2,+2]) in 
response to market reactions based on the five-day window around the announcement. All 
independent variables are lagged by one fiscal period relative to the CSR event dates. As shown 
in equation (1), the emphasis of our study is to assess the effect of CEO risk preferences on CSR 
cumulative abnormal returns. A significant positive value of β1 for the first four proxies (and a 
significant negative value for CEO vega-to-delta ratio) will indicate that investors generally react 
more (less) positively to CSR announcements made by CEOs with risk-averse (risk-seeking) 




motivate more risk-averse (risk-tolerant) management practices work as expected. Meanwhile, if 
the coefficient β1 is insignificant, it would imply that investors do not rely on CEO risk preferences 
to draw inferences about the credibility of CSR investments on the social and financial 
performance of the announcing firm. Alternatively, it would mean that CEO compensation 
contracts intended to encourage more risk-averse (risk-tolerant) management practices do not 
work. For brevity, we do not report the intercepts in the subsequent analysis. 
Table 2.3 reports regressions of CAR[-2,+2] estimated from the three-factor model on the 
five proxies of CEO risk preferences, respectively. Consistent with the univariate results, the 
multivariate findings provide additional support to our main prediction that equity investors react 
more positively to CSR investments pursued by CEOs with high inside debt compensation (more 
risk-averse CEOs) than those announced by low inside debt CEOs (more risk-tolerant CEOs). The 
coefficient estimates of the first four proxies are positive and statistically significant at either 5% 
or 1%. For instance, a one standard deviation surge in CEO relative leverage (i.e., CEOs with more 
risk aversion) is associated with an increase of 30 basis points in the shareholders’ short-term 
reaction to CSR announcements.20 Similarly, CSR announcements made by CEOs with a low value 
for vega-to-delta ratio (risk-averse CEOs) are associated with stronger shareholder reactions as 
measured by CAR[-2,+2] than those initiated by CEOs with a high value of vega-to-delta ratio 
(risk-seeking CEOs. The corresponding coefficient is also statistically significant at 10%. 
 [Insert Table 2.3 about here]  
With respect to the control variables, we observe a significant negative relation between 
R&D spending and cumulative abnormal stock returns. This piece of evidence suggests that 
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shareholders dislike CSR initiatives by firms with high R&D spending commitments because they 
view CSR investment decisions a misallocation of capital resources. 
Post-CSR long-term performance and CEO risk preferences 
If CEOs with risk-averse inducing compensation engage in CSR activities with the aim of 
improving firm long-term performance, we should also expect a positive relationship between 
CEO risk aversion and the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of the CSR announcing firm. 
Therefore, we re-estimate the baseline equation (1) by replacing the dependent variable with firm 
BHARs, estimated as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,1−125 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
125
𝑡=1




We compute the BHARs over the period of 125 trading days (approximately six months) 
after the announcement date.21 Table 2.4 reports the multivariate results of regressing six-month 
BHARs on the five proxies of CEO risk preferences. For brevity, we suppress the coefficients of 
the other control variables and report only the coefficients of the main independent variables. 
[Insert Table 2.4 about here] 
Consistent with our conjecture, we find that CSR investments announced by high inside 
debt CEOs (more risk-averse CEOs) that triggered positive and significant announcement market 
reactions are also associated with higher long-term firm performance, suggesting that shareholders 
did not overestimate the valuation effects of CSR announcements. Most importantly, this result 
demonstrates that CSR investment decisions under the helm of risk-averse CEOs improve firm’s 
long-term performance. All the coefficients of the first four proxies of CEO risk preferences are 
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consistently positive and significant (at 5%), indicating that the relation between risk aversion–
inducing CEO compensation contracts and value-increasing CSR investment decisions is robust. 
For instance, a one standard deviation increase in CEO relative leverage is associated with a 2.88% 
increase in the long-term market performance of the CSR announcing firm. Despite being negative, 
as expected, the coefficient of CEO vega-to-delta ratio is not statistically different from zero. 
Additionally, we find that CSR announcing firms with higher CEO cash compensation, smaller 
firm size, and higher firm sales growth seem to improve firm post-CSR announcement 
performance. 
As a robustness check, for each firm in the sample, we exclude consecutive CSR 
announcements within the 50-day period after the first announcement to mitigate the influence of 
firms with frequent CSR activities. This restriction ultimately reduces the sample size from 843 to 
528 observations. However, we still find similar results with respect to the effect of CEO risk-
averse inducing compensation on post-CSR long-term performance.22 In brief, the six-month 
BHAR analysis shows that shareholders are better off with CSR activities carried out by risk-
averse CEOs in the long run. These results suggest that the post-announcement improved BHARs 
of CSR announcing firms are also in line with shareholders’ short-term market reactions. Overall, 
the reported evidence so far demonstrates that CSR announcements by firms managed by CEOs 
with risk-averse inducing compensation contracts (i.e., high inside debt) are beneficial to 
shareholders not only in the short run but also in the long run. 
Propensity to engage in CSR and CEO risk preferences 
 On one hand, due to the unsecured and unfunded nature of pension and deferred 
compensation, high (low) inside debt CEOs are more (less) concerned with the firm’s long-term 
                                                          




survival and, thus, are willing to lower its overall risk. Thanks to the goodwill hedging feature of 
CSR discussed in the literature (e.g., Goss and Roberts 2011), CEOs with risk-averse (risk-
seeking) inducing compensation are expected to have more (fewer) incentives to engage in CSR 
investments. If this conjecture holds, we expect a positive relation between CEO risk-averse 
inducing compensation and firms’ propensity to invest in CSR. On the other hand, other studies 
(e.g., Servaes and Tamayo 2013; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014) suggest that CEOs with risk-
averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation contracts will be more (less) prudent in allocating 
resources to CSR activities, since they have greater (less) incentive to maintain the long-term 
performance of the companies they manage. In this case, CEOs with risk-averse inducing 
compensations, as opposed to CEOs with risk-inducing compensations, are not anticipated to 
exhibit higher CSR propensity unless these investments are truly beneficial to firm value. Based 
on these opposing views, the potential relation between CEO risk aversion and the propensity to 
engage in CSR is an empirical issue that warrants investigation. Therefore, we further investigate 
the probability of engaging in CSR investments for firms led by CEOs with different levels of risk-
averse inducing compensation contracts. 
For this empirical test, the sample of interest consists of firm–year observations with CEO 
information available from the ExecuComp database for the period from 2007 to 2015. By merging 
this sample with our CSR sample, we are able to determine whether a CEO with a given level of 
risk-averse inducing compensation will decide to engage in CSR investments in a particular year. 
The merged sample comprises 11,640 firm–year observations and the dependent variable is a 
dummy that takes a value of one if the company in a given year makes at least one CSR investment 
and zero otherwise. In particular, there are 404 firm–year observations that have at least one CSR 




CEO risk preferences, measured by CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO 
relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. In addition to the 
previous set of controls, we also account for industry and year fixed effects. 
[Insert Table 2.5 about here] 
 Table 2.5 reports the logistic regressions of the propensity to engage in CSR on CEO risk 
preferences while controlling for other CEO and firm characteristics. Across the five model 
specifications, we find empirical evidence that CEOs with higher inside debt (risk-averse CEOs) 
exhibit a lower, instead of higher, propensity to engage in CSR activities. Although the coefficient 
of CEO risk preferences in the second model is not statistically significant, it is still negative. 
Consistently, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of CEO vega-to-delta ratio also 
suggests that risk-seeking CEOs have a higher propensity to engage in CSR activities. Therefore, 
because risk-averse CEOs’ welfare is more aligned with their firms’ future fortunes, the empirical 
evidence shows that they do not have a strong incentive to excessively engage in CSR investments; 
they appear to be interested only in CSR investments that truly matter to their firms’ long-term 
performance. Jointly, the evidence in this section advocates that risk-reducing CEO compensation 
packages (e.g., high inside debt) tend to curb excessive CSR spending and/or the misallocation of 
corporate resources, whereas the opposite pattern is observed for CEOs with risk-inducing 
compensation contracts. 
CSR information disclosure and CEO risk preferences 
 The findings reported so far support our central argument that investors rely on the nature 
of CEO compensation contracts and, in particular, on CEO inside debt type that is designed to 
motivate risk-averse decision making to draw inferences about the credibility of CSR investments 




findings is that CEOs with risk-averse inducing compensation are likely to be more transparent 
than their counterparts with risk-seeking inducing compensation with respect to the degree to 
which CSR-related information is conveyed to the general public. Undoubtedly, greater disclosure 
can reduce the degree of information asymmetry between investors and corporate executives, 
which, in turn, should help investors to better assess the credibility of firms’ CSR decisions. 
Additionally, several empirical studies in the business literature show a significant relation 
between CSR disclosure and managerial characteristics. For instance, Jizi, Salama, Dixon, and 
Stratling (2014) find that powerful CEOs are associated with greater CSR disclosure. Therefore, 
in this section, we extend our empirical analysis by examining the potential connection between 
firm CSR disclosure and CEO risk preferences. From a theoretical standpoint, we expect CEOs 
with risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation to disclose more (less) CSR-related 
information to the markets.   
To address this issue, we measure CSR disclosure using firms’ ESG scores as covered and 
reported by Bloomberg. Specifically, this aggregate measure captures how well a company is 
evaluated in these three categories in terms of disclosure. In accordance with Bloomberg’s 
definition, ESG disclosure score is the firm’s weighted average of the environmental, social and 
governance scores. The ESG values range from 0.1 to 100, depending on the firm’s public 
disclosure in terms of CSR. The higher the ESG score, the better a company’s CSR disclosure 
transparency. For this empirical test, we first extract our ESG sample by merging the ExecuComp 
database with the Bloomberg database for the period from 2007 to 2015. The final sample size 
comprises 6,412 firm–year observations with complete information on all variables except CEO 
vega-to-delta ratio. In this analysis, we use two alternative proxies for CSR disclosure: the three-




year observation exhibits an increase in ESG score in the next period and zero otherwise. We also 
include the same set of control variables as in the previous tests and account for industry and year 
fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the firm level. For brevity, the coefficient estimates of 
the controls are omitted here.  
[Insert Table 2.6 about here] 
Table 2.6 shows the multivariate regression results of CSR information disclosure, based 
on the ESG disclosure score, on CEO risk preferences for the five proxies used in the previous 
tests. As shown in Panel A, the coefficient estimate of CEO relative leverage is 0.0736 and 
statistically significant at 1%. A similar pattern is observed with respect to the other proxies of 
CEO risk preferences. As expected, the coefficient estimate of CEO vega-to-delta ratio is negative 
and significant at conventional levels. This pattern, as reported in Panel B, holds even when the 
three-year average of the ESG score is used as the dependent variable. Hence, the positive 
(negative) and significant shareholder reaction to CSR announcements carried out by CEOs with 
risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation contracts, documented in Panel B of Table 2.2, 
is consistent with the higher (lower) credibility of the CSR information disclosure reported in 
Table 2.6. Overall, the evidence reported in Table 2.6 is consistent with our conjecture that CEO 
risk-averse inducing compensation is significantly and positively (negatively) related to the firm 
ESG disclosure measure, implying that risk-averse (risk-seeking) CEOs are more (less) likely to 
disclosure CSR-related information to the public to reduce information asymmetry and improve 
the credibility of their CSR investment decisions in the eyes of investors. 
CSR information disclosure, financial performance, and CEO risk preferences 
Empirical evidence has produced mixed results with respect to the relation between CSR 




Christensen, and Hughes 2004; Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari 2008; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, 
and Yang 2011; Clarkson, Fang, Li, and Richardson 2013; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang 2014; 
Plumlee, Brown, Hayes, and Marshall 2015). For example, Dhaliwal et al. (2014) report a negative 
relation between CSR information disclosure and the cost of equity capital based on an empirical 
analysis of 31 countries. Plumlee et al. (2015) find that voluntary environmental disclosure 
indicating a firm has done something good for the environment is not only negatively associated 
with the cost of equity capital, but also positively related to expected future cash flows. On the 
contrary, according to Richardson and Welker (2001), greater CSR disclosure is significantly 
associated with higher, instead of lower, costs of equity capital. In addition, other studies even 
document a nonsignificant relation (e.g., Clarkson et al. 2013) between CSR information 
disclosure and firm financial performance. Therefore, the lack of empirical consensus on the 
relation between CSR information disclosure and firm financial performance motivates this 
section. The documented inconsistency can be potentially explained through managerial risk 
preferences influenced by the design of CEO risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation 
contracts. 
Having documented thus far that firms led by CEOs with risk-averse inducing 
compensation are associated with CSR information disclosure, make better CSR investments in 
terms of market-based performance, and do not engage in excessive CSR investments, it can be 
reasonably argued that the mixed empirical evidence on the relation between CSR information 
disclosure and firm financial performance could be attributed to unexplored CEO risk preferences. 
To empirically address this conjecture, we regress firm financial performance on the firm ESG 




based on CEO relative leverage ≥ 1 and CEO relative incentive ≥ 1.23 In other words, we examine 
whether the relation between firm performance and CSR information disclosure varies with CEO 
compensation contracts intended to motivate risk-averse (risk-seeking) behavior. To capture firm 
performance, we use the three-year-average of the measures market-to-book ratio and return on 
equity.24 The main independent variable of interest is the firm ESG score reported by Bloomberg. 
We also include the same set of control variables used in previous tests and account for industry 
and year fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the firm level. For brevity, the coefficient 
estimates of the controls are omitted.  
[Insert Table 2.7 about here] 
 Across all regression specifications, as shown in Table 2.7, we find a positive relation 
between a firm’s financial performance and its ESG disclosure score. Consistent with our 
prediction, the positive association between firm financial performance and a firm’s ESG 
disclosure score is statistically significant (at least at 10%) only for the risk-averse CEO subsample 
(i.e., CEO relative leverage (incentive) ≥ 1), but not for the risk-seeking CEO subsample. That is, 
risk-averse inducing compensation contracts help strengthen the effect of CSR information 
disclosure on firm financial performance, while risk-seeking inducing compensation contracts do 
not appear to have any influence on firm financial performance. Jointly, these results show that 
the CEO’s degree of risk preference, based on risk-averse (risking) inducing compensation 
contracts, appears to influence the relation between firm performance and CSR information 
disclosure. Regarding the other controls, smaller firms with higher growth opportunities, higher 
                                                          
23 Using median splits based on CEO relative leverage and CEO relative incentive yields similar results. The analysis 
is not tabulated but available upon request. 





sales growth, higher R&D expenses, and more free cash flows are associated with better future 
financial performance. 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
CSR announcement returns conditional on different CSR type 
To ensure the robustness of our results, we examine whether market reactions to CSR 
investment announcements are sensitive to CSR characteristics.25 Specifically, we re-estimate the 
baseline OLS regressions, controlling for the three CSR categories, environmental concerns, 
corporate philanthropy, and socially responsible investing, respectively. For brevity, we suppress 
the coefficients of the other control variables and report the results in Table 2.8. Consistent with 
our previous evidence, these empirical results show that the firm CAR[-2,+2] conditional on CEO 
risk preferences remains intact, even after controlling for the three different types of CSR 
investments; that is, shareholder reactions to CSR investments per se are insensitive to all three 
CSR categories. The rest of the control variables remain consistent with the previous findings. 
Additional test results (not tabulated) also suggest that our results remain robust to whether firms 
explicitly disclose the monetary amounts they commit to CSR activities. 
[Insert Table 2.8 about here] 
CSR announcement returns conditional on CEO power 
In addition to the different categories of CSR investments, we also check the robustness of 
our main empirical findings controlling for CEO power. The rationale behind this test is that one 
could argue that the market reactions to CSR investments are driven by CEO power rather than 
CEO risk preferences. From a theoretical point of view, CEOs with more power are more likely to 
make decisions subject to greater conflicts of interest with shareholders. Therefore, they are 
                                                          
25 In untabulated test results, we also find that the post-CSR long-term performance of announcing firms is unaffected 




expected to react more negatively to CSR investments made by more powerful CEOs with 
discretionary influence. 
To test this conjecture, we regress the cumulative abnormal returns obtained from the three-
factor model (CAR[-2,+2]) on CEO risk preferences, CEO power, and the other control variables. 
The effect of CEO risk preferences is captured by using CEO relative leverage.26 We employ the 
following proxies of CEO power in our baseline OLS regressions previously used in the literature: 
CEO pay slice, CEO relative ownership, CEO relative tenure, and CEO duality. Specifically, CEO 
pay slice equals one if the ratio of CEO total compensation to that of the top five executives is 
greater than the industry median and zero otherwise, CEO relative ownership equals one if CEO 
stock ownership is above the industry median and zero otherwise CEO, relative tenure equals one 
if CEO tenure is above the industry median and zero otherwise, and CEO duality equals one if the 
CEO is also the chair of the company’s board of directors and zero otherwise. The results are 
reported in Table 2.9. 
[Insert Table 2.9 about here] 
Across all regression specifications, we find that the coefficients of CEO relative leverage 
are positive and strongly significant, whereas the influence of CEO power on CSR announcement 
returns is statistically nonsignificant. These findings indicate that our main empirical results on the 
relation between CEO risk preferences and CSR investments are not sensitive to CEO power. 
Self-selection bias test 
 Next we use Heckman’s (1976, 1979) two-step approach to address the potential self-
selection bias in our CSR sample. Specifically, we first run a probit regression of a firm’s 
                                                          
26 We find similar results when the other four proxies (CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO relative 




propensity to engage in CSR in a given year, similar to the model specification reported in Table 
2.5, and calculate the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). In the second step, we augment the OLS 
regressions of market short-term reactions (CAR[-2,+2]) and post-CSR long-term performance 
(six-month BHARs) on CEO risk preferences with the IMR. We expect the main empirical findings 
to hold with the inclusion of the IMR in the second step. Specifically, if the IMR’s coefficient is 
statistically insignificant, this would imply that our results are not sensitive to self-selection bias. 
In line with the main analysis, we perform this test using the five following proxies to gauge CEO 
risk preferences as before: CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative 
incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. The dependent variables are 
the cumulative abnormal returns for the five-day window around the CSR announcement (CAR[-
2,+2]) and firm post-CSR long-term performance (six-month BHARs). For brevity, the coefficient 
estimates of the controls are not reported. The results of Heckman’s test are reported in Table 2.10. 
Overall, the IMR’s coefficients in all the regression specifications are not statistically 
significant, suggesting that our sample is not sensitive to self-selection bias. More important, our 
main results remain robust, even after including the IMR in the regressions, since all the 
coefficients of CEO risk preferences remain statistically significant at either 10%, 5%, or 1%. 
[Insert Table 2.10 about here] 
Reverse causality test  
An issue that could raise concerns about the validity of our empirical results is reverse 
causality. Specifically, self-interested managers, who anticipate that the CSR activities they plan 
to choose will certainly benefit their firms in the long run, could demand greater risk-averse 
inducing compensation. This possibility could lead to endogeneity problems. To ensure that our 




are robust to possible reverse causality concerns, we follow previous studies and employ two-stage 
least squares models (Cassell et al. 2012; Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong 2013; Phan 2014). In 
the first stage, we run OLS regressions of CEO relative leverage, CEO relative incentive, and CEO 
vega-to-delta ratio on a group of potential instruments that are considered important determinants 
of CEO risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation. Specifically, we include CEO age, new 
CEO dummy, firm size, firm leverage, firm market-to-book ratio, firm cash flows from operation 
scaled by total assets, firm tax loss carry-forward scaled by total assets, maximum state tax rate 
on individual income, and the industry–year median CEO relative leverage (incentive) value (or 
CEO vega-to-delta ratio).27 
[Insert Table 2.11 about here] 
 Consistent with previous studies, we document that the first-stage F-statistic is greater than 
22 in all three models, suggesting rejection of the null hypothesis of weak instruments (Stock and 
Yogo 2005). According to Table 2.11, we also find that around 36.51%, 26.87%, and 36.09% of 
the variation in CEO relative leverage, CEO relative incentive, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio, 
respectively, in our sample can be explained by the above list of instrumental variables.28 For 
instance, the industry–year median and maximum state tax rates are positively (negatively) 
associated with CEO relative leverage and CEO relative incentive (CEO vega-to-delta ratio) and 
the effects are statistically significant at either 1% or 5%.  
In the second stage, we re-estimate our baseline equation (1) using the predicted values of 
CEO relative leverage, CEO relative incentive, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio, estimated from the 
                                                          
27 The maximum state tax rate on individual income is retrieved from http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/. These 
tax rates are calculated using the TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts 1993). 
28 Our sample size in this test is smaller because of missing values in the tax loss carryforward variable. Excluding 




first-stage regressions, as the independent variables. These results are reported in Table 2.12. 
[Insert Table 2.12 about here] 
Having addressed potential endogeneity concerns due to reverse causality, consistent with 
our previously documented results, we continue to find that equity holders endorse CSR 
announcements initiated by CEOs with risk-averse inducing compensation contracts. In the first 
three columns of Table 2.12, the coefficient estimates of the instrumented values (i.e., predicted 
values from the first-stage regressions) of CEO relative leverage and CEO relative incentive (and 
CEO vega-to-delta ratio) are positive (negative) and statistically significant at least at 5%. 
Similarly, as reported in the last three columns, our previously reported findings of post-CSR long-
term performance are not sensitive to potential reverse causality problems either. 
CONCLUSION 
The CSR literature remains inconclusive about the valuation effects of CSR investments. 
Motivated by previous studies that stress the importance of managerial fixed effects in corporate 
investment decisions, we posit that the impact of CSR investments on firm value could be related 
to CEO compensation contracts designed to induce risk averse (risk-seeking) behavior (decision 
making). Our evidence shows that CSR announcements made by firms run by CEOs with risk-
averse inducing compensation (i.e., high inside debt) contracts elicit strongly positive market 
reactions. That is, the strong and favorable reaction to announced CSR investments indicates that 
investors view CSR corporate decisions as value increasing when initiated by CEOs with risk-
averse inducing compensation contracts, whereas the opposite reaction is documented for CEOs 
with risk-seeking inducing (convex) compensation contracts. In addition, our evidence suggests 
that risk-averse inducing compensation motivates CEOs to allocate capital resources to CSR 




but also in the long-run. To put it differently, our results point out that CSR decisions made by 
high inside debt (or low vega-to-delta ratio) CEOs help increase and preserve firm value rather 
than enhance CEOs’ myopic self-interests at the expenses of shareholder value. Low inside debt 
(or high vega-to-delta ratio) CEOs, however, engage in more CSR investments that are consistently 
associated with negative announcement abnormal returns and lower post-CSR firm performance. 
Jointly, equity investors appear to strongly endorse CSR investments initiated by CEOs with risk-
averse inducing compensation contracts as value-increasing decisions, whereas they tend to reject 
CSR investments pursued by CEOs with risk-seeking inducing compensation. 
Our findings remain consistent in a battery of robustness checks, including additional CSR 
and CEO characteristics, self-selection bias, and endogeneity concerns. Additional analysis with 
respect to CSR information disclosure and firm performance shows that CEO risk-averse inducing 
compensation (i.e., high inside debt) ensures that CSR investment decisions are trustworthy and 
beneficial to firm value. In sum, our evidence highlights the role of different CEO compensation 
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Table 2.1 CSR announcement distribution by year during the 2007 – 2015 period 
This table reports the annual distribution of 843 CSR announcements made by 155 U.S. public firms (financial and utility firms are excluded) during the 2007 – 
2015 period. In panel A, the second and third columns show the annual number of and percentage of CSR announcements for the full sample. The next five columns 
show the number of events for each the five subcategories. Panel B reports the number of CSR announcements and the corresponding percentages across the 10 
Fama & French industries. Information about these announcements is manually collected from https://www.CSRwire.com. 
 
Panel A: CSR announcement distribution by year 














2007 40 4.74% 21 19 8 31 1 
2008 80 9.49% 36 44 15 64 1 
2009 87 10.32% 54 33 20 66 1 
2010 196 23.25% 116 80 43 143 10 
2011 159 18.86% 117 42 41 98 20 
2012 99 11.74% 76 23 21 55 23 
2013 92 10.91% 64 28 21 60 11 
2014 38 4.51% 29 9 10 21 7 
2015 52 6.17% 39 13 12 30 10 
Total 843 100.00% 552 291 191 568 84 
Panel B: CSR announcement distribution by Fama & French 10 industries 
Code Industry description       CSR events Percentage 
1 Consumer Non-Durables    81 9.61% 
2 Consumer Durables    12 1.42% 
3 Manufacturing    118 14.00% 
4 Energy    3 0.36% 
5 Business Equipment    95 11.27% 
6 Telecommunication    73 8.66% 
7 Shops    247 29.30% 
8 Health    58 6.88% 







Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
The table presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variables and the univariate analysis of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[-2,+2]) around the CSR 
announcements. The sample comprises 843 CSR events announced by U.S public firms from 2007 to 2015. Utilities and financial firms are excluded. Panel A 
shows the number of observations, means, standard deviations, the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. Panel B reports average shareholder reactions (as measured by 
CAR[-2,+2]) to CSR events for the full sample and the four quartiles based on CEO relative leverage. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside 
equity scaled by firm market leverage. The last column of panel B shows the difference-in-means test of CAR[-2,+2] between risk-averse and risk-seeking CEO 
groups. All related information to derive or estimate the variables are from the following databases: ExecuComp, CSRwire, CRSP, and Compustat. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% extreme. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 







25% 50% 75% 
CEO relative leverage 843 0.7903 0.7159 0.1565 0.6535 1.3081 
CEO relative leverage ≥ 1 843 0.4911 0.5002 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
CEO relative incentive 843 0.7448 0.6781 0.1460 0.5772 1.3282 
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1 843 0.4508 0.4979 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
CEO vega-to-delta ratio 707 1.0010 1.0329 0.3908 0.6805 1.3218 
CEO age 843 4.0245 0.0979 3.9512 4.0431 4.0943 
CEO tenure 843 1.5842 0.8244 1.0986 1.6094 2.1972 
CEO cash compensation 843 7.1972 0.4317 6.9745 7.1685 7.3406 
Firm size 843 10.2562 1.4469 9.3530 10.4247 11.3356 
Firm leverage 843 0.7734 1.1960 0.2613 0.4970 0.9066 
Firm market-to-book ratio 843 1.8357 0.7148 1.2977 1.6530 2.2144 
Firm sales growth 843 0.0632 0.1505 0.0007 0.0451 0.1048 
Firm R&D 843 0.2956 0.3235 0.0000 0.0000 0.6397 
Firm free cash flows 843 0.0577 0.1135 0.0062 0.0652 0.1192 
Multiple announcements 843 0.7722 0.4196 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
CSR financial commitment 843 0.3452 0.4757 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
CSR environmental concern 843 0.2266 0.4189 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CSR corporate philanthropy 843 0.6738 0.4691 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
CSR socially responsible investment 843 0.0996 0.2997 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 




Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q4 - Q1 
Risk-seeking 
CEOs 




Mean -0.0001 -0.0026 -0.0015 0.0001 0.0035** 0.0061** 




Table 2.3 CSR announcement cumulative abnormal returns and CEO risk preferences 
This table reports the regression analysis of firm CAR[-2,+2] on different proxies of CEO risk preferences including 
CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-
to-delta ratio. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside equity scaled by firm market leverage 
after logarithmic transformation. CEO relative incentive equals CEO inside debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled 
by the ratio of firm debt to change in firm equity after logarithmic transformation. CEO vega-to-delta ratio is CEO 
vega to CEO delta scaled by CEO debt-to-equity ratio after logarithmic transformation. All models include the 
constant term as well as other controls with firm clustered standard errors shown in parentheses. Continuous variables 
are winsorized at 1% extreme. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO relative leverage 0.0042***         
(0.0015) 
    
CEO relative leverage ≥ 1   0.0061**        
(0.0025) 
   
CEO relative incentive     0.0041***       
(0.0015) 
  
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1       0.0052**      
(0.0023) 
 
CEO vega-to-delta ratio         -0.0019*     
(0.0011) 
CEO age -0.0108 -0.0105 -0.0105 -0.0099 -0.0207 
(0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0145) 
CEO tenure 0.0007 0.0004 0.0007 0.0006 0.0014 
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0015) 
CEO cash compensation 0.0054 0.0060* 0.0053 0.0058* 0.0054 
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0036) 
Firm size -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0017 
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Firm leverage 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Firm market-to-book ratio 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0016 
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0022) 
Firm sales growth -0.0054 -0.0039 -0.0050 -0.0033 -0.0027 
(0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0059) 
Firm R&D -0.0108*** -0.0099*** -0.0105*** -0.0097** -0.0090** 
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
Firm free cash flows -0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0007 -0.0016 0.0095 
(0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0138) 
Multiple announcements 0.0032 0.0029 0.0031 0.0030 0.0041 
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
R2 (%) 2.60% 2.58% 2.51% 2.37% 2.20% 





Table 2.4 Post-CSR long-term performance and CEO risk preferences 
This table reports the regression analysis of six-month BHARs on CEO risk preferences. CEO risk preferences are 
captured using CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 
1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside equity scaled by firm 
market leverage after logarithmic transformation. CEO relative incentive equals CEO inside debt to change in CEO 
inside equity scaled by the ratio of firm debt to change in firm equity after logarithmic transformation. CEO vega-to-
delta ratio is CEO vega to CEO delta scaled by CEO debt-to-equity ratio after logarithmic transformation. All models 
include the constant term as well as other controls with firm clustered standard errors shown in parentheses. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% extreme. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO relative leverage 0.0290**         
(0.0116) 
    
CEO relative leverage ≥ 1   0.0415**        
(0.0180) 
   
CEO relative incentive     0.0277**       
(0.0118) 
  
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1       0.0350**      
(0.0177) 
 
CEO vega-to-delta ratio         -0.0080     
(0.0111) 
CEO age -0.0019 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0039 -0.1406 
(0.1057) (0.1041) (0.1067) (0.1049) (0.1138) 
CEO tenure 0.0015 -0.0005 0.0011 0.0003 0.0040 
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0167) 
CEO cash compensation 0.0459** 0.0497** 0.0454** 0.0483** 0.0644*** 
(0.0226) (0.0229) (0.0226) (0.0224) (0.0241) 
Firm size -0.0185** -0.0200** -0.0172* -0.0184** -0.0140 
(0.0093) (0.0095) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0119) 
Firm leverage 0.0050 0.0048 0.0049 0.0043 0.0032 
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0085) 
Firm market-to-book ratio 0.0019 0.0010 0.0028 0.0021 0.0252* 
(0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0140) 
Firm sales growth 0.0894* 0.0998* 0.0920* 0.1036** 0.1015* 
(0.0521) (0.0516) (0.0522) (0.0511) (0.0561) 
Firm R&D -0.0471 -0.0410 -0.0455 -0.0396 -0.0589* 
(0.0292) (0.0303) (0.0293) (0.0302) (0.0318) 
Firm free cash flows 0.1364 0.1312 0.1376 0.1316 0.1152 
(0.0884) (0.0897) (0.0878) (0.0886) (0.0978) 
Multiple announcements -0.0126 -0.0143 -0.0133 -0.0140 -0.0057 
(0.0203) (0.0201) (0.0203) (0.0201) (0.0222) 
R2 (%) 3.19% 3.16% 3.07% 2.92% 4.19% 





Table 2.5 Propensity to engage in CSR and CEO risk preferences 
This table reports the regression analysis of propensity to engage in CSR on CEO risk preferences. CEO risk 
preferences are captured using CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO 
relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside 
equity scaled by firm market leverage after logarithmic transformation. CEO relative incentive equals CEO inside 
debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled by the ratio of firm debt to change in firm equity after logarithmic 
transformation. CEO vega-to-delta ratio is CEO vega to CEO delta scaled by CEO debt-to-equity ratio after 
logarithmic transformation. All models include a constant term as well as other CEO and firm characteristics with 
standard errors shown in parentheses. The models also control for year and industry fixed effects; the latter is defined 
using two-digit SIC codes. All independent variables are lagged by one period. Continuous variables are winsorized 
at 1% extreme. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable 
Propensity to engage in CSR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO relative leverage -0.1637**         
(0.0776) 
    
CEO relative leverage ≥ 1   -0.1352        
(0.1270) 
   
CEO relative incentive     -0.1616**       
(0.0786) 
  
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1       -0.2571**      
(0.1269) 
 
CEO vega-to-delta ratio         0.1542**     
(0.0720) 
CEO age -0.6753 -0.7660 -0.6737 -0.6748 -0.6467 
(0.5696) (0.5698) (0.5699) (0.5704) (0.7526) 
CEO tenure -0.1136 -0.1046 -0.1120 -0.1107 0.0692 
(0.0755) (0.0756) (0.0755) (0.0755) (0.0988) 
CEO cash compensation 0.1814* 0.1759 0.1791* 0.1835* 0.1693 
(0.1070) (0.1076) (0.1070) (0.1073) (0.1717) 
Firm size 1.0243*** 1.0139*** 1.0195*** 1.0182*** 1.0915*** 
(0.0527) (0.0525) (0.0523) (0.0522) (0.0718) 
Firm leverage -0.0425 -0.0408 -0.0426 -0.0424 -0.0209 
(0.0338) (0.0339) (0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0490) 
Firm market-to-book ratio -0.3491*** -0.3665*** -0.3537*** -0.3628*** -0.2753*** 
(0.0863) (0.0862) (0.0863) (0.0861) (0.1061) 
Firm sales growth -1.1980*** -1.1783*** -1.1939*** -1.1974*** -1.0589** 
(0.4054) (0.4052) (0.4054) (0.4048) (0.5159) 
Firm R&D 0.3574 0.3447 0.3580 0.3702 -0.1221 
(0.3227) (0.3228) (0.3227) (0.3231) (0.4210) 
Firm free cash flows -0.4522 -0.4179 -0.4458 -0.4140 -1.7444** 
(0.5326) (0.5326) (0.5327) (0.5322) (0.6958) 
Pseudo R-Squared (%) 9.60% 9.58% 9.60% 9.60% 12.52% 




Table 2.6 CSR information disclosure and CEO risk preferences 
This table reports the regression analysis of CSR information disclosure on CEO risk preferences. CEO risk 
preferences are estimated using CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO 
relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside 
equity scaled by firm market leverage after logarithmic transformation. CEO relative incentive equals CEO inside 
debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled by the ratio of firm debt to change in firm equity after logarithmic 
transformation. CEO vega-to-delta ratio is CEO vega to CEO delta scaled by CEO debt-to-equity ratio after 
logarithmic transformation. In panel A, CSR information disclosure is captured using a dummy indicating the annual 
change in environmental, social, governance (ESG) score greater than zero. In panel B, CSR information disclosure 
is captured using the three-year average ESG performance in the next period. All models include a constant term as 
well as other CEO and firm characteristics. The models also control for year and industry fixed effects; the latter is 
defined using two-digit SIC codes. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% extreme. Clustered standard errors at 
the firm level are shown in parentheses. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used 
to denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable 
Panel A: ΔESG > 0  
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CEO relative leverage 0.0736**         
(0.0347) 
    
CEO relative leverage ≥ 1   0.1998***        
(0.0689) 
   
CEO relative incentive     0.0631*       
(0.0342) 
  
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1       0.1684**      
(0.0704) 
 
CEO vega-to-delta ratio         -0.0786*     
(0.0407) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-Squared (%) 13.45% 13.52% 13.44% 13.48% 12.70% 
Observations 6,412 6,412 6,412 6,412 3,657 
Variable 
Panel B: Three -year average ESG score of CSR disclosure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO relative leverage 0.0156         
(0.0098) 
    
CEO relative leverage ≥ 1   0.0574***        
(0.0195) 
   
CEO relative incentive     0.0126       
(0.0095) 
  
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1       0.0414**      
(0.0192) 
 
CEO vega-to-delta ratio         -0.0244**     
(0.0114) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 56.35% 56.51% 56.33% 56.41% 57.34% 









Table 2.7 CSR information disclosure and firm financial performance for CEOs with different risk preferences 
This table reports the regression analysis of firm financial performance on CSR information disclosure (ESG score) for CEOs with different risk preferences based on the CEO relative 
leverage ≥ 1, and CEO relative incentive ≥ 1. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside equity scaled by firm market leverage after logarithmic transformation. 
CEO relative incentive equals CEO inside debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled by the ratio of firm debt to change in firm equity after logarithmic transformation. In the first 
four models, the dependent variable is the three-year average market-to-book ratio. In the last four models, the dependent variable is the three-year average return on equity. All 
models include a constant term as well as other CEO and firm characteristics. The models also control for year and industry fixed effects; the latter is defined using two- digit SIC 
codes. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% extreme. Clustered standard errors at the firm level are shown in parentheses. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. 
***, **, and * are used to denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable 
Three-year average of market-to-book ratio   Three-year average of return on equity 
CEO relative 
leverage ≥ 1 
CEO relative 
leverage < 1 
  CEO relative 
incentive ≥ 1 
CEO relative 
incentive < 1 
 
CEO relative 
leverage ≥ 1 
CEO relative 
leverage < 1   
CEO relative 
incentive ≥ 1 
CEO relative 
incentive < 1 
1 2   3 4   5 6   7 8 












































































































































R2 (%) 79.25% 72.61%  79.10% 72.73%  13.23% 7.28%  14.70% 7.19% 




Table 2.8 CSR announcement cumulative abnormal returns conditional on different CSR types 
This table reports the regression analysis of firm CAR[-2,+2] on CEO risk preferences and CSR categories. CSR 
categories comprise CSR socially responsible investment, CSR corporate philanthropy, and CSR environmental 
concern (base category). CEO risk preferences are captured using CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, 
CEO relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. CEO relative leverage equals CEO 
inside debt to CEO inside equity scaled by firm market leverage after logarithmic transformation. CEO relative 
incentive equals CEO inside debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled by the ratio of firm debt to change in firm 
equity after logarithmic transformation. CEO vega-to-delta ratio is CEO vega to CEO delta scaled by CEO debt-to-
equity ratio after logarithmic transformation. All models also include a constant term (environmental concern) as well 
as other controls with firm clustered standard errors shown in parentheses. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% 
extreme. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote significance at 1%, 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO relative leverage 0.0042***         
(0.0015) 
    
CEO relative leverage ≥ 1   0.0061**        
(0.0025) 
   
CEO relative incentive     0.0041***       
(0.0015) 
  
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1       0.0053**      
(0.0023) 
 
CEO vega-to-delta ratio         -0.0020*     
(0.0012) 
CSR socially responsible investment 0.0025 0.0028 0.0026 0.0029 0.0021 
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0040) 
CSR corporate philanthropy 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0024) 
CSR environmental concern (base) 0.0146 0.0127 0.0121 0.0092 0.0578 
(0.0563) (0.0566) (0.0566) (0.0567) (0.0583) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 2.67% 2.66% 2.58% 2.46% 2.25% 




Table 2.9 CSR announcement cumulative abnormal returns conditional on CEO power 
This table reports the regression analysis of firm CAR[-2,+2] on CEO risk preferences and CEO power. CEO relative 
leverage is used to capture CEO risk preferences, which equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside equity scaled by firm 
market leverage after logarithmic transformation. The four proxies used to capture CEO power are CEO duality, CEO 
relative ownership, CEO pay slice, and CEO relative tenure. Specifically, CEO duality equals one if a CEO is also 
the chair of the company's board of directors, and zero otherwise. CEO relative ownership equals one if CEO stock 
ownership is above the industry median, and zero otherwise. CEO pay slice equals one if the ratio of CEO total 
compensation to the top five executives’ is greater than the industry median, and zero otherwise. CEO relative tenure 
equals one if CEO tenure is above the industry median, and zero otherwise. All models also include a constant term 
as well as other controls with standard errors clustered at the firm level shown in parentheses. Continuous variables 
are winsorized at 1% extreme. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CEO relative leverage 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0043*** 
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0015) 
CEO duality 0.0038       
(0.0025) 
   
CEO relative ownership   -0.0015      
(0.0023) 
  
CEO pay slice     0.0002     
(0.0023) 
 
CEO relative tenure       -0.0009    
(0.0031) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 2.91% 2.59% 2.60% 2.61% 





Table 2.10 Heckman tests for self-selection bias 
This table reports the regression analysis of firm CAR[-2,+2] and six-month BHARs on CEO risk preferences 
controlling for Heckman self-selection bias. In panel A, the dependent variable is firm CAR[-2,+2]. In panel B, the 
dependent variable is firm six-month BHARs. CEO risk preferences are captured using CEO relative leverage, CEO 
relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. CEO relative 
leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside equity scaled by firm market leverage after logarithmic transformation. 
CEO relative incentive equals CEO inside debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled by the ratio of firm debt to 
change in firm equity after logarithmic transformation. CEO vega-to-delta ratio is CEO vega to CEO delta scaled by 
CEO debt-to-equity ratio after logarithmic transformation. All models include the constant term as well as other 
controls with firm clustered standard errors shown in parentheses. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% extreme. 
Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable 
Panel A: CAR[-2,+2] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO relative leverage 0.0043***         
(0.0015) 
    
CEO relative leverage ≥ 1   0.0063**        
(0.0025) 
   
CEO relative incentive     0.0042***       
(0.0015) 
  
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1       0.0053**      
(0.0023) 
 
CEO vega-to-delta ratio         -0.0021*     
(0.0011) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.0190 0.0180 0.0188 0.0180 0.0202 
(0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0169) (0.0152) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 2.78% 2.75% 2.69% 2.53% 2.50% 
Observations 843 843 843 843 707 
Variable 
Panel B: Six-month BHARs 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CEO relative leverage 0.0297**         
(0.0118) 
    
CEO relative leverage ≥ 1   0.0430**        
(0.0182) 
   
CEO relative incentive     0.0286**       
(0.0119) 
  
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1       0.0356**      
(0.0179) 
 
CEO vega-to-delta ratio         -0.0089     
(0.0109) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.1429 0.1332 0.1420 0.1251 0.1002 
(0.1307) (0.1241) (0.1288) (0.1244) (0.1123) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 3.42% 3.35% 3.29% 3.09% 4.36% 





Table 2.11 Instrumental variable analysis: first-stage regressions 
This table reports the first-stage OLS regressions of CEO risk preferences on the following instruments including the 
industry medians and maximum tax rates on wages. The dependent variables are CEO relative leverage, CEO relative 
incentive, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio respectively. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside 
equity scaled by firm market leverage after logarithmic transformation. CEO relative incentive equals CEO inside 
debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled by the ratio of firm debt to change in firm equity after logarithmic 
transformation. CEO vega-to-delta ratio is CEO vega to CEO delta scaled by CEO debt-to-equity ratio after 
logarithmic transformation. In addition to their industry medians and maximum tax rates on wages, we control for 
CEO age, new CEO dummy, firm size, firm leverage, firm market-to-book ratio, firm cash flows from operations 
scaled by firm total assets, and firm tax loss carry forward scaled by firm total assets. All models include a constant 
term with standard errors shown in parentheses. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% extreme. Variable 










(1) (2) (3) 
Industry median of CEO relative leverage 0.6896***     
(0.0530) 
  
Industry median of CEO relative incentive   0.6241***    
(0.0600) 
 
Industry median of CEO vega-to-delta ratio     0.8469***   
(0.0663) 
Maximum state tax rate on income 0.0134** 0.0150** -0.0250** 
(0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0111) 
CEO age 0.3148 0.2787 -1.0125** 
(0.2130) (0.2222) (0.3990) 
New CEO -0.1692*** -0.1577** 0.4551*** 
(0.0633) (0.0660) (0.1103) 
Firm size 0.0599*** 0.0324* -0.1634*** 
(0.0160) (0.0166) (0.0271) 
Firm leverage -0.0439** -0.0418** -0.1005*** 
(0.0183) (0.0191) (0.0288) 
Firm market-to-book ratio 0.0723* 0.0532 -0.0513 
(0.0383) (0.0397) (0.0643) 
Firm cash flows from operation 1.7133*** 1.6009*** -0.2595 
(0.4813) (0.5014) (0.8282) 
Firm tax loss carry forward -0.0240 -0.0026 -1.8771*** 
(0.2335) (0.2433) (0.5139) 
F-statistics 37.54 22.98 30.50 
R2 (%) 37.51% 26.87% 36.09% 










Table 2.12 Instrumental variable analysis: second-stage regressions 
This table reports the second-stage OLS regressions of firm CAR[-2,+2] and six-month BHARs on the predicted values of CEO risk preferences generated from the 
first-stage OLS regressions including instrumented CEO relative leverage, instrumented CEO relative incentive, and instrumented CEO vega-to-delta ratio. All 
models include the constant term as well as other controls with standard errors shown in parentheses. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% extreme. Variable 
descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable 
CAR[-2,+2]   Six-month BHARs 
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Instrumented CEO relative leverage 0.0156***     
 
0.0636**     
(0.0044) 
   
(0.0303) 
  
Instrumented CEO relative incentive   0.0172***   
 
  0.0656*    
(0.0051) 
   
(0.0350) 
 
Instrumented CEO vega-to-delta ratio     -0.0056** 
 
    -0.0077   
(0.0028) 
   
(0.0179) 
CEO age -0.0111 -0.0105 -0.0234 
 
-0.0659 -0.0620 -0.0827 
(0.0138) (0.0140) (0.0175) 
 
(0.0954) (0.0954) (0.1118) 
CEO tenure 0.0007 0.0008 0.0006 
 
-0.0060 -0.0057 0.0009 
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0019) 
 
(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0120) 
CEO cash compensation 0.0047 0.0051 0.0046 
 
0.0671*** 0.0685*** 0.0827*** 
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0035) 
 
(0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0223) 
Firm size -0.0020* -0.0017 -0.0019 
 
-0.0319*** -0.0304*** -0.0292*** 
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013) 
 
(0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0086) 
Firm leverage 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0004 
 
0.0087 0.0089 0.0002 
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
 
(0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0078) 
Firm market-to-book ratio -0.0045* -0.0041* 0.0004 
 
0.0064 0.0092 0.0502*** 
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0023) 
 
(0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0150) 
Firm sales growth 0.0028 0.0039 -0.0006 
 
0.1032 0.1070 0.0940 
(0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0128) 
 
(0.0826) (0.0829) (0.0822) 
Firm R&D -0.0113*** -0.0106** -0.0098** 
 
-0.0484* -0.0454 -0.0563** 
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0044) 
 
(0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0279) 
Firm free cash flows 0.0000 0.0009 0.0079 
 
0.1320 0.1352 0.0059 
(0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0141) 
 
(0.0877) (0.0879) (0.0902) 
Multiple announcements 0.0006 0.0006 0.0016 
 
0.0090 0.0088 0.0128 
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0032) 
 
(0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0206) 
R2 (%) 3.88% 3.63% 2.09%  4.29% 4.14% 5.09% 
Observations 573 573 496  573 573 496 





ESSAY 3:  CEO MOBILITY AND ACQUISITIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have been and will likely remain the most visible and 
crucial form of corporate investments. Indeed, the Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and 
Alliances has documented that over 44,000 transactions have been initiated at the global scale, 
with a total market value of more than $4.5 trillion in 2015. Given the vital importance of corporate 
takeover activities, research scholars have investigated their potential antecedents. Although a 
significant number of large-sample M&A studies over the last three decades have identified a 
robust set of acquirer performance determinants, the overall variation in the returns to acquisition 
activity remains largely unexplained (e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004; Masulis, 
Wang, and Xie 2007; Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell 2012). For instance, despite 
employing an extensive list of determinants, a widely cited comprehensive study by Moeller et al. 
(2004) is able to explain just over 5% of the variation in acquirer returns (as judged by the adjusted 
R2 values of their main regression models). Similarly, other studies with smaller sample sizes have 
been able to explain only a small fraction of the variation in acquisition returns (Masulis et al. 
2007; Harford et al. 2012). More importantly, in contrast to the common belief that mergers fail to 
create value, anecdotal evidence from acquisitions carried out by firms such as Berkshire 
Hathaway, Cisco Systems, Diageo, General Electric, and IBM suggest persistent acquisition 
success. 
Motivated by the pioneering work of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) , a growing number of 
research studies aim to resolve the puzzle of M&A return variation by focusing on CEO fixed 
effects (Malmendier and Tate 2008; Goel and Thakor 2009; Yim 2013; Phan 2014; Croci and 




overconfident CEOs tend to undertake M&A activities that are detrimental to acquirer value and 
overpay the targets. Croci and Petmezas (2015) report a positive association between CEO risk-
inducing compensation (i.e., vega) and bidder announcement returns as well as the propensity to 
engage in acquisitions. Furthermore, Elnahas and Kim (2017) document a significant negative 
relation between conservative CEOs—captured by political ideology—and firm propensity to 
pursue M&As. Recently, Andreou, Doukas, Koursaros, and Louca (2019) show that value-
destroying corporate diversification decisions are associated with CEO overconfidence. 
Following this emerging stream of research, in this study we examine whether CEO 
mobility—the manager’s ability and willingness to change jobs in the presence of outside career 
options (Gao, Luo, and Tang 2015; Colak and Korkeamaki 2017) – can explain the return variation 
of M&A activities documented in the literature. Specifically, from a theoretical standpoint, CEO 
mobility can affect the outcomes of M&As in two ways. First, due to the nature of job hopping, 
more mobile CEOs are likely to possess diverse skills as well as experiences from different 
industries after each transition, which could be beneficial to the current acquiring firm (Song 1982; 
Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hambrick 2007). Indeed, CEOs with higher mobility are likely to 
obtain valuable experience in strategy formulation and execution as they switch firms over time. 
Therefore, more mobile CEOs are deemed better at making corporate decisions than less mobile 
CEOs. Consistent with this argument, for firms undergoing poor performance, Ryan and Wang 
(2012) show that more mobile CEOs increase shareholder value and improve operating 
performance after their appointment. In terms of M&As, Custódio and Metzger (2013) also find 
that CEOs with accumulated experience in the target industry are able to deliver better returns than 




higher-mobility CEOs are associated with riskier corporate policies that tend to increase firm 
equity value. 
Second, the potential costs in terms of human capital caused by job loss, in addition to 
limited external job opportunities, induce immobile or less mobile CEOs to behave more 
conservatively than what would be optimal for the shareholders of acquiring firms (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Gervais, Heaton, and Odean 2011). In other words, immobile or less mobile CEOs 
are more likely to be risk averse than mobile CEOs. This point of view is also consistent with 
organizational behavior and labor economics studies (Pissarides 1974; Harris and Weiss 1984; 
Nicholson and West 1988; Pfeifer 2008). Essentially, shareholders’ interests are more aligned with 
the interests of mobile CEOs because they are more willing to take risks and implement alternative 
strategies with uncertain outcomes (Ryan and Wang 2012; Colak and Korkeamaki 2017). In line 
with the second argument, several studies have also shown that shareholders do not prefer 
corporate decisions made by CEOs exhibiting risk-averse behavior. For example, Wei and 
Yermack (2011) find that the stock market generally reacts negatively to a higher level of inside 
debt (i.e., more risk-averse CEOs) disclosed in a company’s proxy statements. Phan (2014) records 
that M&A announcements made by CEOs with higher (lower) levels of inside debt (i.e., debt like 
compensation) elicit negative (positive) shareholder reactions. 
Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize that acquisitions by CEOs with higher 
(lower) mobility are more likely to be associated with higher (lower) shareholder gains and we 
then test this conjecture. We also investigate other important aspects of corporate takeover 
decisions by more (less) mobile CEOs, including acquirer post-M&A long-term performance, 
M&A decisions, payment considerations, and diversification strategies. To address these issues, 




possible mobility determinants suggested in the literature (Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Balsam and 
Miharjo 2007; Benson and Davidson III 2009; Garmaise 2011; Cremers and Grinstein 2013; Deng 
and Gao 2013; Eisfeldt and Kuhnen 2013; Serfling 2014; Dittmar and Duchin 2015; Gao et al. 
2015; Francis, Hasan, John, and Waisman 2016; Colak and Korkeamaki 2017). The higher the 
value of our mobility measures, the more likely a CEO is expected to switch jobs in a given year.  
Using a sample of 2,906 M&A announcements initiated by 1,085 unique U.S. public 
companies (or 1,444 unique CEOs) between 1994 and 2016, we find that acquisitions announced 
by highly mobile CEOs are associated with significant positive shareholder reactions. Acquirers 
managed by CEOs with higher mobility also tend to outperform those run by CEOs with lower 
mobility in the long run. In addition, we document a positive relation between CEO mobility and 
the propensity to engage in M&A activities. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Furfine and 
Rosen 2011), we find more mobile CEOs (i.e., exhibiting higher risk tolerance) use a higher 
percentage of cash in financing M&A transactions than immobile or less mobile CEOs. We do not 
find significant evidence with respect to the effect of CEO potential mobility on acquirers’ industry 
and/or international diversification strategies. Additional tests demonstrate that our overall 
findings are not sensitive to the inclusion of managerial ability or CEO risk-seeking inducing 
compensation. Finally, the results remain statistically significant after we correct for self-selection 
bias. 
The contribution of this study to the literature is threefold. First, we add to the literature by 
showing that CEO mobility, as a distinct managerial attribute (fixed effect), can help explain the 
puzzle of M&A return variation documented in previous M&A studies. Specifically, we find 
corporate takeover decisions made by CEOs with higher mobility increase shareholder value 




CEOs are capable of capitalizing roughly $18.05 million more than less mobile CEOs when 
engaging in M&As.  
Second, this study offers an alternative angle to the criticism of hiring and appointing job-
hopping executives. Some researchers argue that CEO potential mobility (e.g., with more outside 
career options) can be detrimental to the current firm because more mobile CEOs can be myopic, 
focus on their own interests, and ignore the firm’s long-term performance (Liu, Nanda, Onal, and 
Silveri 2018). However, consistent with other recent studies (Ryan and Wang 2012; Colak and 
Korkeamaki 2017), our findings suggest the opposite. Specifically, they imply that improving a 
manager’s potential mobility in the current firm (e.g., through lowering restrictions in severance 
packages) can also alleviate managerial conservatism and increase firm value. In addition, as 
suggested by recent anecdotal evidence, hiring a new CEO with a history of job hopping can be 
beneficial as well.29 
Third, this paper empirically polishes and validates recently proposed measures of CEO 
mobility that can potentially be used to address various research issues in the future. To name a 
few, researchers can investigate the potential effect of CEO mobility on corporate innovation. On 
one hand, given more available outside career options as well as greater willingness to switch jobs, 
more mobile CEOs might not see any need for innovation in the current firm. On the other hand, 
at the same time, CEOs with higher mobility, thanks to their higher risk tolerance, could be induced 
to innovate, because innovation is also considered risky and intangible yet can raise considerably 
a firm’s upside potential. Similarly, future studies can also examine the effects of CEO mobility 
on other important areas of corporate finance, including but not limited to dividend policies, capital 
structure, and cash holdings. 
                                                          
29 For more information on this discussion, see https://www.wsj.com/articles/job-hopping-executives-no-longer-pay-




The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the research 
methodology. Section 3 reports the empirical results of shareholder reactions to M&A decisions, 
acquirer post-M&A long-term performance, M&A decisions, payment considerations, and 
diversification strategies conditional on different levels of CEO mobility. Section 4 presents 
additional robustness checks for potential omitted variables bias and self-selection bias. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
METHODOLOGY 
Variable description 
Cumulative abnormal returns 
For each M&A deal, we follow the standard event study procedure to estimate acquirer 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement date. Following previous studies 
(e.g., Officer 2003; Acharya, Amihud, and Litov 2011), we compute acquirer CARs as the sum of 
daily abnormal returns estimated from the one-factor model (Sharpe 1964) for the seven-day 
window (i.e., from t = -3 to t = +3) around the announcement date:30  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) +  𝑖,𝑡 
The acquirers’ daily stock returns are obtained from the Center for Research in Securities 
Prices (CRSP). We calculate the coefficient estimate for the market risk premium using the 
estimation period from t = -211 to t = -11 relative to the M&A announcement date for each 
acquirer. The daily abnormal stock return (ARi,t or 𝑖,𝑡) is the difference between the actual return 
and the return predicted by the one-factor model. 
                                                          
30 The results are similar when we employ a four-factor model or different event windows (i.e., CAR[0,+1] or 




CEO mobility measures 
 We label CEO potential mobility as a CEO’s unobservable outside job options, as well as 
the CEO’s willingness and ability to exercise these options. Inspired by recent empirical work 
(Fracassi and Tate 2012; Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos 2013; Colak and Korkeamaki 2017), we 
employ principal component analysis (PCA) to estimate the first mobility measure. Specifically, 
CEO PCA mobility is the weighted average of the top five orthogonal principal components whose 
eigenvalues are greater than one, constructed from a comprehensive list of 14 possible mobility 
determinants. The literature, as discussed below, suggests that these variables relate to a CEO’s 
job hopping.31 The variable CEO age is an important factor, because older CEOs are less likely to 
change jobs voluntarily due to higher fixed costs to adapt to a new corporate environment (Serfling 
2014). The term CEO tenure—the number of years a CEO has been in the position—captures the 
possible effect that the longer an executive stays with a company, the less likely that executive is 
to switch jobs (Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Balsam and Miharjo 2007; Benson and Davidson III 
2009; Gao et al. 2015). The variable CEO duality could also be influential, since holding the CEO 
and chair titles at the same time could discourage an executive from changing firms (Serfling 
2014). If a manager is currently offered already high compensation relative to other options in the 
market, the manager might be less likely to switch (or would find it hard to switch) to another firm 
(Gao et al. 2015). Hence, it is reasonable to include CEO relative pay decile—the decile ranking 
assigned to a CEO based on the CEO’s total compensation relative to other CEOs—in the analysis. 
Similarly, we also control for CEO cash pay, the natural logarithm of the CEO’s salary plus bonus, 
and CEO equity pay, the ratio of the CEO’s equity compensation to total compensation (Balsam 
and Miharjo 2007). High relative performance (High RPE) indicates whether a firm already 
                                                          




outperforms others (based on either cash flows or returns on assets) in the same industry in a given 
year (Eisfeldt and Kuhnen 2013). The rationale for the inclusion of this factor is that, if a CEO 
already works for a better company relative to others in the industry, the CEO is less likely to 
switch jobs. Besides, Garmaise (2011) suggests that states with high non-competition 
enforceability (NCE index) could discourage a manager from moving to another firm. 
On the other hand, the more connections a CEO has with other firms, generally, the higher 
the probability and ease in switching jobs. We augment this potential effect using a dummy 
indicating if an executive has an interlocking membership (CEO interlocking) on the board of 
another firm. A greater number of firms in the same industry (or geographical region) also provide 
more opportunities for a CEO to switch jobs. These effects are captured using firms in industry 
and firms in same MSA (Deng and Gao 2013; Francis et al. 2016). Furthermore, the extent to which 
a manager wants to change jobs could be affected by the oligopolistic structure of a certain 
industry, which is estimated by the Herfindahl index based on sales (Cremers and Grinstein 2013; 
Deng and Gao 2013). As suggested by Cremers and Grinstein (2013), it should also be easier for 
an executive to switch to another company in the same industry if it has been the norm in the 
industry. We thus include the percent insider CEOs variable to account for the percentage of CEOs 
hired from within the same industry, which is extracted from Table 3 of Cremers and Grinstein 
(2013). Motivated by Ryan and Wang (2012) and Dittmar and Duchin (2015), we also add the 
variable past job moves—the number of times an executive has switched jobs prior to the current 





The second measure, CEO predicted mobility, is estimated as the predicted value of the 
following logistic regression: 
𝑃(𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑋) =  ∅(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽6𝑋6,𝑖,𝑡−1) 
where the dependent variable Switch jobsi,t takes a value of one if CEO i in year t is associated 
with a different firm than in year t – 1, and zero otherwise. The independent variables X1 to X6 are 
CEO specific and include CEO age, CEO tenure, relative pay decile, interlocking, percent insider 
CEOs, and past job moves. We also include industry and year fixed effects in estimating CEO 
predicted mobility. We standardize the values of CEO predicted mobility and CEO PCA mobility 
to make them comparable across different model specifications. In terms of interpretation, a higher 
value for CEO predicted mobility (or CEO PCA mobility) indicates that a CEO has more 
unobservable outside options, as well as greater willingness plus ability to switch to a better 
executive position. 
Thus far, in line with previous literature, we argue that highly mobile CEOs are assumed 
to gain more diverse skills and accumulate more experience from different industries after each 
transition in comparison to immobile or less mobile CEOs. In addition, more (less) mobile 
managers are expected to exhibit risk-taking (risk-averse) behavior. To justify these assumptions, 
we calculate a set of Pearson correlations between our proxies of CEO potential mobility and 
Demerjian, Lev, and McVay’s (2012) managerial ability index; Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos’s 
(2013) general ability index; and CEO risk attitudes (captured by a CEO’s vega-to-delta ratio). If 
our assumptions are reliable, CEO predicted mobility and CEO PCA mobility are expected to be 
significantly and positively correlated with the two ability indexes and the CEO vega-to-delta ratio. 
The evidence (significant at 1%) shows that the correlation coefficients are, respectively, 0.0197 




general ability index), and 0.1312 and 0.0579 (with respect to the CEO vega-to-delta ratio). 
Therefore, these correlation results suggest that our two CEO mobility measures gauge a 
considerable quantity of managers’ unobservable diverse skills, accumulated experience, and risk 
preferences. 
Control variables 
 In addition to the two proxies of CEO mobility, in line with previous studies (e.g., Doukas 
and Travlos 1988; Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh 2006; Yim 
2013), we also include the following set of control variables in the subsequent multivariate 
analyses. In terms of CEO characteristics, we control for CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO cash 
compensation scaled by total assets, and CEO duality, which indicates if the CEO is also the chair 
of the board. For firm characteristics, we use firm size, firm market-to-book, firm leverage, and 
firm return on assets. Specifically, firm size is the natural logarithm of the market value of assets, 
firm market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity, firm 
leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, and firm return on assets is the ratio of income 
before extraordinary items to total assets. Concerning deal characteristics, we control for the 
method of payment (i.e., 100% cash vs. 100% stock vs. mixed), public target, industry, and 
international diversifications. The variable 100% cash (100% stock) is a dummy equal to one if 
the whole transaction was paid with cash (stock), and zero otherwise. The variable public target 
equals one if a public target was acquired, and zero otherwise. The variable for industry 
(international) diversification takes a value of one if the target is not in the same two-digit SIC 
(country) as the acquirer, and zero otherwise. Additionally, we account for the effect of relative 




the acquirer’s market value of assets. A detailed description of these variables is provided in 
Appendix 3.1. 
Data collection and descriptive statistics 
Initially, we retrieve successful M&A deals of private and public targets announced by 
U.S. publicly listed firms with non-negative common equity between 1994 and 2016 from the 
Thomson One M&A database. To construct the final sample, following previous studies (Dong et 
al. 2006; Goel and Thakor 2009; Hasan, Kallberg, Liu, and Sun 2014; John, Knyazeva, and 
Knyazeva 2015), we impose the following restrictions. First, we exclude announcements made by 
acquirers with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes that range from 4900 to 4999 or from 
6000 to 6999. Second, an announcement is included in the final sample only if the transaction 
value exceeds $2 million and the transaction value scaled by the acquirer’s market value of assets 
is greater than or equal to 1%. This restriction ensures that our M&A sample only comprises 
successful announcements that are likely to have a tangible impact on the acquirers and their 
shareholders. 
We merge the M&A sample with the Compustat and CRSP databases to retrieve all the 
required items to estimate acquirer CARs, CEO mobility measures, and related control variables. 
The final sample consists of 2,906 M&A announcements by 1,085 unique companies (or 1,444 
unique CEOs). Panel A of Table 3.1 displays the M&A annual distribution of the sample. 
According to column (1), the number of M&As is spread out quite evenly across the sample period, 
except for the first year of the sample (1994). In addition, M&A activities reduced from 149 to 98 
completed deals during the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 but increased afterward. The 
next three columns report the numbers of M&As based on the method of payment, namely, 100% 




100% cash or a mixed form of payment, whereas only 205 acquisitions were paid with 100% stock. 
A good number of 100% stock-financed acquisitions occurred before 2001, but this method of 
payment became less popular after the tech bubble (Eckbo, Makaew, and Thorburn 2018). On the 
other hand, the use of 100% cash or other payment methods turns out to be more prevalent with 
time during our sample period. 
[Insert Table 3.1 about here] 
Regarding M&A characteristics, reported in Panel B of Table 3.1, around 45% of the 
acquisitions involve public targets. In addition, more than 32% of our M&A sample consists of 
industrially diversified deals, while roughly 20% represent foreign deals. Of the final sample, 
approximately 46% of the takeover deals are financed completely with cash, whereas only 7.05% 
are paid with stock. The average transaction value is around 9.74% of the acquirer’s market value 
of total assets. Comparable to previous M&A studies, the mean of the acquirer market value of 
assets after logarithmic transformation is 7.9375. The average acquirer in our sample has a market-
to-book ratio of 3.5811, a financial leverage of 0.1511, and typically yields 6.27% profitability in 
terms of return on assets. The means of the two proxies of CEO mobility are 0.0333, and -0.0089, 
respectively. In terms of the other CEO characteristics, roughly 55% of the acquisitions were 
consummated by CEOs who were also the chair of the board. The average CEO age in the sample 
is 54.65 years, that is, slightly lower than the median of 55 years, and has a tenure of more than 
seven years. Finally, average CEO cash compensation scaled by total assets is around 1.1241. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns and CEO mobility 
 In this section, we first examine the average acquirer’s short-term performance (i.e., 




method of payment. According to Panel A of Table 3.2, during the sample period, from 1994 to 
2016, successful M&A announcements are typically associated with positive announcement 
abnormal returns (around 0.41%). In addition, 100% cash M&A deals, on average, deliver 
significant short-term shareholder gains (around 0.87%), whereas 100% stock-financed 
acquisitions result in significant shareholder short-term losses (roughly -1.63%). With respect to 
M&As involving a mixture of payments, the average shareholder reactions are not statistically 
different from zero. Generally, the reported results are consistent with previous studies (Fuller, 
Netter, and Stegemoller 2002; Masulis et al. 2007; Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki 2011; Duchin 
and Schmidt 2013; Schmidt 2015). 
[Insert Table 3.2 about here] 
 Panel B of Table 3.2 shows the average acquirer short-term performance for different 
groups of CEOs based on their predicted mobility, CEO predicted mobility. Although equity 
investor reactions are positive for all three categories, they are not statistically significant for the 
bottom tercile (less mobile CEOs) or the middle tercile, suggesting that acquisitions by less mobile 
CEOs are not viewed by shareholders as value-increasing investments. On the other hand, takeover 
deals pursued by more mobile CEOs (top tercile) are associated with significantly positive 
shareholder gains (approximately 1.13%). More importantly, according to the difference-in-means 
test results, reported in the last column of Panel B, acquisitions consummated by more mobile 
CEOs yield considerably higher CARs (statistically significant at 1%) than those initiated by less 
mobile CEOs. Given that the median acquirer market capitalization is around $1.687 billion in our 
sample, during the seven-day window around the announcement, more mobile CEOs are able to 




activities.32 We also find consistent evidence, as reported in Panel C, when using CEO PCA 
mobility instead of CEO predicted mobility to partition the M&A sample. In summary, in line with 
our expectations, M&A decisions by high-mobility CEOs (with higher ability and more options to 
change jobs) are associated with significant and positive announcement returns. 
Next, we examine the equity market’s reactions to acquisition announcements carried out 
by CEOs with different levels of mobility, controlling for other effects. We employ ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors to test the effect of CEO 
mobility on acquirer CARs around the announcement date. The main dependent variable is the 
acquirers’ cumulative abnormal stock returns for the seven-day event window computed from the 
one-factor model. The key independent variables are the two measures of CEO mobility, that is, 
CEO predicted mobility and CEO PCA mobility. In addition, our research design controls for 
manager, firm, and deal characteristics, with CEO duality, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO 
compensation, firm size, firm leverage, firm market-to-book, firm return on assets, public target, 
industry (international) diversifications, 100% cash, 100% stock, and relative deal value. The 
baseline regression model of our study is  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑗 +  𝑖
𝑘
𝑗=1
         (1) 
According to our main conjecture, M&As consummated by CEOs with higher (lower) 
mobility are expected to be associated with higher (lower) shareholder gains. Therefore, the 
coefficient of CEO potential mobility (i.e., β1) in equation (1) is expected to be positive and 
statistically significant. Table 3.3 reports the OLS regression results. Across the two regression 
specifications, the coefficients of CEO mobility measures are positive and statistically significant 
                                                          
32 The sum of $18.05 million approximates the product of the median market capitalization ($1.687 billion) and the 




at conventional levels. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in 
CEO predicted mobility (CEO PCA mobility) is associated with an increase of around 52 basis 
points (63 basis points) in acquirer CAR[-3,+3].33 Consistent with the univariate results, the 
multivariate analysis lends additional support to our hypothesis that M&A decisions made by more 
mobile CEO are associated with better equity market reactions.34 
[Insert Table 3.3 about here] 
 With respect to the effects of other control variables, our multivariate regressions yield 
consistent coefficient estimates with those documented in previous studies (e.g., Doukas and 
Travlos 1988; Berger, Ofek, and Yermack 1997; Dong et al. 2006; Masulis et al. 2007; Phan 2014). 
Specifically, M&As initiated by CEOs awarded greater cash compensation (i.e., CEOs who are 
more entrenched) are associated with lower CARs. In addition, we find that bigger acquiring firms 
are associated with lower announcement abnormal returns. Deals paid 100% in stock are 
associated with negative and significant announcement returns. In terms of diversification effects, 
the coefficient of industry diversification across all different specifications is negative and 
statistically significant at 1%, suggesting that such M&A decisions destroy value. Although the 
coefficient of international diversification is also negative, it is statistically insignificant in all 
regression specifications. 
Acquirer post M&A long-term performance and CEO mobility 
 The evidence so far suggests that, in the context of M&As, more mobile CEOs outperform 
less mobile CEOs in terms of delivering short-term shareholder gains, since more mobile CEOs 
                                                          
33 The values 52 basis points and 63 basis points are the product of the coefficients and the variable’s standard deviation 
(i.e., 0.0057 * 0.9078 and 0.0065 * 0.9701). 
34 In a separate untabulated analysis, we also check the moderation effects of payment methods (100% cash vs. 100% 
stock vs. mixed) and industry diversification on the relation between CEO mobility and shareholder reactions to 





tend to undertake M&A decisions in line with shareholder preferences. Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to expect acquisitions by more mobile CEOs to continue to have better post-M&A long-
term performance than less mobile CEOs. To examine this conjecture, we conduct a set of 
multivariate regressions of acquirer post-M&A long-term performance on CEO mobility measures 
and other controls. We estimate acquirer post-M&A long-term performance using buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs), as follows. 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅[+1, +𝑇]𝑖 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1




where BHAR[+1, +T]i is the BHAR of acquirer i over the next T trading days after the 
announcement date. We examine acquirers’ long-term performance for the 24 months (T = 500 
trading days) after the acquisition announcement. Furthermore, Ri,t is the actual daily stock return 
of firm i and Rbenchmark,t is the daily benchmark return predicted by the one-factor model. Table 3.4 
reports the multivariate results for acquirer BHARs. 
[Insert Table 3.4 about here] 
 As shown in Table 3.4, the coefficients of CEO mobility measures are consistently positive 
and statistically significant at conventional levels across all models. For instance, a one standard 
deviation increase in CEO predicted mobility (reported in regression (1) of Table 3.4) translates 
into an increase of around 10.66% in acquirers’ BHARs realized over a two-year period.35 That is, 
acquirers led by more mobile CEOs seem to perform better in the long run than those managed by 
less mobile CEOs. Overall, consistent with our main conjecture, the empirical results based on 
short- and long-term market performance imply that corporate decisions made by CEOs with 
higher potential mobility are more aligned with shareholder interests.   
                                                          




Acquirer M&A decisions and CEO mobility 
 Prior studies (e.g., Furfine and Rosen 2011) suggest that M&A decisions largely depend 
on managers’ discretion and, on average, tend to increase acquirers’ default risk. This empirical 
pattern is further highlighted by Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2015) who find that CEOs have a 
tendency to preserve the power of making decisions with respect to M&As, as opposed to other 
corporate policies. The survey-based research conducted by Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013) also 
reveals that CEO characteristics, or, more specifically, CEO risk preferences, play important roles 
in corporate takeover activities. Utilizing CEOs’ ownership of private pilot licenses to capture their 
personal risk-taking preferences, Cain and McKeon (2016) find that risk-seeking CEOs are more 
likely to engage in M&A activities than risk-averse CEOs. Similarly, Croci and Petmezas (2015) 
report that CEOs with risk-inducing (convex) compensation (i.e., more risk seeking) are more 
likely to engage in acquisitions. Using CEO pension and deferred compensation to capture CEO 
risk aversion, Phan (2014) also documents that CEOs with lower relative leverage (i.e., more risk 
seeking) are more likely to pursue M&A activities. Therefore, we can infer that more mobile 
CEOs, who are expected to be more risk seeking, should exhibit a higher propensity to initiate 
acquisitions than immobile or less mobile CEOs, ceteris paribus. 
[Insert Table 3.5 about here] 
To test this conjecture, we adhere to the literature and implement the following procedures 
(e.g., Malmendier and Tate 2008; Yim 2013; Phan 2014). Specifically, we cross-check all firms in 
the ExecuComp database from 1994 to 2016 with the sample of M&A announcements to construct 
the dependent variable, a dummy that equals one if a firm has engaged in M&A activities in a 
certain year, and zero otherwise. We then perform logistic regressions of acquisition propensity 




effects. Based on the above discussion, we expect a positive coefficient estimate for CEO mobility. 
Table 3.5 documents the empirical results. Across the models in Table 3.5, as expected, the two 
coefficients of CEO mobility are found to be positive, implying that the more mobile a CEO is, 
the more likely the CEO is to engage in acquisitions. The evidence is statistically significant at 5% 
and 1%, as shown in columns (1) and (2) respectively. That is, more (less) mobile CEOs who 
exhibit risk-taking (risk-averse) behavior are more (less) likely to engage in corporate takeovers. 
Acquirer payment decisions and CEO mobility 
 According to Furfine and Rosen (2011), financing M&A transactions with cash tends to 
increase bidder risk because this sort of acquisition payment method indirectly substitutes bidders’ 
safer and more liquid assets (i.e., cash) with the target’s assets. Alternatively, financing M&As 
with stock provides bidders insurance in the sense that the potential gains and losses are co-shared 
with the targets. For these reasons, acquirers led by managers exhibiting risk-taking behavior 
should be more likely to facilitate takeover bids with cash, whereas acquirers controlled by risk-
averse and/or conservative CEOs should opt for other forms of payment (e.g., stocks). Consistent 
with this view, Phan (2014) reports that CEOs with higher levels of inside debt (i.e., more risk 
averse) tend to use less cash in their acquisition decisions than those with higher levels of inside 
debt (i.e., more risk seeking). In addition, according to Malmendier and Tate (2008), the use of 
cash implicitly suggests that managers tend to be more confident and have stronger belief in the 
synergy gains of a merger and its post-M&A performance. Therefore, we argue that more mobile 
CEOs, who have accumulated experience based on their past corporate decisions, are more likely 
to close a deal with cash than less mobile CEOs. 




Accordingly, we expect a positive relation between CEO mobility measures and the 
proportion of cash used in financing M&A transactions. To perform this test, following previous 
studies (e.g., Faccio and Masulis 2005; Fu and Tang 2016), we run a Tobit regression of the cash 
proportion used by the acquirers (bounded between 0% and 100%) on CEO mobility and other 
control variables. The dependent variable, cash proportion, is the percentage of deal value 
acquirers financed with cash. The findings are reported in Table 3.6. Consistent with our 
prediction, as shown in Table 3.6, the coefficients of the CEO mobility proxies are strongly 
positive (statistically significant at 5% and 1%) implying that CEOs with higher mobility tend to 
use more cash instead of stock to finance M&A transactions. In summary, CEO mobility is 
significantly related to acquirer payment decisions (cash vs. stock). 
Acquirer diversification decisions and CEO mobility 
 On one hand, the M&A literature documents that diversification can help lower bidders’ 
overall risk and uncertainty via the coinsurance effect with the target whose cash flows are 
imperfectly correlated (e.g., Levy and Sarnat 1970; Lewellen 1971). According to Amihud and 
Lev (1981), diversifying M&A activities even help elevate managers’ undiversifiable employment 
risk (i.e., their career concern). Prior theoretical work also suggests that entrenched managers 
concerned about losing their jobs, without outside alternatives (i.e., with lower job mobility), have 
an incentive to engage in diversification because such a strategy makes it costly for the firm to fire 
them (Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Aggarwal and Samwick 2003). Consistent with this view, Phan 
(2014) reports a significant and positive relation between CEO risk aversion (measured by inside 
debt compensation) and acquirers’ propensity to engage in industry diversification. In line with 
this tranche of research, less mobile or immobile CEOs, given their limited outside career options, 




On the other hand, due to the nature of job hopping, more mobile CEOs are likely to gain 
diverse skills and accumulate experience from different industries after each transition, which 
could be beneficial to the current firm (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hambrick 2007; Ryan and 
Wang 2012; Custódio and Metzger 2013). Accordingly, more mobile CEOs could also engage 
more in diversified M&A deals, especially across industries, since these M&As are thought to add 
value to the acquiring companies (Song 1982; Barbopoulos and Doukas 2018). Given these 
opposing effects, the potential relation between CEO mobility and the propensity to engage in 
diversifying acquisitions needs to be justified empirically. 
[Insert Table 3.7 about here] 
In this part of the analysis, we investigate how CEO mobility affects acquirers’ likelihood 
to acquire a target in a different two-digit SIC industry (i.e., industry diversification), as well as a 
target in a different country (i.e., international diversification). Therefore, we run two logistic 
regressions using industry diversification and international diversification as dependent variables, 
respectively. The empirical evidence is reported in Table 3.7. Regarding industry diversification, 
although the first two regression models show that the coefficients of CEO mobility measures are 
positive, suggesting more mobile CEOs are more likely to engage in diversifying M&A deals 
across different industries, the estimates are not statistically significant. Similarly, as shown in the 
last two columns of Table 3.6, the empirical results for international diversification are not 
statistically significant either. Therefore, we refrain from drawing any definitive conclusions for 
the effect of CEO mobility on acquirers’ propensity to engage in industry and international 
diversification. The results seem to suggest that both industrially and internationally diversifying 





Potential effects of managerial ability and CEO risk seeking inducing compensation 
 The reported correlations in the research methodology section suggest that the two CEO 
mobility measures capture a considerable quantity of managers’ unobservable diverse skills and 
accumulated experience as well as their risk preferences. Therefore, one could argue that the 
overall results of CEO mobility in our study could be confounded by the managers’ unobservable 
skills and risk preferences. To address this concern, in this section, we reexamine the 
aforementioned analyses by including the industry-year adjusted managerial ability index 
(Demerjian et al. 2012; Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and McVay 2012) and CEO vega-to-delta (Core 
and Guay 1999, 2002). 
[Insert Table 3.8 about here] 
If CEO predicted mobility and CEO PCA mobility are simply mirages of the CEO’s innate 
skills and risk preferences, the effects of the two mobility measures on M&A outcomes should 
dissipate when we include the proxies of skills and risk preferences (i.e., the managerial ability 
index and CEO vega-to-delta). Nonetheless, if our mobility measures convey more meaningful 
information than just the underlying skills and risk preferences (e.g., limited outside career 
options), the coefficients of CEO mobility will remain statistically significant. The empirical 
results are reported in Table 3.8. Across all model specifications, the effects of the CEO mobility 
measures remain positive and statistically significant at conventional levels, whereas the effects of 
the CEO vega-to-delta ratio and managerial ability are either marginally significant or 
insignificant. Hence, our overall results are robust to the inclusion of managerial ability and CEO 





 Following recent M&A studies (e.g., Phan 2014; Masulis and Simsir 2018), we utilize 
Heckman’s (1979) selection model to control for self-selection bias in our empirical analyses, 
because the decision to engage in M&As is not random and we can only observe shareholder 
reactions, acquirers’ post-M&A long-term performance, and payment considerations only for 
firms that decided to do so. First, we run a probit regression of a firm’s propensity to engage in an 
M&A in a given year, similar with the model specification reported in Table 3.5, and calculate the 
inverse Mills ratio (IMR), inverse Mills ratio. Second, we rerun the multivariate regressions of 
CAR[-3,+3], BHAR[+1,+500], and cash proportion used to finance M&A transactions on CEO 
mobility measures together with the augmented IMRs. 
[Insert Table 3.9 about here] 
If the IMR’s coefficient is statistically significant, inclusion of the IMR is necessary to 
control for self-selection bias. On the other hand, this would imply that our results are not sensitive 
to self-selection bias. More importantly, we expect the effects of CEO potential mobility to remain 
significant given the inclusion of the IMR. The results of the Heckman’s test, as reported in Table 
3.9, suggest our overall results are robust to self-selection bias, since the coefficients of CEO 
mobility measures remain statistically significant at conventional levels across all regression 
specifications. Specifically, we continue to observe that M&A decisions consummated by more 
mobile CEOs elicit higher CARs, lead to higher post-M&A long-term performance, and are 
financed with a higher percentage of cash than those made by less mobile CEOs. In sum, 






This paper explores the impact of acquirer CEOs’ mobility on the incidence and outcomes 
of takeover decisions. Our results provide strong support for the CEO mobility effect in 
acquisitions. Specifically, we find M&As consummated by more (less) mobile CEOs to be 
associated with higher (lower) short-term shareholder gains. In addition, we find acquiring 
companies led by CEOs with greater (lower) mobility to realize better (worse) post-M&A long-
term performance, exhibit a higher (lower) propensity to engage in value-increasing M&A 
activities, and tend to use cash (stock) to finance M&A transactions. Our findings are robust to 
omitted variable bias (e.g., managerial ability and risk seeking inducing compensation), and self-
selection bias. In summary, among different managerial characteristics, the findings of this study 
demonstrate that CEO mobility plays an important role in explaining the nature of M&A decisions 
and the variation of acquisition returns. More importantly, consistent with recent anecdotal 
evidence, this study also suggests that increased managerial mobility can lead to the undertaking 
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Table 3.1 M&A distribution by year and sample descriptive statistics 
Panel A of this table reports successful M&A announcements made by U.S. publicly listed firms annually during the 
1994 – 2016 period. The final sample comprises of 2,906 announcements. The four columns show the annual number 
of M&A announcement for the full sample as well as the three subsamples based on the method of payment. Panel B 
shows the descriptive statistics of the independent variables used in the main analysis. Column (5) to (7) report the 
number of observations, mean and standard deviation while the last three columns show the 25th, 50th and 75th 
percentiles. Appendix 3.1 provides the variables’ definitions. 
 










1994 28 5 14 9 
1995 87 19 42 26 
1996 137 34 48 55 
1997 120 21 45 54 
1998 136 29 45 62 
1999 139 25 47 67 
2000 120 16 50 54 
2001 93 11 33 49 
2002 103 7 36 60 
2003 118 5 55 58 
2004 138 8 59 71 
2005 149 4 75 70 
2006 131 2 72 57 
2007 149 2 83 64 
2008 120 0 65 55 
2009 98 4 38 56 
2010 156 1 81 74 
2011 178 3 96 79 
2012 165 0 89 76 
2013 130 4 77 49 
2014 146 2 79 65 
2015 154 1 69 84 
2016 111 2 44 65 
Total 2,906 205 1,342 1,359 














Public target 2,906 0.4542 0.4980 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Industry diversification 2,906 0.3235 0.4679 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
International diversification 2,906 0.2017 0.4013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
100% cash 2,906 0.4618 0.4986 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
100% stock 2,906 0.0705 0.2561 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Relative deal value 2,906 0.0974 0.1555 0.0226 0.0451 0.1012 
Firm size 2,906 7.9375 1.5192 6.8446 7.7786 8.8754 
Firm leverage 2,906 0.1511 0.1451 0.0051 0.1300 0.2459 
Firm market-to-book 2,906 3.5811 5.8819 1.7325 2.6073 3.9354 
Firm return on assets 2,906 0.0627 0.0766 0.0332 0.0622 0.0963 
CEO predicted mobility 2,906 0.0333 0.9078 -0.4866 -0.2274 0.2005 
CEO PCA mobility 2,906 -0.0089 0.9701 -0.7212 0.0466 0.6760 
CEO duality 2,906 0.5502 0.4976 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
CEO age 2,906 54.6493 7.7882 50.0000 55.0000 60.0000 
CEO tenure 2,906 7.3111 7.6535 2.0000 5.0000 10.0000 




Table 3.2 Univariate results of acquirer abnormal stock returns 
This table reports the univariate analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[-3,+3]) for different M&A 
samples from 1994 to 2016. The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[-3,+3]) are estimated using the one-factor model. 
The estimation period is from t = -211 to t = -11. Panel A reports the average CAR, its standard deviation, and the 
number of observations for the full sample, 100% cash, mixed, and 100% stock subsamples respectively. The first 
three columns in panel B shows similar statistics for the three different terciles of CEOs based on CEO predicted 
mobility, which is defined as the predicted value estimated from the logistic regression of switching position on 6 
related mobility determinants. The last column of panel B reports the difference-in-means test between the high and 
low mobility groups. Panel C shows similar statistics for the three different terciles of CEOs based on CEO PCA 
mobility, which is defined as the weighted average of the five factors based on their eigenvalues estimated from the 
PCA of all 14 related mobility determinants. ***, **, and * are used to indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Appendix 3.1 provides the other variables’ definitions. 
 
Panel A: Acquirer CARs for the full sample and the three subsamples based on method of payments 
Variable Full sample 100% Cash Mixed 100% Stock 
Mean 0.0041*** 0.0087*** 0.0026 -0.0163** 
Standard error 0.0015 0.0020 0.0023 0.0064 
Observations 2,906 1,342 1,359 205 





Middle tercile Top tercile 
(More mobile 
CEOs) 
Top - Bottom 
Mean 0.0007 0.0002 0.0113*** 0.0107*** 
Standard error 0.0025 0.0025 0.0026 0.0036 
Observations 968 969 969 N/A 





Middle tercile Top tercile 
(More mobile 
CEOs) 
Top - Bottom 
Mean -0.0015 0.0068*** 0.0068*** 0.0083** 
Standard error 0.0029 0.0025 0.0022 0.0036 





Table 3.3 Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns and CEO mobility 
This table reports the OLS results of regressing seven-day acquirer cumulative abnormal returns, CAR[-3,+3], on 
different measures of CEO mobility. CAR[-3,+3] is estimated using the one-factor model with the estimation period 
from t = -211 to t = -11 days to the announcement date. CEO predicted mobility is the predicted value estimated from 
the logistic regression of switching position on 6 related determinants of CEO mobility. CEO PCA mobility is the 
weighted average of the 5 factors based on their eigenvalues estimated from the PCA of all 14 related determinants of 
CEO mobility. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * are used to indicate 





CEO predicted mobility 0.0057***   
(0.0017) 
 
CEO PCA mobility   0.0065***  
(0.0022) 
CEO duality 0.0013 -0.0027 
(0.0032) (0.0034) 
CEO age 0.0004* 0.0001 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
CEO tenure 0.0002 -0.0001 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
CEO cash compensation -0.0039* -0.0047** 
(0.0023) (0.0023) 
Firm size -0.0056*** -0.0070*** 
(0.0015) (0.0016) 
Firm leverage 0.0193* 0.0106 
(0.0113) (0.0114) 
Firm market-to-book -0.0004 -0.0003 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Firm return on assets 0.0415* 0.0353 
(0.0250) (0.0248) 
Public target -0.0007 -0.0012 
(0.0037) (0.0037) 
Industry diversification -0.0099*** -0.0109*** 
(0.0031) (0.0031) 
International diversification -0.0023 -0.0025 
(0.0034) (0.0035) 
100% cash 0.0044 0.0051 
(0.0031) (0.0031) 
100% stock -0.0155** -0.0136** 
(0.0068) (0.0069) 
Relative deal value -0.0157 -0.0161 
(0.0172) (0.0172) 
Intercept 0.0306* 0.0654*** 
(0.0177) (0.0188) 
R2 2.28% 2.28% 





Table 3.4 Acquirer post M&A long-term performance and CEO mobility 
This table reports the OLS results of regressing two-year acquirer buy-and-hold abnormal returns, BHAR[+1,+500], 
on different measures of CEO mobility. BHAR[+1,+500] is estimated using the one-factor model with the estimation 
period from t = -211 to t = -11 days to the announcement date. CEO predicted mobility is the predicted value estimated 
from the logistic regression of switching position on 6 related determinants of CEO mobility. CEO PCA mobility is 
the weighted average of the 5 factors based on their eigenvalues estimated from the PCA of all 14 related determinants 
of CEO mobility. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * are used to 





CEO predicted mobility 0.1174***   
(0.0421) 
 
CEO PCA mobility   0.3160**  
(0.1363) 
CEO duality -0.0716 -0.2621 
(0.1707) (0.2028) 
CEO age 0.0117 0.0005 
(0.0147) (0.0163) 
CEO tenure -0.0033 -0.0100 
(0.0083) (0.0089) 
CEO cash compensation -0.2819*** -0.3141*** 
(0.0915) (0.0974) 
Firm size -0.1430 -0.2159 
(0.1354) (0.1593) 
Firm leverage 0.6174 0.1720 
(0.5772) (0.5283) 
Firm market-to-book -0.1467 -0.1410 
(0.1060) (0.1055) 
Firm return on assets 6.5690** 6.2468** 
(2.5956) (2.5639) 
Public target 0.3037 0.2775 
(0.2806) (0.2727) 
Industry diversification -0.1941 -0.2429 
(0.2244) (0.2350) 
International diversification -0.0246 -0.0223 
(0.1514) (0.1517) 
100% cash 0.1762 0.1973 
(0.1556) (0.1548) 
100% stock -1.4791 -1.3788 
(0.9770) (0.9475) 
Relative deal value -0.3220 -0.3422 
(0.4345) (0.4360) 
Intercept 0.1283 1.5897 
(1.5798) (1.9811) 
R2 5.43% 5.61% 






Table 3.5 Acquirer M&A decisions and CEO mobility 
This table reports the logistic regressions of acquirer M&A decisions on the measures of CEO mobility. The dependent 
variable (i.e., the decision to engage in M&A activities) is a dummy that takes a value of one if a firm decides to 
engage in M&As in a certain year, and zero otherwise. CEO predicted mobility is the predicted value estimated from 
the logistic regression of switching position on 6 related determinants of CEO mobility. CEO PCA mobility is the 
weighted average of the 5 factors based on their eigenvalues estimated from the PCA of all 14 related determinants of 
CEO mobility. All models also include year and industry fixed effects; the latter is defined using two-digit SIC codes. 
All independent variables are lagged by one period. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * are used to indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Appendix 3.1 





CEO predicted mobility 0.0683**   
(0.0343) 
 
CEO PCA mobility   0.1014***  
(0.0370) 
CEO duality -0.0253 -0.0854* 
(0.0468) (0.0515) 
CEO age -0.0079*** -0.0119*** 
(0.0029) (0.0029) 
CEO tenure 0.0000 -0.0029 
(0.0032) (0.0030) 
CEO cash compensation -0.0545*** -0.0667*** 
(0.0199) (0.0203) 
Firm size 0.0684*** 0.0469** 
(0.0190) (0.0213) 
Firm leverage -1.0573*** -1.1314*** 
(0.1600) (0.1616) 
Firm market-to-book -0.0017 -0.0017 
(0.0029) (0.0030) 
Firm return on assets 1.9461*** 1.9594*** 
(0.2682) (0.2669) 
Intercept -2.2995*** -1.8298*** 
(0.2373) (0.2552) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 6.78% 7.13% 






Table 3.6 Acquirer payment decisions and CEO mobility 
This table reports the Tobit regressions of acquirers’ use of cash in financing M&As (bounded between 0% and 100%) 
on the measures of CEO mobility. The dependent variable is the percentage of cash acquirers use to finance the 
takeover deals. CEO predicted mobility is the predicted value estimated from the logistic regression of switching 
position on 6 related determinants of CEO mobility. CEO PCA mobility is the weighted average of the 5 factors based 
on their eigenvalues estimated from the PCA of all 14 related determinants of CEO mobility. All models also include 
year and industry fixed effects; the latter is defined using two-digit SIC codes. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * are used to indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 





CEO predicted mobility 0.1345**   
(0.0641) 
 
CEO PCA mobility   0.1830***  
(0.0588) 
CEO duality 0.0873 -0.0203 
(0.0758) (0.0824) 
CEO age 0.0118** 0.0043 
(0.0049) (0.0048) 
CEO tenure -0.0018 -0.0084* 
(0.0049) (0.0045) 
CEO cash compensation -0.1332*** -0.1492*** 
(0.0361) (0.0364) 
Firm size -0.1458*** -0.1831*** 
(0.0326) (0.0355) 
Firm leverage 0.1132 -0.0294 
(0.2696) (0.2719) 
Firm market-to-book -0.0163** -0.0147** 
(0.0066) (0.0065) 
Firm return on assets 1.6261*** 1.5160*** 
(0.4745) (0.4713) 
Public target 0.0554 0.0423 
(0.0790) (0.0788) 
Industry diversification -0.3892*** -0.3923*** 
(0.0761) (0.0758) 
International diversification 0.6662*** 0.6628*** 
(0.1034) (0.1028) 
Relative deal value -2.2540*** -2.2743*** 
(0.2327) (0.2315) 
Intercept 3.9246*** 4.9314*** 
(0.7746) (0.8125) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
AIC 3,217.52 3,212.01 





Table 3.7 Acquirer diversification decisions and CEO mobility 
This table reports the logistic regressions of acquirer diversification decisions (i.e., either across industries or country 
borders) on the measures of CEO mobility. In the first (last) two columns, the dependent variable is a dummy that 
take a value of one if the target firm belongs to a different two-digit SIC group (country) from that of the acquirer, 
and zero otherwise. CEO predicted mobility is the predicted value estimated from the logistic regression of switching 
position on 6 related determinants of CEO mobility. CEO PCA mobility is the weighted average of the 5 factors based 
on their eigenvalues estimated from the PCA of all 14 related determinants of CEO mobility. All models also include 
year and industry fixed effects; the latter is defined using two-digit SIC codes. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * are used to indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Appendix 3.1 provides the other variables’ definitions. 
 
Variable 
Industry diversification   International diversification 
(1) (2)   (3) (4) 
CEO predicted mobility 0.0559   
 





CEO PCA mobility   0.0808 
 


















































































Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 21.86% 21.88%  12.84% 12.84% 






Table 3.8 Potential effects of managerial ability and CEO risk-seeking inducing compensation 
This table reports the multivariate analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns, post-M&A long-term 
performance, M&A decisions, and method of payments on the measures of CEO mobility controlling for managerial 
ability and CEO risk preferences. In column (1) and (2), the dependent variable is CAR[-3,+3] estimated using the 
one-factor model with the estimation period from t = -211 to t = -11 days to the announcement date. In column (3) 
and (4), the dependent variable is BHAR[+1,+500] estimated using the one-factor model with the estimation period 
from t = -211 to t = -11 days to the announcement date. In column (5) and (6), the dependent variable is a dummy that 
takes a value of one if a firm decides to engage in M&As in a certain year, and zero otherwise. In column (7) and (8), 
the dependent variable is the percentage of cash acquirers use to finance the takeover deals. CEO predicted mobility 
is the predicted value from the logistic regression of switching position on 6 related determinants of CEO mobility. 
CEO PCA mobility is the weighted average of the 5 factors based on their eigenvalues estimated from the PCA of all 
14 related determinants of CEO mobility. CEO vega-to-delta is the ratio of CEO vega to CEO delta. Managerial 
ability is the decile rank (by industry and year) of managerial efficiency estimated from Demerjian et al. (2012). Other 
control variables are suppressed for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, 




CAR[-3,+3]   BHAR[+1,+500] 
(1) (2)   (3) (4) 









CEO vega-to-delta -0.0013 -0.0014  0.0778 0.0734 
(0.0013) (0.0013)  (0.0615) (0.0605) 
Managerial ability -0.0069 -0.0051  -0.1394 -0.0427 
(0.0051) (0.0051)  (0.2264) (0.2021) 
Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2/Pseudo R2/AIC 2.38% 2.36%  5.47% 5.65% 
Observations 2,906 2,906   2,906 2,906 
Variable 
M&A decisions   Cash proportion 
(5) (6)   (7) (8) 









CEO vega-to-delta 0.0452* 0.0425*  0.0690* 0.0650 
(0.0232) (0.0231)  (0.0407) (0.0402) 
Managerial ability 0.0454 0.0648  -0.1720 -0.1186 
(0.0792) (0.0794)  (0.1260) (0.1276) 
Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2/Pseudo R2/AIC 6.83% 6.85%  3,217.16 3,212.84 










Table 3.9 Heckman tests for self-selection bias 
This table reports the multivariate analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns, post-M&A long-term performance, and method of payments on the measures 
of CEO mobility controlling for Heckman self-selection bias. In column (1) and (2), the dependent variable is CAR[-3,+3] estimated using the one-factor model 
with the estimation period from t = -211 to t = -11 days to the announcement date. In column (3) and (4), the dependent variable is BHAR[+1,+500] estimated using 
the one-factor model with the estimation period from t = -211 to t = -11 days to the announcement date. In column (5) and (6), the dependent variable is the 
percentage of cash acquirers use to finance the takeover deals. CEO predicted mobility is the predicted value from the logistic regression of switching position on 
6 related determinants of CEO mobility. CEO PCA mobility is the weighted average of the 5 factors based on their eigenvalues estimated from the PCA of all 14 
related determinants of CEO mobility. Other control variables are suppressed for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * are used to indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Appendix 3.1 provides the other variables’ definitions. 
 
Variable 
CAR[-3,+3]   BHAR[+1.+500]   Cash proportion 
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 













Inverse Mills ratio 0.0042** 0.0029  -0.2018*** -0.2792***  0.4077** 0.3781* 
(0.0018) (0.0018)  (0.0746) (0.0844)  (0.2034) (0.1982) 
Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2/Pseudo R2/AIC 2.45% 2.36%  5.53% 5.81%  3,215.14 3,210.24 













APPENDIX 1.1 ESSAY 1 VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
Variable Description 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size Log of (1 + Total Assets) 
Firm Financial Leverage (Current Debt + Long-term Debt)/(Total Equity) 
Firm Market to Book Ratio (Total Assets - Book Equity + Market Capitalization)/ (Total Assets) 
Deal Characteristics 
Relative Deal Value Deal value scaled by the acquirer’s total assets 
Friendly Deal Equals 1 if the acquisition was a friendly attempt, and 0 otherwise 
Public Target Equals 1 if a public target was acquired, and 0 otherwise 
Private Target Equals 1 if a private target was acquired, and 0 otherwise 
Pre-crisis Equals 1 if the announcement was made before 12/31/ 2007, and 0 otherwise 
During-crisis Equals 1 if the announcement was made after 12/31/2007 and before 06/30/2009, and 0 otherwise 
Post-crisis Equals 1 if the announcement was made after 06/30/2009, and 0 otherwise 
Stock Deal Equals 1 if at least 30% of the transaction was paid with the acquirers' stock, and 0 otherwise 
International Diversification Equals 1 if the target was a non-US company, and 0 otherwise 
Industrial Diversification Equals 1 if the target was not in the same industry as the acquirer based on 2-digit SIC, and 0 otherwise 
CEO Characteristics 
CEO Age Log of (CEO Age) 
CEO Compensation Log of (1 + Total Compensation) 
CEO Relative Leverage (CEO Debt to Equity)/(Firm Debt to Equity) 
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP) (CEO Pension to Equity)/(Firm Debt to Equity) 
CEO Relative Incentive (CEO Inside Debt/Change in CEO Equity)/(Firm Debt/Change in Firm Equity) 






APPENDIX 2.1 ESSAY 2 VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
 
Variable Description 
CEO relative leverage CEO inside debt to CEO inside equity scaled by firm market leverage 
after logarithm transformation 
CEO relative leverage ≥ 1 Equals one if CEO relative leverage is greater than or equal to one, and 
zero otherwise 
CEO relative incentive CEO inside debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled by the ratio of 
firm debt to change in firm equity after logarithm transformation 
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1 Equals one if CEO relative incentive is greater than or equal to one, and 
zero otherwise 
CEO vega-to-delta ratio CEO vega to CEO delta scaled by CEO debt-to-equity 
CEO age Natural logarithm of CEO age 
CEO tenure Natural logarithm of one plus the number of years the CEO has held the 
CEO position 
CEO cash compensation Natural logarithm of CEO salary plus bonus 
CEO duality Equals one if the CEO is also the chair of the company's board of 
directors, and zero otherwise 
CEO relative ownership Equals one if the CEO's stock ownership is above the industry median, 
and zero otherwise 
CEO pay slice Equals one if the ratio of the CEO's total compensation to the top five 
executives' is greater than the industry median, and zero otherwise 
CEO relative tenure Equals one if the CEO's tenure is above the industry median, and zero 
otherwise 
Firm size Natural logarithm of firm market capitalization 
Firm leverage Long-term debt to total equity 
Firm market-to-book ratio Market value of assets to book value of assets 
Firm sales growth Percentage change in sales from the previous period to the current 
period 
Firm R&D Firm R&D expense to firm total assets after logarithm transformation 
Firm free cash flows Ratio of earnings before depreciation and amortization minus the 
change in working capital and capital expenditures to firm total assets 
Multiple announcements Equals one if the firm announces more than one CSR event in a year, 
and zero otherwise 
CSR financial commitment Equals one if the firm explicitly discloses the invested amount of money 
is greater than $200,000, and zero otherwise 
CSR environmental concern Equals one if the announcement is an environmental - related event, and 
zero otherwise 
CSR corporate philanthropy Equals one if the announcement is a corporate philanthropy event, and 
zero otherwise 
CSR socially responsible investment Equals one if the announcement is a socially responsible investment, 




APPENDIX 3.1 ESSAY 3 VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
 
Variable Description 
Deal & Firm Characteristics 
Public status Equals 1 if a public target was acquired, and 0 otherwise 
Industry diversification Equals 1 if the target was not in the same industry as the acquirer based on 
two-digit SIC, and 0 otherwise 
International diversification Equals 1 if the target was a non-US company, and 0 otherwise 
100% cash Equals 1 if the whole transaction was paid with cash, and 0 otherwise  
100% stock Equals 1 if the whole transaction was paid with stock, and 0 otherwise 
Relative deal value Deal value scaled by the acquirer’s market value of assets 
Firm size Natural logarithm of market value of assets 
Firm leverage Ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
Firm market-to-book-ratio Ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity 
Firm return on assets Ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets 
CEO Characteristics 
CEO predicted mobility The predicted value estimated from the logistic regression of switching 
position on 6 related mobility determinants 
CEO PCA mobility The weighted average of the five factors based on their eigenvalues estimated 
from the PCA of all 14 related mobility determinants 
CEO duality Equals 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board, and 0 otherwise 
CEO age Age of the CEO in years 
CEO tenure Tenure of the CEO in years 
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